

Women, children, animals, geniuses, are all commonly credited with "intuition". The word is in everyday use, and accepted without discussion.

But what is Intuition? Who has defined it? Is there such a faculty?

Miss Wild looks into contexts that have the authority of great names or of accepted usage to see whether or not the idea behind the word can be deduced. If she does not settle the question, she shows the problem with a new clarity, the possible answers, and a way by which, perhaps, the right answer may at last be found.

INTUITION

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INTUITION

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To

MY MOTHER

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PREFACE

MANY subjects of deep philosophic import are treated of in this small volume, on none of which am I an authority. I feel that I may with justice be condemned as a "Jack of all Trades". Nevertheless I beg the patience and toleration of scholars whose studies have been more profound than mine, since no one who was unwilling to be a "Jack" could cultivate "Intuition", a plant of confused and intricate growth which has wound its tendrils round many noble trees and mingled its roots with those of the brightest flowers and most ineradicable weeds in the philosopher's garden. In philosophy, as in gardening and medicine, the work of the general practitioner must come before that of the specialist.

Mr Ffloyd Watson and Miss Eileen Ordish have done me a great kindness in correcting the proofs.

K. W. W.

February, 1938

INTRODUCTION

IT is a characteristic of modern philosophers to set a kind of preliminary value on the ideas accepted without question by the ordinary man and woman. They are inclined to pay special attention and respect to traditional beliefs, both those which control action and those which have become embedded in the language; and they will attach extra importance to any phenomena that at first sight appear extraordinary or abnormal. So one finds Lord Balfour in his Gifford Lectures using as a supplementary if not a primary argument the fact of man's "common feelings and beliefs"; Mr Bertrand Russell appeals to, or at least vindicates, the views on perception more or less unconsciously held by the man in the street; Professor Alexander in *Time, Space and Deity* justifies man's faith in Deity; and Henri Bergson uses man's conviction of Free Will, if not quite as an argument in itself, at least as a support to his arguments.

However doubtful the value of such an appeal may be if unsupported by more conclusive reasonings, however contrary to the spirit of science, and however lacking in the power to convince the scientist or the philosopher, the fact that it is even uttered seems to point to a marked change in the attitude of the twentieth-century thinker from that of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth, a distinct decline of confidence in the power, and even adequacy, of reason, a groping after some other more convincing and more certain method of approaching the problem of reality.

Such a method, real or imagined, is intuition. And intuition has the support of a popular following; at least of man's lip-service. One hears of woman's intuition, of the sure intuition of the child or the domestic animals. One grows accustomed to the idea in reading the biographies of geniuses or the records of the mystics; if one is introspective, one uses it in describing one's own mental experiences: Herr Hitler proclaims intuition as the instigation of his politics.

But who has defined its meaning?

Like most words with a long history it has found a variety of uses: it is often used when "instinct" would convey too much of the animal; when "revelation" would arouse suspicion; when "perception" would be too vague or too technical, "rapid synthesis of judgment" too prosaic, the "fruits of experience or observation" too loose, "innate or *a priori* knowledge" too disputable, or "one with" too incomprehensible.

One may therefore be justified in the suspicion that the word is but a synonym for any or all of these words and phrases and therefore so loosely used as not to be admitted to the serious vocabulary of the philosopher or psychologist. But one of the great values of such a word lies in the fact that it may be specialized. When the need is felt for a name to distinguish one from many nearly allied ideas, a term already familiar has many advantages (as well as disadvantages) over a coined one, and the very restlessness of the term "intuition" points to the fact that it has not yet found its abiding place; it is as rich in suggestion as it is poor in definition.

In science, however, in psychology, in philosophy generally, there is no room for words without a precise meaning: they confuse; while the business of philosophy is to elucidate. "Intuition" then must be blotted out from the philosopher's dictionary or it must be given a local and permanent habitation.

Is there such a faculty as intuition? And, if so, how is it distinguished from the many mental activities with which it is commonly confused? Or, on the other hand, is it really synonymous with one of them; if so, which one?

Before making a decision on the subject it will be useful first to examine the function of the word when used by some of its more frequent, or interesting, or enlightening exponents; then to see what bearing these have on a general consideration of particular aspects of man's mind, or his particular interests, and, finally, to make an attempt at classification and definition.

Part One



Chapter I

BERGSON

IT is without doubt to the writings of Henri Bergson that our thoughts first turn when we consider the problem of intuition, for it is to Bergson we owe the most strenuous philosophical attempt ever made to establish intuition as an independent mental function. Not only did he seek to persuade the world that, would it but use the faculty, intuition is a useful instrument in the search for reality, the most powerful, indeed, in man's possession, but that it is owing to man's neglect of it that he has so long wandered in the maze of contradictory theories and conclusions.¹

Very briefly his doctrine is as follows:

The prime reality is movement—change. A demand for something more fundamental than, or previous to, change, he regards as the result of the working of the human mind in giving the same positive value to the negative idea as to the affirmative. Change evolves along definite (though not predictable) lines, and in its course life has appeared. To establish itself in the universe life has followed various methods: the most successful on the whole being the intellectual. The intellect, then, has come into being at the call of survival, and its function is to establish the most satisfactory reactions to environment. Everything in the universe influences and is influenced by everything else, but with the appearance of mind in the course of change came the faculty of choice. The

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 252.

reasoning power enables man—or animal—to choose which of several possible reactions to stimuli he shall adopt, and to facilitate the working of this power of choice man's intellect has classified the universe, divided it up into definite objects and endowed them with permanence; that is, man's intellect has changed reality, for man's convenience, from a perpetual happening, which he calls duration, to a "patterned immobility". To the patterned and the immobile alone can the reasoning powers understand and respond; life and movement, however, are neither patterned nor immobile but a moving complex in which no one element is separable from the rest, and is, in consequence, quite beyond the powers and the scope of intelligence. As far, then, as our minds are dominated by intellect we are unable to grasp the nature of life and movement, and when we try to bring them under the artificial laws of science we are faced with contradictions. (Kant's Antinomies, the riddles of Zeno.)

But Bergson notices that animals, particularly insects, show a comprehension of life and an ability to deal with its problems without, apparently, any intellectual power, certainly without enough to account for the success of their actions. Instinct then provides a practical knowledge and gives a practical power. But it works unconsciously and would therefore be useless to the philosopher even if he possessed (as some psychologists think he does) as rich instinctive powers as the insect.

Between these two mental faculties, however, Bergson perceives first the possibility, then by experiment, contemplation, and self-analysis, the certainty of a third which, while giving the immediate knowledge of life-in-action possessed by instinct, gives to consciousness the more impersonal and remote objects of intellect. This he calls *Intuition* and makes the claim that through it man can comprehend the very movement of life itself, and so be freed from the contradictions which follow from the artificial point of view of intelligence.

Through lack of development, or through decay, this faculty of intuition, Bergson admits, is very little used by man, still less by philosophers, who have altogether given themselves up to the guidance of intellect; but it may, he asserts, be put to use, and only by its use can one attain to the true nature of reality, the very aim and end of the art of philosophy. By a "violent" mental effort one may free oneself from the reasoning powers and sink back (or leap forward) into the very essence and flow of the present experience (the past, too, as involved in the present) of one's personality; that is, one may experience pure duration.¹

And this is the method more particularly: "Now the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there is an intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as possible, we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences of aspect, they all require from the mind the same kind of attention, and in some sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a particular and clearly defined disposition—that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without any veil. But then consciousness must at least consent to make the effort, for it will have been shown nothing: it will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order to make the desired effort, and so to come by itself to the intuition."²

Bergson apparently allows other objects of intuition besides pure duration as it is embodied in an ego. He says little about scientific and philosophic geniuses beyond the remark

¹ *Creative Evolution* (translated by Mitchell, 1913), p. 210.

² *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translated by Hume, 1913), p. 14.

that their use of intuition as a method (unconscious perhaps) will be found on inspection, but the artist's gift he calls *intuitional*, and finds it in an immediate identity with and the understanding of the artist's object: "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."¹ Repeatedly, too, he talks of the intuition of movement, as distinct from the movement of duration. It glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake: "On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a light, feeble and vacillating, but one which none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us."²

It is a consideration of these objects of intuition that first brings clearly to our mind the difficulties of Bergson's proposition that intuition is an independent mental faculty. His words seem full of confusion, of minor contradictions, or at least incompatibilities, which, though he is not blind to them and even attempts to reconcile them, seem to me to remain.

First there is the difference between intuition and instinct. Sometimes Bergson speaks of the former as though it were identical with the latter: "The *Ammophila* no doubt discerns very little of that force, just what concerns itself; but at least it discerns it from within, quite otherwise than by a process of knowledge—by an intuition (*lived* rather than *represented*)."³ And then a page farther on: "By intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely." But when an instinct—here I imagine an impulse to action after McDougall's definition—has been reflected upon and had its object enlarged at will, it is nothing more or less than an analysed instinct modified into something of a

¹ *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 6.

² *Creative Evolution*, p. 282.

³ *Ibid.* p. 183.

sentiment (again in McDougall's terminology); not an instinct self-conscious, but an individual consciousness contemplating its instinct and the object of its instinct, no new mental faculty being involved. And if Bergson argues that he allows of the common origin of instinct, intuition and reason in a general mind or mental functioning, still in this particular description of intuition he fails to show anything different from the working side by side of the other two faculties, a combination common enough in man.

Bergson gives two descriptions of intuition: "By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."¹ Here Bergson definitely says "intellectual" sympathy. But when speaking of intuition as experienced by the artist, Bergson surely uses sympathy in a different sense—a feeling rather than an intellectual sympathy.

"By placing himself back within the object by a kind of *sympathy*, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts between him and his model."²

Both these types of intuition are commonly called imagination. By an effort of the mind, in the first case, using the powers of observation, analysis, and comparison, the artist finds something in his object with which he is familiar in his own character; then he deduces, and so creates or comprehends a character. This may be described as intellectual imagination and is founded largely on readiness in comparison and analogy, and is common to many types besides the pure artist: the natural leader, the successful educator, the lover of animals. Browning is perhaps the typical poet whose strength lies in *intellectual* imagination.

The second quotation describes the imagination of feeling—*real sympathy*. It is the imagination of the great artists who do not deduce their Antigones and Hamlets, but *are* momen-

¹ *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 6.

² *Creative Evolution*, p. 186.

tarily one with the same. The more complete the identity, the more convincing is the creation, or, it may be, the understanding; for this type of imagination, no more than the first, is limited to the creative artist: we see it clearly in maternal affection; we may experience it again when we are watching some physical exhibition, juggling, jumping, etc., or some mental struggle, as when we are conscious that a friend is on the verge of a confidence.

Now unless we are finding a new name for imagination there is no point in describing this, so useful and necessary and essentially human faculty, as "intuition". No doubt "imagination" is a term that like "intuition" itself should be used with discrimination, but its different species and degrees have been analysed: it is not an unknown or mysterious power of the mind, except in so far as all mental powers, whether of perception or judgment or deduction are ultimately mysteries; we know them by usage, not by understanding.

Both types of imagination are essentially different from that kind of sympathy which expresses itself in some instinctive emotion, where the feeling of understanding is entirely from the actor's point of view. The wasp sympathizes with the caterpillar in so far as it has a sure practical knowledge that a certain play of the muscles, in a certain relationship to the body of the latter will bring satisfaction—but there is no understanding of the caterpillar, only of the satisfaction-giving relationship. This is the emotion which accompanies the consummation of an instinctive action.

Bergson implies that if we could only order the scope of our intellectual understanding or our instinctive emotions so as to be conscious of their implications while they are in full play, and at the same time conscious of the nature of their object and of their effect on their object, we should experience the very heart of the mystery. But two such opposite actions as instinctive and imaginative cannot be made to amalgamate: they are not different in degree, nor in scope,

but in essence. Instinct seeks its own: its achievement is self-satisfaction; imagination abandons the self; he who imagines does not act upon or enjoy his object; he is transformed into his object; his achievement is not satisfaction but understanding, and, in the very act of imagining is not even that, since not till *after* his coincidence with his object does the artist become himself again and record his past experiences.

Neither do I find any clear distinction between intuition (in one of its aspects at least, and here again as will be shown later, Bergson fails to make his meaning precise) and "pure perception". The latter, as understood by Bergson, seems to be the potential physical reaction to the stimulus chosen by the body from among many for reasons of utility, but without any admixture of memory (a situation which, as Bergson points out, never occurs, for "it is indisputable that the basis of physical stimulus on which our perception of the external world is developed, is a small matter compared with all that memory adds to it").¹

"Our eyes are closed to the primordial and fundamental act of perception—the act, constituting pure perception, whereby we place ourselves in the very heart of things."² "Restore, on the contrary, the true character of perception; recognize in pure perception a system of nascent acts which plunge roots deep into the real; and at once perception is seen to be radically distinct from recollecting; the reality is no more constructed or reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived; and the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to eternal metaphysical discussions, is solved or rather dissolved by intuition."³

"In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition."⁴ Here "pure perception" and "intuition" are identical; yet Bergson has already told us that pure percep-

¹ *Matter and Memory* (translated by Paul and Palmer, 1911), pp. 70, 71.

² *Ibid.* p. 73.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 74, 75.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 84.

tion is rather without us than within; it is the effect of other images on that image which is our body, and the effect in question is action and has no connection (as far as the perception is "pure") with the mind. It would seem, in spite of such passages as the above, that intuition functions only when perception is not "pure", when it is in working alliance with mind.

Bergson, too, frequently uses the term "intuition" when he means the grasping by the mind of some truth, of some essential aspect of reality, or of an individual. In such cases it seems impossible to distinguish it from any other truth-receiving function of the mind, whether it be intellect or instinct. "Knowledge is knowledge."¹

"Perception" seems to be used where we should have expected "intuition" but in the following passage "intuition" seems to be used where we should have expected "perception", and in fact, where "perception" is intended. "It is indisputable that the basis of real, and so to speak instantaneous intuition, on which our perception of the external world is developed, is a small matter compared with all that memory adds to it. Just because the recollection of earlier analogous intuitions is more useful than the intuition itself, being bound up in memory with the whole series of subsequent events, and capable thereby of throwing a better light on our decision, it supplants the real intuition of which the office is then merely . . . to call up the recollection . . ."²

And again how does this intuition differ from that perception of the artist who perceives, not along conventional lines where colour, form, sound, etc. are mapped out for him by the use and wont of everyday life and its needs, but as they may be in themselves before the mind decides what it wants or is accustomed to see? It is interesting to compare Bergson's instructions for unprejudiced seeing with those for intuiting. The latter has been quoted above, i.e. p. 5; the former occurs in *Le Rire*: "Is it not then the

¹ *Matter and Memory*, p. 292.

² *Ibid.* p. 70.

case that the hunchback suggests the appearance of a person who holds himself badly? His back seems to have contracted an ugly stoop. By a kind of physical obstinacy, by rigidity in a word, it persists in the habit it has contracted. Try to see with your eyes alone. Avoid reflection, and above all do not reason. Abandon all your prepossessions; seek to recapture a fresh, direct and primitive impression. The vision you will require will be one of this kind. You will have before you a man bent on cultivating a certain rigid attitude."¹ There is no doubt a difference; but if one keeps in mind that in the one case the perception is comparatively simple—visual—and on the other the intuition sought is a highly complex one, that of the total ego in full action, it is difficult to find any fundamental differences between the two processes. Nevertheless Bergson does attempt to analyse the difference in his *La Perception du Changement*:

"L'art nous fait sans doute découvrir dans les choses plus de qualités et plus de nuances que nous n'en apercevons naturellement. Il dilate notre perception, mais en surface plutôt qu'en profondeur. Il enrichit notre présent, mais il ne nous fait guère dépasser le présent. Par la philosophie nous pouvons nous habituer à ne jamais isoler le présent du passé qu'il traîne avec lui."²

"Quand ils regardent une chose, ils la voient pour elle, et non plus pour eux. Ils ne perçoivent plus simplement en vue d'agir; ils perçoivent pour percevoir—pour rien, pour le plaisir. Par un certain côté d'eux-mêmes, ils naissent détachés; et, selon que ce détachement est inhérent à tel ou tel de leur sens ou à leur conscience, ils sont peintres ou sculpteurs, musiciens, ou poètes. C'est donc bien une vision plus directe, plus immédiate de la réalité, que nous trouvons dans les différents arts; et c'est parce que l'artiste songe moins à utiliser sa perception qu'il perçoit un plus grand nombre de choses.

¹ *Laughter* (translated by Brereton, 1921), p. 23.

² *La Perception du Changement*, p. 36.

“Eh bien, ce que la nature fait de loin en loin, par distraction, pour quelques privilégiés, la philosophie ne pourrait-elle pas le faire, dans un autre sens et d’une autre manière, pour tout le monde? Le rôle de la philosophie ne serait-il pas de nous amener à une perception plus complète de la réalité par un certain déplacement de notre attention?”¹

Yet he speaks of the “intuition” of the artist and does not make clear the meaning of “autres sens et d’une autre manière”, but would seem to imply that intuition, like the perception of the artist, is the sensing of what matter, i.e. the external world, is, so far as it remains unaltered and unarranged by the mind. But here there is no suggestion of flux, only of the whole as meaning more than the sum of its parts.

Then one cannot be sure how many kinds of intuitions Bergson allows. He speaks of “internal” and “external” intuition: “Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity.”² The one being, it would sometimes seem, synonymous with pure recollection and resulting in divination of personality or free will: “The memory of a given reading is a representation; it is embraced in an intuition of the mind which I may lengthen or shorten at will,”³ and the other with pure perception of the universe in flux. And then there is the intuition of the artist which combines internal and external in sympathy. And, finally, there is what Bergson himself is fain to call “common sense”.⁴

One or other of these meanings seems to attach itself to Bergson’s use of the word “intuition” throughout *Matter and Memory*, but in other works he writes as though, in addition to what may be called “fundamental intuition” there is a sort of ultimate intuition, the flash of genius, the aesthetic synthesis *after* the perceptions and recollections have done their work. “If we have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra-intellectual intuition), then sensuous intuition is likely

¹ *La Perception du Changement*, p. 13.

² *Matter and Memory*, p. 239.

³ *Ibid.* p. 91.

⁴ *Creative Evolution*, p. 224.

to be in continuity with it through certain intermediaries. . . . Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted.”¹

In this final intuition of the genius, be he artist or man of science, we may find ourselves in the presence of a mental faculty which can be reduced neither to synthesized perceptions nor synthesized judgments, and is unique, and if so, here indeed is intuition itself. But are they certainly neither one nor the other? The one—the artist’s vision—comes only to men long practised in perceiving finely; the other to thinkers immersed in every detail of their problem. And, lest the synthesis itself should be mistaken for a new power, it must be remembered that man’s intellectual life consists of such, though the matter is usually less rare and the results less surprising than those of the great creators.

It is difficult in the light thrown by infant psychology to distinguish between Bergson’s intuition of the self and the accumulated experience of the individual: “There is one reality at least which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our own self which endures.”²

It is sometimes thought that the very young child is not self-conscious: does not make a definite distinction between himself and the external world: that this comes gradually, largely through the experience of touch. The knowledge of our personality may not, and probably does not, come to us by self-analysis, but does it not come through the accumulation of experience? And if this gathering of experience round a centre which develops into an individual mind is, or gives rise to, an intuition, where is the “violent” effort described with such vividness by Bergson, which is necessary for an intuition of the real self? It may be that, in the one case, Bergson means that intuition works naturally without mental effort as instinct does, and one is able to intuit the ego as a fact without realizing its essential nature, *to do which* requires

¹ *Ibid.* p. 380.

² *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 8.

an unaccustomed and therefore difficult use of the faculty. But can there be two different intuitions of self? And is there not a suggestion of the methods of psycho-analysis in the deliberate preparations for intuition, and a certain prejudice as to what one expects to find, though both analysis and prejudice are fatal to the achievement of intuition? Moreover a synthesis of experiences into a general idea or an image is surely a clearer description of the artist's idea of Paris or of a poem than the term "intuition". Can or need an intuition of Paris have the absolute quality claimed for intuition in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*?

Throughout his works Bergson insists on the radical opposition, the incompatibility of concept and intuition; only by banishing the former can the latter be achieved; yet even here Bergson is not always consistent, at least not clearly so. The reason of course is plain. Bergson is writing his views for the benefit of other minds, and is therefore compelled to the use of concepts, can only express himself by them, and cannot keep them out of his explanation even of that word which is alien to them. But in such passages as the following there seems a real lack of discernment, or at least a forgetfulness of his conviction that though intuition may proceed to conception, the latter cannot give rise to or do anything but inhibit the former: "Que si maintenant on cherchait à caractériser cet acte on verrait qu'il consiste essentiellement dans l'intuition ou plutôt dans la conception d'un milieu vide homogène."¹

"Tout nombre est un, en effet, puisqu'on se le représente par intuition simple de l'esprit et qu'on lui donne un nom; mais cette unité est celle d'une somme."²

Here surely the conception and intuition of a number are one and the same. Or would Bergson say that he could intuit a small number (say from two to ten) but can only conceive a larger one? He makes no suggestion of such a distinction.

¹ *Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p. 72.

² *Ibid.* p. 57.

In the following passage Bergson makes us understand clearly enough the nature of the faculty he is describing, and then proceeds to plunge us again into the greatest confusion:

"Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many, nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the whole process. Then, by a sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But, though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest, and turned outward by its movements of locomotion."¹

Supposing for a moment that Bergson has succeeded in giving a fairly definite idea of what he means by intuition, we are still faced with the difficulty of experiencing it. Bergson has told us how to arrive at one and, in his mind apparently, the chief object of intuition "l'intuition de la durée", but it is difficult of attainment. When I have followed his directions I have arrived at a state when I am conscious of nothing but details of my physical existence; the beat of my heart, faint digestive sensations, tiny pains; I have at times arrived at a vague state of general feeling, such as one might expect the higher animals to experience, but I have been able to "intuit" no ego, no "duration" differing from that which reason has fashioned for me out of experience. It is possible of course that through lack of skill or fundamental inability I am personally unable to enjoy intuition, but so it would seem are most other people. Some of Bergson's followers, e.g. Wildon Carr, have asserted that they too

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 187.

have been able to experience that intuition of duration; but what has come of it? If the method were of the value that Bergson supposed, and if it were, even rarely and with difficulty, attainable, some fundamental change in the method of philosophy would have taken place in the last forty years. Changes of opinion, of point of view, even of aim there have been, and some of these greatly influenced by Bergson, but there has been no change from reason to intuition as a philosophical method beyond that indicated in the Introduction: a respect for common sense and common notions.

Even if this were not so, even if we had by means of intuition arrived at the practical and immediate knowledge of movement as the prime reality, would intuition have done so great a service? Would not the same conclusion have been reached by other means? Already without the aid of intuition (though not without Bergson's aid) the idea is a commonplace in some schools of thought. Had it been found by intuition it must needs have been verified by reason. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson says that duration can never be enclosed in a conceptual representation.¹ But farther on he says that "from intuition one can pass to analysis", and again "if mobility is given, we can obtain from it by thought as many stoppages as we desire. In other words, it is clear that fixed concepts may be extracted by our thought from mobile reality; but there are no means of reconstructing the mobility."² And in the later and more maturely thought out *Creative Evolution*, he says: "Dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts and so be propagated to other men. . . the philosopher is obliged to abandon intuition, once he has received from it the impetus, and to rely on himself to carry on the movement."³ It does not follow of course that the reality which has to be verified by reason must be initially discovered by reason; perhaps the inspirations of

¹ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 19.

³ *Creative Evolution*, p. 251.

² *Ibid.* p. 59.

genius, the knowledge of the mystic have not been, but these are hardly Bergson's examples. Though he speaks with such apparent certainty of a knowledge given by intuition so immediate and sure that philosophers, could they but use the method, would find themselves in immediate agreement, yet he acknowledges that as it is, intuition cannot be relied upon. Even in his earlier *Introduction* he speaks of the intuition of matter, "external intuition", in these terms: "From the original, and, one must add, very indistinct intuition, which gives positive science its material, science passes immediately to analysis."¹ And again, of intuition of the ego, "internal intuition": "The ego is only a sign by which the primitive, and moreover very confused, intuition has furnished the psychologist with his subject matter...."² How few of the great inspirations of the genius have stood the test of reason the history of thought tells, and how utterly unable individual unreasoned conviction is to convince others we can learn from reading the works of the great mystics.

Bergson does not, I think, attempt to discriminate the *a priori* knowledge or "innate ideas" of other thinkers from intuition, yet it is obvious that by the latter he means more than the former, for he includes such debatable convictions as "freewill".

From Bergson, then, we get many things, not least among them the idea of a kind of knowledge other than that given by reason, or by instinct; but we do not get a definite, consistent, practicable idea of intuition as differing essentially from either or both of these. In short he has introduced us to new ideas rather than to a new method.

¹ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 28.

² *Ibid.* p. 26.

Chapter II

SPINOZA

BENEDICT SPINOZA is a greater philosopher than Bergson and his theory of intuition ultimately, I think, is more interesting, and quite as important to the understanding of his main theme. But to the student of intuition it presents even greater difficulties than that of Bergson because of the double fact that Spinoza convinces us that he really did experience an unusual method of attaining knowledge, while at the same time, though he expounded his doctrine no less than three times, he has left us no clear idea of it. We know that Bergson means something quite different from reason when he talks of intuition though we may doubt whether he really experienced anything other than the more recognized forms of receiving knowledge, but do we really know what Spinoza means—Spinoza, the most clear-thinking and precise of philosophers? And what makes this undoubted vagueness the more remarkable is that Spinoza himself seems so entirely satisfied with his exposition that, though he gives it in three different works, he does not vary his example, and that example the stumbling-block to his expounders. We are almost tempted to think that he was imitating one of his Jewish masters, who, when explaining the Scriptures and arriving at a passage on which he thought it unwise to give his real views, left his explanation vague or confused, with the comment that here was a mystery. This, however, could hardly have been the case with Spinoza since, with however varying emphasis, he does ultimately base his whole "ethical" outlook on his conception of intuition.

Spinoza classifies man's ideas or thoughts into three kinds:

- (1) Those gained by himself, or unscientific observation.
- (2) Those gained from reasoning.

(3) Those gained by intuition, or immediately from the object.

On one occasion he subdivides (1) and so intuition becomes the fourth kind. This last he places highest, and, indeed, considers as the only quite satisfactory method of attaining truth. He illustrates his meaning by a sum in proportion, and it will be well, in order to see the difficulties the more clearly, to examine each of the three statements of his classification.

The *Treatise on God and Man and his Well-being* is undoubtedly an early work and therefore must be given less weight, but it does not differ materially, except perhaps in atmosphere, from the other two. It expounds as follows:

"Someone has just heard it said, that, if in the Rule of Three, the second number is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a fourth number will then be obtained which has the same relation to the third as the second has to the first. And notwithstanding the possibility that he who put this before him might have been lying, he still made his calculation accordingly, and he did so without having acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has of colour, so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.

"Another, having a more active intelligence, is not so easily satisfied with mere hearsay, but tests it by some actual calculations, and when he finds that they agree with it, then he gives credence to it. But we have rightly said that this one also is subject to error; for how can he possibly be sure that his experience of a few particulars can serve him as a rule for all?

"A third, who is not satisfied with hearsay, because it may deceive, nor with experience of a few particulars, because this cannot possibly serve as a rule, examines it in the light of true reason, which, when properly applied, has never deceived. This, then, tells him that on account of the nature of

the proportion in these numbers it had to be so, and could not happen otherwise.

"A fourth, however, having the clearest knowledge of all, has no need of hearsay or experience or the art of reasoning, because, by his penetration, he sees the proportion in his calculations immediately."¹

Here, then, Spinoza definitely states that he who knows by the fourth kind of knowledge has no need of the art of reasoning. He does not give a particular example and so we are left rather vague as to whether the intuition consists in finding the fourth proportional or in realizing the vital relationship of the four numbers, the fourth of which must, of course, be present to the mind, i.e. in appreciating an instance of perfect proportion.

The *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* was left by Spinoza unfinished though probably he had not discarded the work, but intended to complete and, ultimately, to publish it. It must be assumed, then, that it contained his considered convictions.

The corresponding passage runs as follows:

"In order that all these things may be better understood I shall employ one example, namely, this one: Three numbers are given to find the fourth, which is to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen will say at once that they know what is to be done to find the fourth number, inasmuch as they have not yet forgotten the operation, which they learnt without proof from their teachers. Others again, from experimenting with small numbers where the fourth number is quite manifest, as with 2, 4, 3 and 6, where it is found that by multiplying the second by the third and dividing the answer by the first number the quotient is 6, have made it an axiom, and when they find this number, which without that working out, they know to be proportional, they thence conclude that this process is good invariably for finding the fourth proportional. But mathematicians, by conviction of

¹ Spinoza, *His Life and Treatise on God and Man and his Well-being*, Wolf, pp. 67-8.

the Prop. 19, Bk. 7, *Elements of Euclid*, know what numbers are proportional from the nature and property of proportion, namely that the first and fourth multiplied together are equal to the product of the second and third. But they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers; or, if they do, it is not from that proposition, but intuitively without any process of working."¹

Here again Spinoza definitely states that reasoned conviction is no help to intuitive knowledge. The object of knowledge, however, seems to be different. Reason brings the conviction that the fourth number is proportional to the other three; intuition, the knowledge or feeling of proportion in the group. A definite instance is given but not as illustrating intuition, though Spinoza does not say what type of idea it does illustrate, and in the light of the corresponding passage in the *Ethics*, the point is interesting. There is no doubt in this case that it is not the finding of the fourth number but the feeling of proportion that is the intuition.

This is the statement in the *Ethics*:

"I shall illustrate these three by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth, which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school-master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small numbers, or by the conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Bk. 7, of Euclid's *Elements*, namely, the common property of proportionals. But in very small numbers there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3 are given, who is there who could not see that the fourth proportional is 6? And this is much clearer because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we see that the first bears to the second."²

Now here with the same illustration the whole orientation of the problem seems changed. First of all it is apparently the

¹ Everyman edition, p. 235.

² *Ibid.* p. 69.

finding of the fourth number which is achieved by intuition, but Spinoza uses the word "intuitively" not of the fourth in relation to the other three numbers but of the relationship of the first to the second. And again he suggests, though he does not definitely state, that the *intuitional* finding of the fourth, or the appreciation of the proportion of the four cannot be done by the intuitive method in the case of large numbers, though he seems to imply this in the first two statements. The idea in the *Ethics*, however, agrees with those in the two earlier statements in so far as it is the relationship and not (seemingly) the fourth number, which intuition perceives. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that Spinoza makes "to find the fourth" the example of his three methods of acquiring knowledge, and in truth when the proportion of all four comes to the mind the fourth must necessarily appear.

The problems of Spinoza's theory of intuition are then as follows: (1) Are we to assume that intuition, as understood by Spinoza, gives us both *a priori* and ultimate knowledge as appears to be the case with Bergson? (2) Are we to regard this immediate form of knowledge as mystical in character, or aesthetic? (3) Does it apply to morals, or intellect? (4) How far is emotion essential to its experience? (5) Is it a power only recognizably experienced by a few? (6) What did Spinoza actually achieve by its means? Could these achievements have been attained by any other method?

Before any satisfactory answers to the first question be given it would be as well to state briefly Spinoza's theory of truth. Truth, he tells us, is its own standard. It appeals to our minds as true, and is accepted on that ground (though Spinoza does not say that everything of which one is convinced is therefore necessarily true). "Who can know that he is certain of anything unless he first be certain of that thing?"¹

Reason (if rightly used) never deceives, but neither does it (Spinoza seems to think) always bring conviction, and so, though its deductions are true, they do not always bring that satisfaction of mind which appealed so much to Spinoza. It

¹ *Ethics* (Everyman ed.), p. 70.

is only what is intuitively grasped that is true in the full meaning of the word as he uses it, or, as he sometimes says true "and *adequate*". One cannot help remarking how particularly interesting this is in the light of his geometric method and the aspersions that have been cast upon the philosopher on account of it. The very man who expounded his convictions, of which he is as certain as he is that the angles of a triangle together make up two right angles, in a form as nearly approaching mathematical reasoning as can be, rejects such reasoning as the final standard of truth. "I have thought it worth while to note this that I may show from the example how much the knowledge of individual things which I call intuition, or knowledge of the third kind, is advanced and more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or of the second class. For although I showed in the first part that all things... depend on God with regard to essence and existence, that proof... does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is concluded from the essence of any individual thing, which we say depends on God."¹ And again: "For although I could perceive all this quite clearly in my mind [i.e. where his greatest good lay] I could not lay aside at once all greed, pleasure and honour."² And again, speaking of reason: "but nevertheless, it is not a means in itself whereby we may acquire our perfection."³ And: "The fourth mode alone comprehends the adequate essence of the thing, and, that without any danger of error."⁴ In the *Treatise on God and Man* the same idea is expressed with just that touch of emotion which is characteristic of the early work: "But we call that *clear knowledge* which comes, not from our being convinced by reasons, but from our feeling and enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses the other by far."⁵ And again, in what

¹ *Ethics* (Everyman ed.), p. 220.

² *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (Everyman ed.), p. 229.

³ *Ibid.* p. 235.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 235.

⁵ *Short Treatise on God and Man and his Well-being* (translated by Wolf), p. 69.

perhaps is a more interesting form: "This (True Belief or Reason) shows us, indeed, what a thing ought to be, but not what it really is. And this is the reason why it can never unite us with the object of our belief."¹

These passages make it quite clear, I think, that by intuition Spinoza meant that form of knowledge which brings absolute certainty and satisfaction to the mind. It would not, for instance, include the findings of a Newton or an Einstein so long as these (no matter how convincingly proved) did not bring with them the satisfaction, not only of being clear and irrefutable in themselves, but of forming a perfect harmony with all other parts of knowledge with which they come in contact. Such a theory would seem to allow of a progressive or evolutionary truth, but that conception cannot be ascribed to Spinoza.

With such a conception of truth it is easy to see that the only ultimately satisfactory idea of the universe must be such a one as Spinoza actually had, namely, of a complete, though infinite whole in which the category of whole and parts is quite inadequate to express the perfect harmony of relationship between particulars and universals as well as between particular and particular: "As soon as we had knowledge of this method, we saw, fourthly, that it would be perfect when we had the idea of a perfect thing."²

I am aware that it is on this point that Spinoza's critics are most severe: that, indeed, he never did make quite clear the status of the individual thing, but it is in his doctrine of intuition that he comes nearest to the modern idea of the importance of the particular, though by this he may and probably does mean not the individual object but the particular scientific law. There is no doubt, however, about Spinoza's attitude of mind, whatever lapses may occur. He constantly disparages the abstract generality and encourages the study of the particular. Intuition is the immediate recognition of the

¹ *Short Treatise on God and Man and his Well-being*, p. 74.

² *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, p. 241.

meaning of the particular in its relationship to the whole, or, as he prefers to put it, not probably without a deeper meaning, with "God". "Now this kind of knowledge", he says, "proceeds from an adequate idea of the primal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."¹ And again: "The more we understand individual things the more we understand God."² And once more: "I have thought it worth while to note this in order that I may show from this example how much the knowledge of individual things which I call intuition or knowledge of the third kind is advanced and more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or of the second class. For although I showed in the first part that all things... depend on God with regard to essence and existence, that proof... does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is concluded from the essence of any individual thing which we say depends on God."³ And: "For the more specialized an idea is, the more distinct it is, and therefore the more clear. Whence the knowledge of particular things must be sought mostly by us."⁴

It is probable, then, to go back to our point, that Spinoza made no vital distinction between fundamental and ultimate knowledge attained intuitively, and it is because he made no distinction that the difficulties of this theory arise. One class of knowledge comes this way with an overwhelming and utterly satisfactory conviction, and why not other kinds? The assumption did not seem unreasonable to Spinoza because the most full and perfect object of knowledge came to him in just such a manner.

Certain fundamental facts of knowledge come to us intuitively then: "Finally, a thing is said to be perceived *through its essence alone* when from the fact that I know something, I know what it is to know anything, or from the fact that I know the essence of the mind, I know it to be united to the

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³ *Ibid.* p. 220.

⁴ *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, p. 259.

body. By the same knowledge we know that two and three make five and that if there are two lines parallel to the same line they shall be parallel to each other, etc. But things I have been able to know by this knowledge so far have been very few."¹

Spinoza accepts this *a priori* kind of intuitive knowledge without much question or examination as may be seen from the examples given. Modern psychologists will hardly class the knowledge that two and three make five, for instance, among *a priori* truths; but then Spinoza was not at the moment particularly interested in this kind of intuitive truth. He wanted and sought an equal and immediate certainty in more complex matters, and to this end he saw the necessity of the "aid of reason". In spite, then, of the passages quoted above and of those (not emphasized in the *Ethics*) where he repudiates the aid of reason, he makes it abundantly clear that the discerning of new truth can hardly be expected except by the man who has used his reasoning powers to the full. Because of this connection Spinoza tends to class Reason and Intuition together as opposed to the cruder form of knowledge—opinion. He is emphatic on the point.

In the *Ethics* Spinoza promises a work on the formation of notions other than common, "certain axioms and notions". "Certain would be common to all, while others, clear and distinct to those alone who do not labour under misconceptions; and certain would be ill-founded."² He does not here, however, mention intuition though we may surmise that those "clear and distinct to those alone who do not labour under misconceptions" are notions arising from intuition. In the following passage, however, he is speaking directly of intuition: "Now this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the finite essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."³ And later on he talks even of "deduction" in con-

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nection with intuition. "But as all things are in God and through Him are conceived, it follows that we can *deduce* from this knowledge many things which we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge."¹ And again: "The endeavour or desire of knowing things according to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge."²

It is in order to find out the means by which knowledge may be attained by intuition that Spinoza began the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. He would seem to have had a very definite plan, but unfortunately the *Tractatus* breaks off at the crucial point: "The fourth mode alone comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and that without any danger of error; and therefore it must be adopted above all others. Therefore in what manner this mode may be attained so that we may understand *unknown* things by means of such knowledge, and at the same time as speedily as possible, we shall proceed to explain."³ In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* Spinoza seems to state quite absolutely that intuitive knowledge is either *a priori* or dependent on Reason as a foundation. "A man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have been so endowed since Christ."⁴ And Spinoza is so very sure of its impossibility that he does not allow in his own day of prophets claiming a divine or immediate knowledge of the will of God after the manner of the ancient Hebrews.

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30 MYSTICAL NATURE OF INTUITION?

come united with him. And only in this union, as we have already remarked, does our blessedness consist."¹

There are, too, other signs of a mystical temperament in Spinoza. One cannot help comparing his description of his own state of mind when undertaking the search for the highest good, with that of Bunyan and many another mystic setting out on the first stage of his pilgrimage: "For I saw myself in the midst of a very great peril and obliged to seek a remedy however uncertain, with all my energy: as a sick man seized with a deadly disease, who sees death straight before him if he does not find some remedy, is forced to seek it however uncertain, with all his remaining strength, for in that is all his hope placed."²

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The whole scheme of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emenda-*

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the *Ethics*, as though the idea gained additional weight with meditation.

It is probable then that though he did not distinguish them Spinoza accepted two kinds of intuitive knowledge, the first simple and *a priori*, the second, complex and, though immediate and certain, dependent on reasoned knowledge (and the more widely and deeply reasoned the better) as a necessary forerunner of the intuitive moment, and that this intuition brought with it not only a knowledge of truth (whether of fact or idea) but a personal conviction produced by a realization of its harmony with the rest of knowledge and with the universe at large, with a resulting emphatic mental satisfaction.

What then is the nature of this intuitive process? It has been seen that with one exception Spinoza insists on the necessity of previous *a priori* or reasoned knowledge; but it does not necessarily follow that the intuition itself is purely intellectual in character. Professor Wolf and Professor Höffding assert its mystical nature.

What is meant by mystical knowledge? I suppose strictly and firstly knowledge attained without the direct aid of previous knowledge of any kind. But the strict sense is hardly to be followed, for undoubtedly at least most of the great mystics had minds very well prepared for the reception of the knowledge they claimed to receive in this manner; while it is just as evident that that same knowledge or truth, though absolute and immediate, adapted itself or its presentation to the circumstances and character of the recipient. So that the reasoned preparation thought necessary by Spinoza would not absolutely forbid us to interpret his intuition mystically.

Secondly, mystical knowledge seems to be connected with the supernatural, in the sense of the divine, and at its consummation to a conviction of a personal unity with the divine whatever shape the idea of the divine may take. Now Spinoza the "gottgetrunkener Mann" was wrapped up in the idea of the divine, though probably in the most scientific form that conception has ever taken (unless we

except the twentieth-century mathematical conception of God). As Sir F. Pollock has once for all put the matter, he does not degrade God to Nature, but raises Nature to God. And this conception of God is ultimately connected with his theory of intuition. God is immanent in Nature, not quite in the more common mystical way of "closer is He than breathing and nearer than hands and feet" which allows of (or at least suggests) a divine personality, but in the most scientific of pantheistic senses, where the whole universe, mental as well as physical, passive as well as active, *is* God. It is the supreme intuition that realizes this, and the supreme intuition is the supreme blessedness of man, more particularly *felt* and realized when man realizes himself as God, being as he is, Nature: "As soon as we had knowledge of this method, we saw fourthly, that it would be perfect when we had the idea of a perfect thing."¹ "But even this true knowledge varies with the objects that come before it: the better the object is with which it happens to unite itself, so much the better also is the knowledge. And, for this reason, he is the most perfect man who is united with God (who is the most perfect being of all) and so enjoys him."² And again with a suggestion of that ecstasy with which we are accustomed to associate the mystics' confession of faith, and which glimmers through the *Treatise on God and Man*, and glows throughout the fifth book of the *Ethics*: "Now we have said that this kind of knowledge (intuitional) does not result from something else, but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the understanding. And if that object is glorious or good, then the soul becomes necessarily united with it, as we have also remarked with reference to our body. Hence it follows incontrovertibly that it is this knowledge which evokes love. So that when we get to know God after this manner, then (as he cannot reveal himself or become known to us otherwise than as the most glorious and best of all) we must necessarily be-

¹ *Treatise on God and Man*, p. 133.

² *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, p. 229.

come united with him. And only in this union, as we have already remarked, does our blessedness consist."¹

There are, too, other signs of a mystical temperament in Spinoza. One cannot help comparing his description of his own state of mind when undertaking the search for the highest good, with that of Bunyan and many another mystic setting out on the first stage of his pilgrimage: "For I saw myself in the midst of a very great peril and obliged to seek a remedy however uncertain, with all my energy: as a sick man seized with a deadly disease, who sees death straight before him if he does not find some remedy, is forced to seek it however uncertain, with all his remaining strength, for in that is all his hope placed."²

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¹ *Treatise on God and Man*, p. 133.

² *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, p. 229.

tion is an examination of the working of the human mind which finds its consummation in intuition following after reason, and Spinoza sets out (though he does not arrive as far as can be judged owing entirely to his early death) to show, or perhaps to find out, how intuition works, so that "unknown things" may be discovered at will by its aid. A characteristic of mystical immediate knowledge is the fact that it is independent of its agent; the visionary does not know or cannot arrange the supreme moment though he can encourage it. But Spinoza set out to show that intuition could be used when required, once man knew how to acquire its services.

Reason, moreover, is to Spinoza the distinguishing mark of man. This is no trite or unconsidered part of his doctrine, for on it hangs his reading of human morality; it is then very much more likely that the very highest mental function that man can attain to is the consummation of reason rather than of its contrary. The very form of the *Ethics*, the spirit and meaning of all Spinoza's teaching, lead to this conclusion.

It may be argued that Spinoza's intuition differs from his reason by virtue of, not its mystical nature, but its aesthetic.

Spinoza's total negation of the category of "Whole and Parts" is aesthetic in nature. The whole is more than the sum of its parts, and the part is more than a section of the whole. Alter a part, and the nature not only of the whole, but of every other part or aspect of the whole is altered. Spinoza goes further than this: he does not allow of parts at all. Nature has various aspects, he names Extension and Thought, (but note that they are aspects of identically the same thing) and each aspect has eternal and infinite modes or ways of manifesting itself, as for example motion and intellect. Though individual things, in the obvious meaning of the term, are modes or manifestations of the eternal and infinite modes, yet they are not *parts* of it, but *manifestations*. All this is very abstract and no doubt the weakness of Spinoza's system, as a system, lay in this very inability to grasp the

concrete and individual reality of the individual thing, or really to explain its existence at all. Outside this section of his theory, however, and never brought into harmony with it, is a very emphatic clinging to the concrete. There is no doubt that Spinoza was a thorough-paced mechanist. He believed that every effect has its cause and that every existence lies "in bonds of firm necessity"; which in itself is perhaps an aesthetic idea: in this way and no other must the material lie to produce the desired effect. The unity of the individual and the universal, then, is an aesthetic end. The meaning of the individual is realized with the realization of the whole, and the whole recognized as represented or explained or illustrated in the individual.

I do not need the skies'
Pomp when I would be wise;
For pleasure nor to use
Heaven's champaign when I muse.

One grass-blade in its veins
Wisdom's whole flood contains:
Thereon my foundering mind
Odyssean fate can find.

Such a reading of reality effectually does away with the category of "Whole and Parts", so abhorrent alike to Spinoza and the artist.

Again the purely natural or scientific may be, at least conceived as, impersonal. The eternal laws of Nature operated probably long before there were minds (in the plural) conscious of their operation. But this is hardly true of aesthetic effects. Beauty is presumably an effect on the mind of an experiencing subject. The laws of Nature may have worked from all eternity, but the beauty of the working (at least on this planet) came into its fullness only with the evolution of mind.¹ There must, then, be an individual enjoyer as well as

¹ This can hardly be considered as Spinoza's view since he believed that every physical manifestation of substance had also its mental side.

the things enjoyed in the aesthetic world. Spinoza seems to make this distinction between "ratio" and intuition when he says: "he can say that the four numbers must be proportional and although that is so, he speaks none the less as of a thing that is beyond him. But when he comes to see the proportion in the way we have shown in the fourth example, then he says with truth that the thing is so, because it is in him and not beyond him,"¹ i.e. there is personal appreciation of form.

In connection with the question of personal appeal arises that of emotion. I think that Spinoza would not have allowed, if one of his correspondents had put the question to him, that there was any necessary or desirable emotional accompaniment to intuition, but over and over again when he speaks of it, and more especially in connection with the final intuition of the unity of man and every other phenomenon with Nature, a note of feeling, of joy, of "glory" as Spinoza himself once calls it, creeps in. The intellectual love of God, however the philosopher may lay emphasis on the adjective, can have no meaning without a clear understanding of the term "love" which he, great psychologist as he was, defined as "pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause". Even though, in describing the intellectual Love of God in its eternal aspect, Spinoza dismisses the idea of emotion by substituting "blessedness" for "pleasure", since emotion involves change from one state to another and perfection can tolerate no change, he does not really get rid of all trace of feeling, or "love" would have no meaning whatever. Emotion is not eliminated but is in harmony with, not in opposition to, Reason. "And this love or blessedness is called by the scriptures 'Glory'." There is surely a note of exultation here. "Nevertheless we feel and know that we are eternal." Here "feel" is added to "know", no doubt in order to discriminate between the lingual assurance of reason and the personal assurance of intuition, but what can we

¹ *Treatise on God and Man*, p. 75.

savour by that difference if not an emotional or aesthetic flavour? Spinoza seems to make the same distinction again in the *Tractate* when he describes the different effects reason and intuition had upon him: "for although I could perceive all this quite clearly in my mind, I could not lay aside immediately all greed, pleasure and honour." This at the beginning of the *Tractate*. While at the close of the *Ethics* we have: "Blessedness consists of love towards God. . . . No one rejoices in blessedness because he restrains lusts, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining lust comes from blessedness itself." And earlier in the *Ethics*: "Blessedness is nothing less than satisfaction of mind which arises from intuitive knowledge of God." In the following passage Spinoza, in considering the three forms of knowledge, describes their results: "Of these we say this, namely, that from the first proceed all the 'passions' which are opposed to good reason; from the second the good desires; and from the third true and sincere love with all its offshoots." Here the "good desires" are the clear seeing of what is fundamentally and ultimately good for the human race, and the "love" the same good desires with the additional emotional force which urges willing union. Spinoza makes a great difference between the active emotions and the passive, for the former rouse to activity and the latter cause man to be acted upon; the latter he banishes completely from the state of blessedness, and the former in so far as they involve change (and change is an integral condition of emotion according to Spinoza's definition). In this case some other name must be found for the "feeling" which undoubtedly accompanies, at least *conscious*, intuition in Spinoza's meaning of the term. We might describe as "scientific delight", the recognition of the perfect harmony which a newly acquired fact or theory forms with the rest of Nature, the feeling of triumph or achievement or contentment at the neatness or the complexity with which the new idea or fact fits itself into its place. "From this third kind of knowledge arises necessarily the intellectual love of

God...that is the love of God not as we imagine Him present but in so far as we imagine God to be eternal.”¹ Whatever we may call it, it is almost impossible to eliminate emotion from such an experience and equally impossible to deny that the change, necessary according to Spinoza, to emotional experience, takes place along with it, unless we accept the mystical, eternal, ecstatic contemplation of the divine.

Is then intuition, as understood by Spinoza, the achievement of reason supplemented by the glow which the achievement brings personally to the thinker? or is the emotional touch additional to the intuition and a part, not of it, but of the resulting blessedness? Spinoza speaks of the third kind of knowledge as an instrument to an end, not as an end in itself, and I think we must adopt the latter conclusion even if we assert that at any rate intuition is invariably accompanied by an intellectual delight or love, the joy or satisfaction of the man of science.

The question as to whether intuition was to Spinoza moral or intellectual or both does not really arise since Spinoza considered the question of morals an anthropological one. That is, he did not acknowledge an absolute good or bad in Nature, only men who approached more or less nearly to a peculiar fact in Nature, the *reasonable* being. Moral action then is that which leads to the preservation or well-being of man *as* man or reasonable being, and immoral action that which degrades him from that standard or puts an end to his well-being or existence. “We do not desire a thing”, he says, “because it is good; but it is good because we desire it.” So he discriminates between the morality of a murderer, a prophet and Christ. The first as far as he is a natural phenomenon is perfect; he could not be altered without altering the whole of Nature, and, as Nature itself is perfect infinitely and eternally, the nature of the criminal could not and must not be altered—it is perfect. But compared with a perfect

¹ *Ethics*, p. 218.

man, that is, the man whose actions tend most to the preservation and well-being of the human race, he is very far from perfect as being less powerful in achieving these ends, but is no more bad in himself than a mouse is bad for not being an elephant or a daisy for not being a rose. The morality of a prophet lies in a love, albeit a blind love, of good action, that is, of that action which ensures the well-being of the race. He does not understand good along these lines, however, but as something absolute. It appeals to him not through his intellect but through his emotions and in the form of images, dreams, etc., and he preaches it likewise in images, as in parables or as the absolute divine commands of a personal God. But the morality of Christ is an intellectual realization that certain actions tend to the preservation of man on the earth and certain others to his extinction or enfeeblement; that is, He, Christ, had a clear and adequate perception (an intuition) of the laws of Nature in so far as they affected man. Moral intuition was then to Spinoza exactly the same thing as intellectual intuition: a realization of the union of man with Nature. If we act in such a way as to diminish the power and perfection of man as man, we are immoral, and the remedy lies in emending the understanding, though indeed it may lie, and has at sundry times lain in obeying the voice of the prophet who has a natural bent towards a love of right conduct without understanding the nature of its rightness.

While Spinoza evidently has had some definite mental experience in the acquirement of knowledge which differs from that common to mankind and of a complex nature comparable in kind only to our *a priori* notions, yet he does not succeed in conveying to our mind exactly what this intuition is. Is it mystical in character and therefore outside the possibility of being expressed unless by people of a peculiar temperament? Is it aesthetic, being the addition of the sense of beauty or harmony to the verification of newly acquired knowledge? Is it essentially emotional, so that the new knowledge is not only acquired but felt? Or is it of a

purely intellectual cast so that while different from reason, it is yet the offspring of reason, different as the child differs from the parent, yet dependent as the child is dependent for its existence on its parent; different as water is from H_2O or as life is from a chemical compound, or as reason is from life? We have examined what is to be said for and against the earlier possibilities and find ourselves not satisfied that any of them quite fit what Spinoza has to say about intuition, though all seem to lend a quota to it. Of the last we must of necessity be ignorant unless we have ourselves experienced it. The conclusions of genius do seem to spring from accumulated experiences deeply reasoned or pondered upon. Are intuitive conclusions the final product of such reasoning? the point of light at which all the invisible but very present colour-rays meet? or are they something new, some evolution from reason which is essentially different from reason itself, being immediate and yet occurring only to the mind steeped in reason? Spinoza seems to indicate the last, though he has not succeeded in conveying to us the secret of its evolution. We can take hydrogen and oxygen and make water, but we cannot take molecules and make life, no more can we from reason make an intuition as Spinoza seems to understand the experience.

It is of course possible that Spinoza has mistaken the nature of his experience. He was a great psychologist, but the art of scientific introspection was undeveloped in his day. He may have been dazzled by the stupendous conception—then so new and rare—of a wholeness and unity in the universe, mental as well as physical, of the satisfactoriness and ultimateness of the idea of Cause; and combining the reasoning which led him to accept the Causal idea, with the dazzlement brought by the realization of what it meant to the philosophic mind, he called the combination by a new name, "intuition".

If we could show from Spinoza's works that there was any idea which he could not have arrived at by the ordinary

reasoning processes and yet which he accepts as true, and is able to persuade us is true, we might exclaim with him: "Here is a new faculty, a new and surer way of attaining knowledge." But I do not think there is any such idea. His particular intuition or conception of God has never been unknown to the philosophic world, whether it has taken the form of pantheism, mysticism, or the causal law. It is his mode of attack, his attitude of mind, his mental powers that have left their mark on the world rather than any convictions unattainable by reason.

We are then left in doubt. His correspondents, so persistent, and sometimes acute, over other matters never questioned him as to the exact nature of intuition.

Chapter III

BENEDETTO CROCE

“KNOWLEDGE has two forms: it is either ‘*intuitive*’ knowledge or *logical* knowledge; knowledge obtained through the *imagination* or knowledge obtained through the *intellect*; knowledge of the *individual* or knowledge of the *universal*; of *individual things* or of the *relations* between them: it is, in fact, productive either of *images* or of *concepts*.”

So Signor Benedetto Croce opens his *Aesthetic*, another name for the first of the two kinds of knowledge; for intuition is for him the “expression of impressions”, i.e. the fundamental and first working of the spirit, the impressions themselves being mechanic and outside the realm of spirit. Expression is both art and beauty, and he gives us intuition, imagination, representation, aesthetic, art, beauty, expression, as synonymous terms. Croce believes that without activity there can be no knowledge; for the second kind of knowledge (logical) is dependent on the first, and “intuition” supposes mental activity, a selective process among impressions ending in a synthesis and forming a unity “expressed” or made clear in the mind. These fundamental intuitions are absolute “with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination”, otherwise “the life of the spirit would tremble to its foundations”, we should in fact be in the condition of the builders of the Tower of Babel.¹

Croce makes it quite clear that “expression” need not be physical, and may consist entirely of imagery: sounds and sights, etc., in the mind alone, but in some definite arrangement which may be converted into exterior sound, colour, shape, etc.

¹ *Aesthetic* (translated by D. Ainslie), p. 123.

In addition to these two forms of knowledge or theoretic activity, Croce allows two kinds of practical activity: the economic and the moral; the first, the useful, corresponds to aesthetic as being fundamental to the second, the moral; the distinction being between willing an end and willing a rational end. Of these four activities the aesthetic or intuitive is the basis and the only independent one, while the logical is dependent on the intuitive, and will (to end and rational end) on both. It is to the first practical activity, the economic, that the phenomena of pleasure and pain belong, not, primarily, to aesthetic or logic or ethic; nevertheless, according to the "unity of the spirit"¹ these hedonistic qualities are found to accompany other activities, so that we get "aesthetic pleasure" as a kind of invariable accident accompanying intuition, or rather, the act of creation which of necessity involves will, i.e. the practical, is accompanied by pleasure or pain.

So the complete progress of aesthetic production can be schematized in four stages: "(a) impressions; (b) expression or spiritual aesthetic synthesis; (c) hedonistic accompaniment; (d) translation of the aesthetic fact into physical phenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines, colours, etc.). Any one can see that the capital point, the only one that is, practically speaking, aesthetic and truly real, is in (b)."²

Croce proceeds to tell us that intuition is not only "expression and nothing but expression" but also that beauty, that is, everything we call beautiful, is just adequate expression; he will not indeed allow even of "adequate" since there can be no degrees in expression: an impression is either expressed, when we get beauty, or it fails to get expressed; "the attempt and not the deed confounds us", and ugliness, which has degrees, results. We get the idea that beauty belongs to only some types of expression because in the simpler forms of intuition it is unnoticed and is thrown into prominence in the more complicated forms purely on account of their com-

¹ *Aesthetic*, p. 141.

² *Ibid.* p. 196.

plexity and the ugliness of unsuccessful syntheses. So that though we get intuitions of the beautiful, beauty is not the characteristic of any particular intuition, but of all: of the sort that adequately expresses disgust at a foolish remark¹ as of, and in equal degree with, the deliberate, balanced strokes of the paint brush which gives us the intuition of the Chinese artist.

It is clear from what has been said that Croce cannot find beauty in Nature, animate or inanimate. If he did, he would have to see in Nature the expression of some spiritual being, of God, in fact: and this he does not see. So to Croce Nature, whether man, animal or physical feature, has no beauty of its own, only the potentiality of supplying impressions from which the mind may choose for purposes of syntheses. So that when on a November morning we look out of the window and see crows settling on or rising from the bare boughs of an ash tree, black against a sky of greys we do not immediately see a beautiful sight and exclaim "how lovely it is", but we select suitable impressions, reject others, synthesize the former and *make* a thing of beauty; and from this follows the truth of "*de gustibus*". Nature then, like representations stored in memory, is a stimulus to the production of, not a possessor of, beauty.² And so with works of art. If we call a picture, poem, etc., beautiful we are creating it as did the original artist, making our own synthesis to which the original picture is merely the stimulus: "If that object or stimulant be designated by the letter (*e*), the process of reproduction will take place in the following order: (*e*) the physical stimulus; (*d, b*) perception of physical facts (sounds, tones, mimetic, combinations of lines and colours, etc.), which is together the aesthetic synthesis, already produced; (*c*) the hedonistic accompaniment, which is also reproduced."³

It follows that the difference between creation of a work of

¹ "a cry of pain...objectified in consciousness." *Ibid.* p. 4.

² *Ibid.* ch. xiii.

³ *Ibid.* p. 97.

art and appreciation is one of circumstance only: the same creative process is gone through, only the conditions under which the impressions are received being different. Beauty is intuited in both cases—beauty has no degrees.

This is a definite and interesting theory of intuition, the following of which is enlightening, especially on the subject of beauty; but for one searching for the essential nature of intuition it holds difficulties.

First: there must, it seems to me, be some essential difference between the spiritual activity, which is the *foundation* of all a mind's knowing, and that which is the outcome of the same. The former consists of what most psychologists describe as perception, i.e. a receiving of impressions or sensations from the external physical world into consciousness so that they become part of the perceiver's mental being. The latter is conscious creation: in the case of genius, of works of art or thought or action, and, in the case of the smaller man, of less notable entities. Croce calls both intuition, and indeed they are both expressions of a mental synthesis of impressions. In the first case, however, the process is unconscious and the effect unsought, there is no deliberate expression of a state of the soul; a shrugging of the shoulders, a cry of recognition, may be "objectified in consciousness" and yet not consciously objectified. There may very well be no impression without expression, but the expression need not be a conscious, still less a deliberate, one. The mind is not giving but receiving, and can select only to some biological or psychological end, not in order to express itself; in fact it is itself in the becoming stage, not in the producing, and though the two may often synchronize, yet the difference remains essential.

I am puzzled too at this point as to what Signor Croce believes to be expressed in these basic intuitions. When a child or, for that matter, a man, intuits a patch of blue sky which he does when he recognizes it as a patch of blue sky (or possibly as something else), we can realize that he has selected among many sensations. Is that selection his expression? And

if it is in fact not mechanical, but spiritual activity, what is the motive of his selection, to what end does he make just that synthesis? And how is it necessarily beauty and not utility?

When Croce is describing an expression which is so complicated and difficult in its manifestations as to draw attention to its beauty or ugliness, he describes the artist (we are all artists in so far as we express) as consciously and deliberately trying this and that method of expressing his impressions until at last he attains expression, that is, beauty.

Croce affirms that both kinds of expression are alike intuition, art, beauty; that is, exactly the same spiritual activity, the only difference being in the elaboration of the impressions dealt with. This seems to me false in fact and unsatisfactory in theory. False in fact because the intuition of a situation expressed by a cry: "caught!" may be of as extended a field of impressions as that expressed by a sonnet, say, or a statue, and yet convey no idea of beauty; and unsatisfactory in theory because the problem of beauty is really burked, our fundamental intuitions being not beautiful but useful.

Croce is apparently insensitive to religion; he appears to feel no spiritual need for metaphysics; but he does seem to be very much alive to beauty. Where, however, in his rigid scheme, does beauty make an appearance? It is expression, he says. But we are conscious of beauty, there is a definite feeling or at least intellectual realisation that rises in us at the presence of the beautiful. When we shrug our shoulders, that feeling is not necessarily present, yet we have expressed ourselves admirably; neither is it present in the ordinary run of perceptions; we may grunt with displeasure, but the sound is not beautiful to us nor to the hearers except under particular conditions, in a poem or play for instance. Yet these are adequate expressions and we readily admit that without expression there cannot be beauty. There must surely be, in expression which conveys beauty, some touch of wonder or awe in addition to adequacy, that is, something in addition to perfect expression. It is hardly a question, as

Croce suggests, of the beauty or ugliness becoming noticeable because of attendant circumstances, but of its actual presence or absence to the creating mind. It is true that in "The Essence of Aesthetic" Croce says (p. 30): "What gives coherence and unity to the intuition is feeling", but this is a plain denial of his "expression and nothing but expression" theory.

It follows, then, that if we intuit beauty we are expressing a different type of mental working, or spiritual activity, from that we experience when we perceive there is a misprint and express impatience by some movement or sound, or on a more primitive occasion perceive a candy and say "Thank you". Beauty, Croce affirms, is form, and outside the realm of feeling: (pleasure, pain, as has been pointed out, being of an accidental though invariable nature). Nevertheless, he speaks of "the divine joy of creation", creation is expression, expression beauty, and that "joy" seems to be just what is required to make Croce's barren "expression" blossom into "beauty". Yet if this "divine joy" is just the hedonic pleasure which accompanies practical activity it cannot be the artists' joy which accompanies expression in the mind alone and which may never achieve utility. He accounts for the very evident presence of "pleasure" when we realize beauty by appealing to the "unity of the spirit" and drawing the hedonic characteristic of the economic practical value back into the intuitive act. But Croce has already told us that intuition is the only activity that can stand alone, that in fact it often does, and to attribute what appears so essential to the recognition of beauty as feeling (or that same recognition) to an illogical accident, is not an acceptable doctrine. What is beauty if not that expression which elicits a peculiar kind or complexity of feeling? That feeling seems the essential fact, and that it is invariably accompanied by expression, the accident.

Again, if the pleasure that accompanies intuition is a loan from the practical economic activity, why does it vary in intensity? It is not surely the most beautiful sight or sound, i.e.

the most complex intuition that is nearest akin to the economic. It certainly is not the case that the most beautiful is the most useful, or, even in Croce's way of looking at it, it is not true that the most complex unit of intuition, or expression, is the most useful. If there is no degree of intensity in expression, there is in hedonistic feeling, as far as it is aroused by beauty—the more beautiful, the deeper or more complex the feeling.

In short, can beauty be just intuition? Just expression?

Secondly: Croce makes it clear when he gives us the scheme of intuiting under the letters (a), (b), (c), (d), that (b) the internal, mental arrangement of the synthesis is the intuition proper, and that (d) the external expression in physical form, though frequent, is by no means necessary. When he says there is no impression without expression, he means internal expression. Now what is the internal expression of, say, a sonnet? No matter how elaborate the work of art, Croce says, as a work of art it is a unity, not a multiplicity, and requires only one intuition, so that one might just as well say a tragedy as a sonnet. What is intuited? The idea? The feeling? The form? The form—Croce says. But the form consists of words, of lines, of sentences, of rhymes, of alliterations and cadences, of contrasts, of pauses, of figures of speech. Does Signor Croce really mean that every vowel sound, every remote suggestion conveyed by the choice of a particular word, is arranged in the poet's mind before he puts pen to paper? Even in *Hamlet*? It is obvious that he does not.

Croce himself does not seem consistent in limiting intuition proper to internal expression: "Just as one who is deluded as to the amount of his material wealth, is confronted by arithmetic, which states its exact amount, so he who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his own thoughts and images is brought back to reality, when he is obliged to cross the Pons Asinorum of expression. Let us say to the former, count; to the latter, speak. Or, here is a pencil, draw, express yourself."¹ The internal expression then may be unsatis-

¹ *Aesthetic*, p. 11.

factory, and external expression be necessary to exact intuition. And Croce's illustrations throughout most of the *Aesthetics* suggest the same.¹

Is it really impossible to appreciate the loveliness, of a woman, say, unless one has the technical skill to select from her physical characteristics those that make a harmony? Can one really appreciate a poem only when one creates it oneself, stimulated by suggestion or artist? And may one not be able to experience Lear's passion without his power of expression? Did his power of expression then increase his sufferings? Was he the victim of his own words? Was Turgenev wrong in imagining a "Lear of the Steppes"? Are there no "mute inglorious Miltons"?

It is very difficult to believe that intensity of aesthetic feeling goes hand in hand and at equal pace with intensity of technical skill, that genius is not the happy accord of the two.

Thirdly: Does Croce finally make a clear distinction between intuition and concept? Both are knowledge which find their reality in expression. You have the logical thought first or innately, apparently, and then intuit it.² But how is the thought different from the knowledge brought by intuition? In the passage quoted above Croce says that "one is knowledge attained through the imagination and the other knowledge obtained through the intellect", but the intellect works through images. We cannot think logically without words even if we can intuit. Then one is knowledge of "individual things" and the other "of the relations between them". But how is the knowledge of a relation arrived at unless through the intuition of the whole which is composed of the elements related as well as of the relationship? If, as he sums up, knowledge "is productive of either images or of concepts", is a concept not in fact an image of a peculiar rarefied kind? Even on Croce's own argument it seems to be, for he acknowledges not only that the elements of the con-

¹ *Aesthetic*, pp. 8, 145, 197.

² *Ibid.* p. 44.

cepts are intuitions but that the concept itself has to go through the process of intuition before achieving reality.

Croce repudiates this conclusion¹ but does he rebut it? Building on his foundations there seems to me to be only one fundamental way of arriving at knowledge and that is the intuitive, through the imagination, through the individual; one, that is, of individual things (which may be ideas) and which produces images. The concept, in short, if we follow Croce's exposition, is a species of intuition distinguished for practical convenience. I think the following extracts speak for themselves:

I. "If this character of expressivity be common to the concept and to the representation, its universality is peculiar to the concept"²: i.e. expression and aesthetic are not quite synonymous or else "intuition" and "concept" are not distinct.

II. "Truth is faith... In vain you will lift two fingers of the hand, and then the third and fourth, in order to demonstrate to one who does not wish for demonstration that two and two are four; he will reply that he is not convinced. And indeed he cannot be convinced, if he do not accomplish that inner spiritual synthesis by which twice two and four reveal themselves as two names of one and the same thing."³ Here we have the basic synthesis of all knowing, whether it be aesthetic or logical; in the one case it is the representation, in the other the concept which comes *a priori*, Croce says, but his examples suggest a common nature, in fact, *one* miracle of knowing, not two.

III. "The concept is not applied to the intuition, because it does not exist, even for a moment, outside the intuition, and the judgment is a *primitive act* of the spirit, it is the logical spirit itself."⁴ This seems to be the same thing as saying that the logical spirit itself *is* the intuition, i.e. that there is only one primitive act of the spirit whether that be representation or concept.

¹ *Logic*, chap. I.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 51, 53.

² *Ibid.* p. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 215.

IV. "The logical *a priori* synthesis presupposes an aesthetic *a priori* synthesis. . . . In the logical act intuition is *blind* without a concept, as the concept is *void* without the intuition. But pure intuition is not blind because it has its own proper intuitive light."¹ This makes it quite clear that in Croce's view the concept needs the intuitive act before it can come to birth, but when he describes intuition without concept Croce seems to shirk the issue. What is "its own proper intuitive light"? If it is totally unconnected with a concept, it can surely have no meaning, cannot be a part of knowledge; even a cry, a patch of blue sky are mere sensations or emotions unless transfigured by the intuition, the fundamental knowing, and this, it seems to me, must also be akin to conceptual knowledge even if "pseudo-conceptual".

I cannot see, even if we did attain "pure intuition" in such primitive forms as these, that Croce's theory that art is "expression and nothing but expression", and that expression is a synonym for intuition, will hold. Art is not "blind" and so must, according to Croce's own verdict, partake of conceptual knowledge.

V. "A logical affirmation . . . can be regarded as well thought-out and so also as very well expressed, perfectly aesthetic because perfectly logical; or as very well expressed but ill-thought, or not truly thought, and so not logical, and yet sentimental, passionate and imaginative."² "But", Croce should have added, "not expressed". And here your "expressed" cannot mean "intuited" in any sense but that the *a priori* logical synthesis is intuited, always remembering that intuition must be inward before it becomes external.

VI. "If by this it were meant merely that one identical truth or one identical concept can assume infinite verbal or expressive forms. . . . there would be nothing to object."³ If "infinite expressive" forms implies the different aspects of a truth that are grasped, i.e. intuited, expressed, then surely

¹ *Logic*, p. 225.

² *Ibid.* pp. 148-9.

³ *Ibid.* p. 130.

there are infinite truths to correspond to the infinite intuitions, and the truth and the intuition of the truth may be considered one; i.e. once again there seems to be *one* type of *a priori* synthesis, since some connection with the conceptual seems always necessary before the "expression" can take place.

VII. "Those concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions are no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and fused, for they have lost all independence and autonomy."¹ Croce uses as illustration the ethical observations in *Promessi Sposi*. But have these observations lost their conceptual character? Are they not at one and the same time completely fused in the work of art and logically clear? Are they not, in fact, art and logic at one and the same time?

Lastly: Is creative ability commensurable with quantity of intuition? It would seem to follow that the artist is the most knowledgeable of men. Intuitions, too, are no less necessary to the man of science. Every line of argument seems to lead to the conclusion that a man of science, of concepts, must be in equal degree an artist, an intuitor. In fact, however, this is not often the case. Da Vinci's are rare.

Signor Croce, then, with so many other philosophers, realizes the ultimate and inexplicable miracle which takes place in perception, when the mechanical becomes part of the spiritual, when impression becomes expression, when fact becomes knowledge, and he calls the process intuition; but he does not satisfy us that the output of the artist is only quantitatively different from first primitive intuitions, nor does he explain (though he accepts) the intuition of the artistic genius, while in opposing intuition and concept he repudiates "intellectual intuition" of the ultimate type altogether.

¹ *Aesthetic*, p. 2.

Chapter IV

JUNG

PSYCHOLOGY is a young science, but even so it has its eras. Up to the present day pioneers have been so busy analysing and describing the more generally accepted mental functions and processes that they have not had the time to devote to more problematical mental activities, and perhaps with the former so vaguely understood the abstention has been fortunate. At any rate not till the present day, i.e. twentieth century, has intuition been propounded by a professional psychologist as an activity, the understanding of which is vital to an understanding of mental functioning generally, and though the process is very commonly assumed nowadays, as far as I know only Jung has described its psychological nature and function with any pretence at fullness and accuracy.

The schools of Freud and Jung and Adler all interest themselves primarily in the subconscious or unconscious mind, whereas their predecessors were absorbed in and overwhelmed by the intricacies of the conscious. And not until the existence and status of the unconscious is established can intuition (as understood by them) as a mental function, though not as a gift of God, be even surmised to any practical effect.

Nevertheless there have been many unprofessional psychologists among the philosophers, so that neither the word "intuition" nor the idea is new.

Spinoza asserted an infinite number of "attributes" to "substance", though he named and could name only two: extension and thought; but he intuited intuition and subsumed the idea under thought.

Kant gave us an idea of intuition when he enumerated his

categories as so many avenues and methods of immediate or intuitive knowing.

Bergson, descriptively, though not analytically, discovered and described a professionally unrecognized way of knowing—or perhaps realizing—which he called intuition.

Religion and ethics laid claim to and described intuition, and magic practised it throughout the ages.

It is Jung who not only asserts and describes, but analyses the origins, the workings and the functions of this debatable and elusive faculty; without a short summary of his conception of the human mind we cannot understand his conception of intuition.

Freud and Jung both analyse the mind into three strata or divisions, which the latter calls (1) the conscious, (2) the personal unconscious, and (3) the collective unconscious.

The personal unconscious consists of all the feelings, thoughts, sensations and intuitions which have once been in consciousness and for practical reasons been found unsatisfactory or undesirable, and repressed, and which in the repressed condition have combined and developed and formed new mental groups which, however, never appear in normal consciousness except in dreams and phantasies and other indirect ways, when they make an appearance in fancy dress so as not too easily to be recognized by the “censor”.

The “collective unconscious” originates and manifests itself in the same way except that the repressed experiences are not those of the individual but of the race back to its remotest ancestors, and are therefore necessarily common to all human beings and many of them to the higher animals.

All these layers of consciousness are active and affect our actions, but the two latter only indirectly since direct action brings them into consciousness.

There are, says Jung, four ways of mental functioning: thought, feeling, sensation and intuition. The first two are rational and deductive, the second two irrational and immediate. Thought and sensation are connected only with the

conscious; feeling and intuition with all three kinds of consciousness.

Intuition is defined by Jung inadequately, but described most fully. He gives us two definitions:

(1) "That psychological function which transmits perception in an unconscious way",¹ which is too vague to be of much value and even suggests that it is the transmitting and not the perception which is unconscious, whereas he says elsewhere that it is the latter.

(2) "The perception of one's unconscious processes",² which, since one cannot consciously perceive the unconscious, implies that the perception itself is unconscious, and this is indeed what Jung means.

We need not feel aggrieved with Jung, as one legitimately may with Spinoza and Bergson, for his inadequate definitions, since in truth he describes and illustrates most abundantly; after former exponents we exclaim with relief: "Here indeed is God's plenty."

Intuition then is like sensation in that it (i) perceives unconsciously, e.g. when it uses the result of an unconscious perception, assumes it as a fact; (ii) perceives what is in the unconscious mind. If passive, these perceptions take the form of "phantasies", images, hallucinations, i.e. the mind very definitely sees, or hears, or assumes, or inclines, but such sights and sounds and assumptions and inclinations are peculiar to itself and inaccessible to other minds. If, however, the intuition is active the situation is much more complicated: what is intuited is not an object but a situation or the possibilities of a situation. The possibilities of a situation imply a future, so that intuition seems to be a sort of teleological sense, and also (since it is active) a power. The unconscious, then, under the influence of intuition, creates new forms, or, as Jung says, "possibilities", i.e. it shapes the future, adventures into new regions, it creates. And the result of this creation appears in consciousness as fact, as immediately

¹ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 567.

² *Ibid.* p. 168.

received truth, as obvious courses of action, and, working always hand in hand with consciousness, intuition *makes*, aesthetically.

In fact we have development, Jung would probably say progress.

The content of the unconscious, however, is the accumulation of the mental experiences undesirable from the practical point of view. For some biological or social reason they have been rejected in the development of man and society. Moreover whatever is most opposed to the main characteristics of the individual finds its only outlet in the unconscious. Thus the man who is of the predominantly thinking type has little use for feeling, which, since it is part of his human make up, finds a life for itself in the unconscious. The intuitive person represses sensation, and so on. The typically masculine man indulges his repressed feminine qualities in his unconscious, and the essentially feminine woman, her masculine characteristics. But, whatever in a person's mentality is capable of dismissal from consciousness must of necessity be feeble in its nature, and, Jung says, primitive, even infantile. Intuition, then, in dealing with the unconscious is most certainly dealing with a very real part of the personality, but at the same time with the feeblest and least developed side of it, not with the individual as a whole. The findings of intuition must therefore, as Jung points out,¹ be in some sense out of touch with reality. "Intuition discovers truth then, but judgment is altogether lacking."² "Intuition, when the dominant mental function, tends to produce either the "mystical dreamer or seer on the one hand, or the fantastical crank or artist on the other";³ or else the "restless seeker after possibilities in practical life, who loses interest as soon as the possibilities have become actualities".⁴

¹ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 189.

² *Ibid.* p. 465.

³ *Ibid.* p. 508.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 463.

Jung gives us examples of actual intuitions which may, and do, take various forms. There is for instance the objective image: serpent, or grail, embodying a complete psychic situation which intuition interprets—unconsciously, since the process is not “here is a serpent in my mind: that means, etc.”, but rather the image of the serpent is in the mind and the intuitive mind realizes certain facts, perhaps even without recognizing any connection between the image and the realized truth.

The intuition may too be actualized through a “symbol”, i.e. a sign which means not only a group of realized ideas but the possibility of further realization. Jung gives the Cross as an example of a symbol when it means to us, not just the Christian faith, but all the unfathomed mysteries and possibilities involved in that faith. A scientific hypothesis may be an intuition of either some physical truth or of a mental category or mode of apprehending facts necessary to man by the peculiar structure of his mind. Jung suggests ether and the atom. And so of metaphysical facts: we intuit God, immortality, freedom.

Such then is the nature of intuition as conceived and described by Jung, and as more or less assumed by Freud and Adler. And if at first it looks a little fantastic, we have not considered it for long before we begin to realize how many problems it solves, how many difficulties it dissipates. To begin with what is so favourite a philosophical argument nowadays: such a conception of intuition justifies the common, unspecialized use of the word by the man in the street. He talks of “womanly intuition”, and Jung justifies him; he talks of realizing a man’s character, or motive, or feeling intuitively, and Jung justifies him; he talks of grasping the possibilities of a situation by a sudden intuition and Jung justifies him.

Then again if we accept Jung’s doctrine our problem with regard to moral intuition is solved. With Spinoza we see the moralist as one who is able to grasp the “possibilities” of a

social or personal situation, and, by a refined unconscious perception of the facts and their relationship to the "archetypes", the hereditary ideas, or rather Jung would say possibility of ideas, given us by the collective unconscious of the race when old experiences

do attain

To something of prophetic strain.

The artist too becomes an open book to us, or at least we are able to turn over a considerable number of his pages, for either he, in virtue of his unconscious but nevertheless accurate and discriminating perception, is, so to speak, seized hold of and possessed by the object so that he describes it, almost one might say unconsciously, at least with a result which appears to him as the work of an external agency (in reality his unconscious perceptions), or else he produces descriptions, stories, myths, symbolic structures which he has unconsciously perceived in "images", and the interpretation of which is known, vaguely certainly, but yet known, by himself or his public. "Their (i.e. poets and thinkers) influence essentially consists in the fact that they voice rather more clearly and resoundingly what we all know, and, only in so far as they express this universal unconscious 'knowledge' have they any considerable effect, whether educational or seductive."¹ In fact they set before us

Those first affections—

Those shadowy recollections,

Which, be they what they may,

Are yet the fountain-light of all our day,

Are yet a master-light of all our seeing.

The case of religious intuition is still clearer, whether what is intuited is God himself or some dogma essential to salvation. God himself is a primordial image or symbol as the case may be; the first if He is realized as a fact, the possibility of accepting which is hereditary and part of our mental nature;

¹ *Psychological Types*, p. 268.

the second if the idea suggests not a fact only but a possibility of new spiritual experience. For Jung recognizes spirit as he recognizes soul—the latter as, so to speak, a summary of the personal, the former of the collective unconscious.

And so of dogma: the waters of baptism are primordial archetypes; they convey ideas which touch the very depths of human experience, the ideas of sin, of cleansing, of new life. The Church with her religious intuition has absorbed and transformed and classified, and so has a power both “educational (*educo*) and seductive”.

And since intuition perceives the relevant and, by a sensitiveness and refinement absent from sensation, even when the latter is stimulated by a purpose, is able to ignore what, though present to outer and inner senses, is beside the point; it has, too, its place in the world of the man of science and of abstract thought, and, where it is abundantly exercised, appears as genius, and alike solves old problems and initiates new ones. And so we have an explanation of Spinoza’s “fourth method”, which he himself failed to give us. The “mathematical boy” and Brindley of engineering fame, whose genius seems to be unaccompanied by adequate education or knowledge, becomes acceptable to our minds along with the great thinkers and inventors of more orthodox type. In fact we have an explanation of intellectual intuition of the final or teleological kind.

Indeed our problem seems solved until we consider that an explanation is but an hypothesis until it is proven, and that many difficulties have to be overcome before Jung’s intuition will be generally used as even a working hypothesis.

(a) To begin with: unless we accept whole-heartedly the theory of the “unconscious” there is neither room nor use for his explanations of intuition. The unconscious as part of man’s mental outfit is not always accepted even by psychologists, still less by philosophers, though it is certainly more and more generally assumed. Freud’s subconscious, and Jung’s unconscious, are repudiated with more or less violence

by a large part of the thinking world, including some qualified to judge. Jung himself questions part of Freud's findings and Adler's too, and Freud repudiates some of the assumptions of both. Yet these three are so closely bound together in their methods and results that it is difficult to think of one without the others. Where workers in the same laboratory cannot agree, we may indeed feel that a most promising line of speculation is being followed up, but we cannot feel the conviction of proof on any one particular result of the experiments—unless indeed the idea brings its own proof with it, the immediate conviction that often accompanies a primary truth.

But Jung's theory of intuition does not do this. It is so closely bound up with one of the most difficult sections of his doctrine that the mind is rather shocked than enlightened; tends to an immediate repudiation rather than to an immediate acceptance. We cannot allow a large part of his teaching on intuition without accepting his theory of "archetypes", of hereditary "engrams", of the "collective" unconscious, all difficult and even improbable notions—and most certainly unproven ones, in spite of all Jung's illustrations. In fact the illustrations themselves stagger the mind even more than the doctrine. Our credulity reels before his explanation of Longfellow's *Hiawatha*, of Shakespeare's

When that rash humour which my mother gave me
Makes me forgetful. . . .

and of the three extraordinary "Miller fantasies". Without a very great deal more persuasion, something more closely approaching proof, we prefer to put them aside as unpalatable illustrations of a great theory. His findings, too, seem partially contradicted by Freud's, which yet Jung seems to accept. They both affirm as a fact really proved by years of practical medical experience, that certain images or ideas which appear in consciousness have a definite and constant meaning to be interpreted by the initiated; small animals,

for instance, enclosed spaces, trees. Both say these images are common to the human race and are subconsciously understood by every one. Jung asserts that they have been handed down from primordial times and represent the most constant and universal and frequently experienced, as well as the most profound of human experiences, while among them Freud includes such modern objects as a man's hat and a watering can. Yet neither of them explains that it is the power of analogy that has been inherited, but assert the actual objective image. The meaning of the image too, often depends on a play on the sound of a word which necessarily differs from language to language.

I am not here attempting to depreciate the interest or the value of such suggestions. I realize that we are on the verge, or even in the midst of discovery, in an enormously interesting and important field of knowledge. But Jung himself would be the first to agree how much work has still to be done before conclusions definite enough for the foundation of further theory can be arrived at. Unless then we accept Jung's theory of the unconscious with its attendant theory of archetypes, we cannot feel that his "intuition" is established.

(b) There appear too to be inconsistencies in Jung's own account. He tells us that intuition is "The noblest of human gifts"¹ and "that it is a characteristic of infantile and primitive psychology";² he tells us how the intuitive subject is characterized in the following passage: "The morality of the intuitive is governed neither by intellect nor by feeling; he has his own characteristic morality, which consists in a loyalty to his intuitive view of things and a voluntary submission to its authority. Consideration for the welfare of his neighbours is weak...neither can we detect in him any respect for his neighbours' convictions and customs; in fact, he is not infrequently put down as an immoral and ruthless adventurer...he readily applies himself to callings wherein he may expand his abilities in many directions. Merchants,

¹ *Psychological Types*, p. 460.

² *Ibid.* p. 465.

contractors, speculators, agents, politicians, etc. commonly belong to this type."¹ This is when intuition is exercised on external objects; when the objects are internal the result of the less modified type is the "seer" or "fantastic dreamer", the "crank", or the "fanatic".

Then Jung tells us (what common talk told us) that "this type is more prone to favour women than men". Now Jung is no feminist, and indeed, the most ardent feminist would be staggered at being told that the characteristics enumerated above were *more commonly* found in women than men, even if they are limited to the social rather than the professional sphere, as he suggests. We should at first sight, and at second too, say that they were, if peculiar at all, peculiar to men: indeed, among the positive qualities may be found those which we should most readily name if we were trying to enumerate the characteristics that most men have and most women lack, and among the negative those which were more rarely found in women. Is Jung here judging too exclusively by the unconscious?—a practice against which he warns the intuitive type—and seeing in women what, being only primordial and infantile in its development finds its only life in the unconscious? However that may be, the practical results of his medical researches tell him that it is woman who is the commoner intuitive, and his theoretical descriptions of the type seem to point to the qualities by which we more commonly distinguish men. Where contradictions occur we are not on sure ground.

(c) There appears too, to be some contradiction as to the value of the unconscious workings themselves, and to the results of intuition: the contents of the unconscious consist of mental experiences that have been rejected by consciousness for reasons good as well as bad. They may for instance be good from a social point of view and bad from an individual, e.g. sex repressions; bad for the biological life, good for the spiritual, e.g. desire for power. But they consist partly, too,

¹ *Ibid.* p. 568.

of what has been, not necessarily repressed, but rather undeveloped, e.g. the masculine qualities in many women, the feminine qualities in many men.

Jung calls intuition the "noblest of human gifts" and justifies his view when he shows how it initiates action and idea as well as developing symbol and analogy and solving intellectual problems. But how, one wonders, can such results be attained from such poor (as described by Jung) material? He tells us that these rejected and undeveloped traits form new complexes in the unconscious, and we can readily realize that new combinations of weakness may attain to strength, but he does not make it clear to us that the strength is ever there. The new combinations do not break into consciousness in the direct way to be expected from new strength, rather creep in as of old through dream and fantasy. They are not strong enough to become conscious. Their force then is not comparable to that of the contents of consciousness, and, if so, how is it that they have the power to do the pioneer work with which Jung credits them? He seems alternately to under- and overestimate the power and value of the unconscious mind and so, indirectly, of intuition.

He tells us too, and repeats, that the intuitive type is always lacking in judgment. Is it then by a happy chance that our intuition leads us into profitable action? The certainty which we associate with intuition may then be a certainty which concerns itself only with one, and perhaps a very minor point, in a given situation? i.e. it may mislead as easily as lead aright in the solution of the main problem, through a specialized and accurate but not embracing perception? Or, is it only when the intuitive is largely modified by the thinking type that desirable results occur? This last agrees with Spinoza's views but is not enunciated by Jung, nor do I think that he really implies it. His panegyric seems to arise from his realization of the possibilities of intuition, his derogatory descriptions from his analyses; and he does not reconcile them. Neither does he indicate that intuition can be cultivated.

(d) Again; does Jung make it really clear that Intuition is a primary mental function? It is, he says, perception. He distinguishes it from sensation by pointing out that the latter perceives consciously and the former unconsciously. But, firstly, consciously or unconsciously, perceiving is perceiving; we have not made a new function by qualifying the old. And, secondly, if we limit sensation to conscious sensation, we are probably eliminating ninety-nine per cent or more of what we commonly consider sensation. It is the *meaning* of sensations that is clear to our consciousness, not the sensations themselves; we interpret them before we are conscious of them; a very short art training will show us how very far we are from realizing at all the actual sensation experienced through our sense organs; in fact, they probably rarely are experienced in the sense of entering into our mentality. Is all sensation, then, except that of which we become actually conscious, to be called intuition? It is quite clear that Jung means no such thing. On the contrary, he even implies that the "unconscious perception" which he calls intuition is really perception of meaning, of interpretation, not of bald fact round which it "tries to peer". How then do we really distinguish between the functions of sensation or perception and of intuition?

Jung himself is quite clear as to the above realities of sensation, and when we read his descriptions of the "extroverted sensation type" and the "extroverted intuitive type" we have no difficulty in realizing the difference, both theoretical and practical, between sensation and intuition: the first loves the pleasures of the body, the second of experiment. But when we come to the "introverted type" there is a real difficulty. Jung's description of the introverted sensation type, with its instantaneous and unrecognized effect of the object on the subject, so that what is perceived is the subjective rendering of the object, is extraordinarily like the introverted intuitive, and, when he adds that it is all unconsciously coloured by archaic imagery, or even unconsciously expressed in archaic

imagery, it is impossible to see how the introverted sensation type is not "perceiving unconsciously", e.g. is not, according to definition, intuiting.

This would seem at first sight like quibbling, quarrelling over words, since after all Jung does give us a clear and discriminating description of both the sensitive and intuitive types; but this is not really the case, since definition and description ought to coincide with fact. It seems to me that the confusion lies in the definition of intuition. It is not really, as described by Jung, perception at all. It is, it seems to me, judgment, unconscious judgment, or judgment so rapid as to appear unconscious. Intuition "peers round the corners of sensation" so as to see what is suitable to the situation. The perception of the realities, the balances, the harmonies of complexes, or what is wrong or lacking in order to get the balance and harmony, is really a judgment that a rearrangement, an addition, a subtraction is necessary; and so the creative tendency Jung insists upon as characteristic of the intuitive type.

If then we describe intuition as a form of judgment and yet talk about an intuitive type, are we back again on the repudiated faculty "psychology"? Is there a faculty of judgment which may be an outstanding quality: one may have a faculty for judging the most suitable arrangement of mathematical data, or of colours, or of emotions; but a general faculty of judging in any kind of circumstance? This perhaps accounts for the "crankiness" which Jung notices in the intuitive; he is occupied only with a limited aspect of the world around him. In any case if we are right and Jung's intuition is rapid judgment as a result of rapid perception, it is a variety of intellect, and the type a variety of the rational thinking type, where the success of thought depends on keenness of perception rather than on laborious deductions; the letters are spread before our eyes and we make a word. Perhaps this form of judgment is distinct enough from other forms to deserve a separate name; but in any judgment there must be

some such miracle of insight, a realization of the possibility of the subsumption of a particular under a general, i.e. a faculty of arrangement. Intuition, then, we must conclude is inherent in judgment and gets sufficient special attention to demand its recognition (and so a name) only when the judgment is so rapid as to make the "miraculous" element predominant.

And so we get back to a fundamental recognition of a truth as a truth, that is, truth is its own proof. If this is intuition, then intuition is no specialized faculty, but the foundation of every conceivable kind of knowing.

(e) And lastly: in his lecture on *Psychical Energy* Jung says: "we are speaking here not of God as 'Ding an sich', but only of a human intuition which, as such, is a legitimate object of science." In *Spirit and Life* he states: "'esse in se' . . . 'esse in intellectu solo' . . . I wish to unite these extreme opposites by an 'esse in anima', that is by a psychological standpoint. Our immediate life is only a world of images." In *Psychological Types* he writes: "Those age-old allegories of sun, fire, wind, breath, etc., which from earliest times have symbolized the begetting, world-moving, creative power, have all come about in this way . . . the idea of a creative world principle is a projected perception of the living essence in man himself."¹

Now if intuition of a truth is intuiting one's conviction of a truth, a truth for us individually; if intuiting the possibilities of a situation is only manufacturing a reason for an inevitable action (inevitable because the outcome of our peculiarities); if, when one understands through intuition the fundamental meaning of things, one is only projecting the character of one's "anima" into the universe, is it much use taking such pains to enumerate in how many different ways we can walk round a sphere and arrive at our original position? We may think we are thinking, or feel we are feeling, or sense our sensations, or intuit our intuition, but if the objects are our

¹ P. 250.

own ideal creations, we may realize them in any way with equal profit; we are not acquiring knowledge but exercising our being, no doubt a healthy experience, but one which any conceivable mode of existing will give us. Everything becomes a phantasy, and when everything is phantastical and unstable, or at least, when its stability depends not on external but internal reality, it seems more a game than a serious occupation for a scientific mind to analyse the modes of arriving at truths which depend on, and are not external to, those very modes of functioning. In short a theory of intuition which does not at least assume a stable exterior world, "in se" or "in intellectu" seems to me worthless frivolity. This standpoint is, however, not necessary to Jung's psychology and possibly not even to his philosophy; at any rate we can accept the former if necessary without the latter.

We find then that Jung does not give us any definite and unchallengeable right to say we have run to earth the faculty for which we have been seeking; that it has turned out to be neither a dream of desire, nor an old friend under a new name, and that if we do not yet fully understand it we may rest assured as to its existence.

On the contrary the wish still seems as though it might be father to the thought; and perception or judgment still seem possible or alternative denominations, while there is as yet no clear distinction made between what we have described as "fundamental" and "ultimate" intuitions.

On the other hand the opening up of the realms of the unconscious does seem to offer new possibilities. We certainly do not understand its workings and it seems likely enough that, though Jung does not make the distinction, the unconscious perceiving of the unconscious may be so very different in its functioning from the unconscious perceiving of the external world, as to demand a different name and a different analysis of its nature, though Jung calls both "intuition". Jung's description of the workings of the extrovert artist tallies so closely with Goethe's experience, for instance,

as (unless indeed he based it on Goethe's description) to convince us that here is really some inward unconscious mind-functioning which to call either voiced perception or judgment would be a misuse of terms. It might almost appear that intuition is an unconscious faculty for arranging data according to the immediate need of the situation, in fact according to a final end, but whether this end is desired, as would seem to be the case in solving an intellectual problem, or unknown or only vaguely surmised, as an artistic or religious intuition, is not clear; neither, as has been already pointed out, would this get over the difficulty of accepting a general "judging faculty", nor be easily discriminated from instinct.

In short the problem of teleology, which is not, at least necessarily, a psychological problem, is involved.

There remains, too, another theory, suggested by Jung, but only indirectly suggested as a theory of intuition. In describing the "collective unconscious" and in describing very young people, and particularly their connection with the mother, Jung tells us that the young mind has no personality of its own, that it is in great degree part of the maternal, paternal, universal unconscious. He tells us, too, that the "participation mystique" which is very common among primitive men, and which consists of an unconscious identification of the subject with the object, was once more or less universal, and that children and undeveloped man are very prone to intuitive knowing; and Koffka in *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* remarks: "When we say: Women rely more on instinct than men, we mean just this—that in a woman's behaviour the Ego is less separated from the environment than is a man's."¹ May intuition, therefore, be a knowledge of what is common to all humanity as being part of the universal unconscious, but of particular importance to the simple and undeveloped because unrivalled and unsuppressed by other forms of knowing? So we get

¹ P. 361.

at the meaning of Wordsworth's description of the child as—

Mighty prophet! seer blest!
On whom those truths do rest
Which we are toiling all our lives to find.

And so we get to an understanding of the very general idea of "God's Fool", and also of the common reverence for the insane and imbecile among primitive people. They know clearly and surely truths which we with wider and more complex mental workings know only unconsciously or uncertainly.

If this is the case, a very profitable field of investigation seems to lie in a selection and examination, not only of the individuals in question, but of the reasons, conscious or unconscious, that man has for respecting and even reverencing them.

M. Lévy-Bruhl has an interesting variation on Jung's theory which he has developed while studying the mentality of primitive peoples.

He considers that there are two quite definite and different (though not contradictory) types of mental activity, one (ours) the logical, the other—"pre-logical". The main characteristic of the former is deduction, and of the latter a "participation mystique", by which he means that recognition by primitive man of a peculiar and particular connection which takes precedence of all other possible and actual forms of relationship between himself and another object: man, or tree, or stone, ghost, or storm, or deed. The same thing applies to any two or more objects external to him. A similar experience in a very mild degree is present to us when we say: "Oh, yes! on Monday, that is my lucky day"; or: "Bats, and an uneasy creeping on one's scalp."

The connecting bond between this and Jung's theory is that Lévy-Bruhl finds that such ideas are common to large groups of people, who therefore are conversant with and act

upon these mystic convictions, inaccessible, invisible to the merely logical mind, which he calls "représentations collectives", just as Jung believes that the human race as a whole acts in accordance with subconscious "images", which he calls "archetypes". While the latter, however, relegates both the meaning of the archetypes and their power over us to the realms of the unconscious, Lévy-Bruhl implies that the pre-logical mind is quite conscious of the "représentations collectives" though he takes them so much for granted that he sees no necessity for explanation, is indeed surprised that anyone should not be aware of them. Sometimes, too, without being conscious of any particular "représentation collective" we recognize, if we examine our minds, a feeling of the rightness or propriety or suitability—if only an aesthetic one—in action or idea in which we ourselves take no actual part. Contrast, for instance, our feelings about ghosts, where the conventional shudder is more often caused by the circumstances than by the ghostly idea, with the satisfaction with which we read:

Thrice toss these oaken ashes in the air;
 Thrice sit thou mute in this enchanted chair;
 Then thrice three times tie up this true love's knot,
 And murmur soft "she will or she will not".

We naturally accept the idea of "thrice" under these circumstances. Browning has attempted to describe such a state of mind in his picture of Lazarus who during the time of death had attained to an immediate knowledge which he retained on his return to life:

Speak of some trifling fact—he will gaze rapt
 With stupor at its very littleness—
 (Far as I see) as if in that indeed
 He caught prodigious import, whole results;
 And so will turn to us the bystanders
 In ever the same stupor (note this point)
 That we too see not with his opened eyes.

Genius, indeed, often seems to be a faculty for perceiving a "participation mystique" unrealized by the rest, whether genius be moral, or aesthetic, or logical.

While Jung believes that the ideas of the subconscious conveyed by, or contained in, archetypes have a very strong influence and, in cases of mental disease, an overpowering one, he does not postulate that their influence is absolute and undeviating, but Lévy-Bruhl declares that not only would a primitive man under their control not even dream of acting contrary to their guidance, but that he could not even conceive such a possibility. Their authority is unquestioned.

Jung again believes that the archetypes are common to the human race and finds their traces in any literature or legends or customs that he examines, no matter what their historical or geographical diversity; but Lévy-Bruhl does not imply more than that these "représentations collectives" are found among any one tribe or race, though he believes that there are so many in every society of primitives as to be the main ground of their mentality.

Jung says that the archetypes are not only universal but (in the narrower sense) eternal, but Lévy-Bruhl gives us a history though not an origin. Among absolutely primitive peoples as undeveloped as the Australian aborigines, he finds the "perceptions mystiques" and the "représentations collectives" unquestioned and their authority absolute; but in more developed communities he finds both in a lesser degree, and a consequent creation and interest in myth and legend, as though, in Jung's phraseology, they were being gradually relegated to the subconscious; while in the logical mind of modern man they are only relics.

It ought to be noticed that however clearly the theories of the two observers tally, there is one big and quite vital difference when we are considering their relationship to the subject of intuition. Lévy-Bruhl shows how the influence of the "perception mystique" is exerted in every detail, important and unimportant, of the savage's life, while Jung at

least suggests that his archetypes make their influence apparent only in vital matters and at critical times, that otherwise, though steady and constant, they have an occasional and limited, not a constant, bearing, i.e. healthy people under normal conditions believe at least in general obedience to logic, or feeling, or sensation, or intuition as their type impels them; and though it seems to me that M. Lévy-Bruhl is wrong in describing the mental phenomenon he observes among savages as "pré-logique" since from one aspect it is eminently logical, this does not alter the fact that a logical conclusion seems to them of importance secondary to that of the "participation".

It would be as absurd as arrogant not to be concerned at the loss of, if indeed we *have* lost, a way of thinking, even if the loss is more than compensated by a logical gain, and, as Bergson has suggested, this may not be altogether so. It is regretted by some thinkers that the moral intuition is not accompanied by a corresponding sense of obligation, while others think that it is always so accompanied, and that to know what is right is to have some urge, however faint, to act accordingly. But among primitive peoples quoted by Lévy-Bruhl there is the knowledge of the right way to behave accompanied by an unquestioned obligation, as it seems sometimes to have been with the saints of old. It is true that the knowledge so acquired as the immediate result of the "participation mystique" is not always satisfactory in its nature, but in our own times knowledge is no doubt far in advance of moral obligation, and were the assurance of the right way to behave accompanied by an absolute fiat, a large portion at least of our troubles would disappear.

To lose the gift of knowledge and obligation combined would be a loss indeed, if we could be sure that the intuitive powers of the savage led to sure and profitable knowledge; but though the knowledge is often astonishing and seems always certain to the savage, it does not always, or even often, seem so to us. Their truth is indeed often false and sometimes

so with terrible consequences, as in the discovery of the party "guilty" of the death of a fellow tribesman. Early training, the rites of initiation, the power of custom, with their accompanying hypnotic influences, suggestion, and conditional reflexes, account for so much, that we feel a more exhaustive examination of the facts might account for much more, if not all.

We are inclined then to discover in the "intuition" of Lévy-Bruhl's savage a valuable though dangerous means of education, already indeed known to us, but no immediate mode of gaining knowledge.

The relics of the power of such immediate knowledge and its accompanying obligations which we still find in ourselves confirm us in our view that unless the result can be made more fundamentally valuable the gift is hardly desirable. We find the "compulsion complex" a sign of mental disease, not mental health. Our conditioned reflexes in the realm of thought when unjustified by logic are generally silly and often harmful as has sometimes been realized by people owning houses or vehicles burdened with the number "thirteen". When we murmur "convince a woman against her will" we are paying no compliment to the sex. National hatred and family prejudice, which may be considered as survivals, do not make life easier or happier.

Can there be any connection between Jung's "universal unconscious", Lévy-Bruhl's "participation mystique", Whitehead's "prehensions", Spinoza's idea of the mental and physical aspect to every phenomenon, and Wordsworth's feeling for the spiritual side to natural appearance, or even the "Gestalt" theory that thought and feeling may occur outside the ego? Is it possible that man is losing a faculty for feeling these things, perhaps because of its unreliability and biological unsucccess? And could this account for the apparent increase in mental or spiritual loneliness which torments modern man and is perhaps a frequent cause of suicide? We may ask the question, but our information is so inadequate as

to make even a tentative answer quite impossible. But unanswered questions point the way to investigation and there seems here, at least, scope for the search for a disappearing or undeveloped power or powers. Experience and experiment are our needs. Of the former there is a host, in history and biography as well as legend and literature—but how unverifiable! At its best, experience of such things tends to be too personal and particular to be scientifically adequate. Unverifiable explanations spring to our minds, as, for instance, that, granted the actuality of telepathy, may not a knowledge of the future be gained from an "observer" at another point in space-time? Or again, that man had once the faculty for pre-seeing the future, as he now has for remembering the past, but has lost it in great measure, on account of its biological undesirability? Ethics and metaphysics are so greatly involved in the question of the future that, like Chaucer, in the absence of definite experiment and measurable results, we ought to prefer to put the question on one side. Nevertheless the mass of evidence, unverified and unsystematized as it is, demands research. The manifestations of those savages particularly gifted with the "participation mystique"—the holy man, medicine man, etc.—seem so often to savour of crude magic that the very logical mind turns away in disgust. But magic nowadays is not lightly to be dismissed. There seems no doubt that magic is practised (in Haiti for instance) in a manner and with results quite incomprehensible to us. Investigation is needed (and indeed is being supplied) before we dismiss the possibility of mental powers alien to our perhaps over-logical minds—lost powers maybe, or powers undeveloped in a scientific age. The "Gestalt" school of psychology in its conception and examination of a "behaviour field" adopts an experimental mode of procedure and suggests unrealized or misunderstood mental functioning rather than a lost or undeveloped faculty.

Readings of the future have never been whole-heartedly rejected by western and logical man; every village fair has its

pretenders. The belief in second sight is still dear to Scottish minds; television, telepathy, and teleology betray by their very nomenclature the scientific interest they inspire; and such names as those of Gilbert Murray and Oliver Lodge and James Ward give dignity to the subjects.

Psychical research is busy on the one hand and there is, I believe, scientific investigation on the power of thought-reading and knowledge of an object without sensation, going on at the present time in America with positive and even measurable results.¹

If then there are powers of the human mind so diverse from our logic as are these, may not one of them be the power of intuitive knowing, or may not intuitive knowing be one of these not quite rightly or fully understood? At least there is a wide and, if it is a question of new faculties to be developed and comprehended, a most important field of research for the psychologist, though at the moment he gives us no certain assurance of a purely intuitive faculty.

Before leaving this subject it may be worth while calling attention to one or two other thinkers who agree, at least partially, with Jung and Lévy-Bruhl in their theories of a way of arriving at knowledge different from the accepted observation by the sense organs and induction.

Of these Whitehead is an interesting instance since his theory is so much in accord with that of the French psychologist from one point of view, and so diverse from another.

We perceive, he believes, in two quite different modes, which he calls "causal efficacy" and "presentational immediacy". The first is not only by far the more primitive mode, but is also the more powerful and frequent in any but the higher intelligences; sometimes Whitehead seems to imply that none but artists very frequently perceive in the mode of presentational immediacy unsupported by the more primitive method.

¹ J. B. Rhine, *Extra-sensory Perception*.

The mode of causal efficacy is working when we perceive one circumstance as caused by another, that is, are conscious of the causal ingredient at the expense of being conscious of mere *sensa*. In his later works Whitehead emphasizes the fact of the causal feeling in sensation itself, i.e. that we feel the causal efficacy of our bodies behind our sensations: the eye, we realize, is the cause of our seeing, the ear of our hearing, etc., our bodily state of a moment ago as the cause of its present state, but in his earlier work he approaches nearer to Lévy-Bruhl in his applications and illustrations; indeed he goes back farther than the Frenchman who speaks only of primitive man, while Whitehead carries causal efficacy back in its workings to primitive organisms.

"This latter type, the mode of causal efficacy, is the expression dominating the primitive living organisms, which have a sense for the fate from which they have emerged, and for the fate towards which they go—the organisms which advance or retreat, but hardly differentiate any immediate display. It is a heavy primitive experience. The former type, the presentational immediacy, is the superficial product of complexity, of subtlety; it halts at the present, and indulges in manageable self-enjoyment derived from the immediacy of the show of things. Those periods in our lives—when the perception of the pressure of a world of things with characters in their own right, characters mysteriously moulding our own natures, becomes strongest—those periods are the product of a reversion to some primitive state."¹ This comes very close to Lévy-Bruhl's description of the savage's "participation mystique" between himself and some other circumstance, or between two external circumstances (most often in the sense of objects). And, in case we should object that this strong causal sympathy is the result of association of a mental experience with familiar *sensa*, Whitehead points out how much more potent they are when *sensa* are at their minimum. "An inhibition of familiar *sensa* is very apt to

¹ *Symbolism*, p. 52.

leave us a prey to vague terms respecting a circumambient world of causal operations. In the dark there are vague presences, doubtfully feared; in the silence, the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon us; in the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an August woodland, the inflow into ourselves from enveloping nature overwhelms us; in the dim consciousness of half-sleep the presentations of sense fade away and we are left with the vague feeling of influences of vague things around us. . . . Every way of omitting the *sensa* still leaves us a prey to vague feelings of influence."¹

Whitehead's mode of causal efficacy is closely connected with his theories on the function of emotion in perception. It is in fact sometimes difficult to distinguish them. He denies that we perceive primarily or even frequently through the *sensa*, i.e. the immediate appeal to the senses, of sight, hearing, smell, etc. Rather he thinks we perceive first through the emotions, or affective tones, or feeling. This is fundamental in Whitehead's philosophy. Every experience requires three, not two, agents: the subject, the object and the subjective feeling, i.e. the attitude of subject to object. Whitehead calls this "feeling", but quite often, always in inorganic nature, he does not mean emotion. On the other hand, when speaking of the higher organisms, he often does; since emotions are "conceptual" feelings. The process then seems to be that (1) we see red, or a lane in spring, or our mother's face, (2) we have an emotional response which can only be described as "feeling of redness", "green in spring feeling", "cheerfulness". Here we may, and often do, stop, never arriving at seeing an object which is red, a lane which is green, a mother with a cheerful expression. We have a sympathetic feeling which relates us to the object, makes us feel a connection: "The former mode [causal efficacy] produces percepts which are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future; a

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 247.

sense of emotional feeling, belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself in the present, and passing from oneself in the present towards oneself in the future; a sense of influx of influence from other vaguer presences on the past, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modifying, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting the stream of feeling which we are receiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general sense of existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world.”¹ Here Whitehead emphasizes the time element. He is insisting on our intuition of inheritance, and his theory approaches more nearly to that of Jung, who would use just such phrases: “heavy with emotion”, “influx from vague influences in the past”. But Whitehead’s theory is not so oppressive as that of Jung, nor so irreconcilable as that of Lévy-Bruhl. It is a reasoned, empirical description of a mode of perception which we may accept or reject on the grounds of intuition, observation or deduction, and which demands no acceptance of definite inherited ideas which mould our characters and minds inevitably, and withhold from us even that small allowance of freedom which gives us the right to call ourselves men, and which act as enemies rather than friends to the reasoning mind. If Whitehead describes the mode of operation as something rather terrifying in the absence of *sensa*, that is only because the *conscious* mind feels what it cannot explain in the familiar terms of subject and qualifying predicate. Lévy-Bruhl describes facts but he makes them mysterious and inexplicable by limiting them to men in a mental condition so primitive as to be outside our experience, and by believing himself, apparently, that the “participation mystique” is outside the experience of civilized man. Whitehead, like Jung, realizes that we are primitive as well as civilized.

But it is in his theory of “symbolic reference” that perhaps Whitehead comes nearest to Jung and to Lévy-Bruhl.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 251.

This occurs when both modes of perception function so that the emotion conveyed by causal efficacy is transferred to an object experienced in the mode of presentational immediacy, i.e. directly through the senses. There must, of course, be a ground for the connection of the two experiences, and this is found in some element common to both, but the connection is not inevitable, and it is here that Whitehead discovers a necessity for the functioning of the individual will, or purpose, in fact for human initiative.

"The human mind is functioning symbolically when some components of its experience elicit consciousness, beliefs, emotions, and usages, respecting other components of its experience. The former set of components are the 'symbols' and the latter set constitute the 'meaning' of the symbols."¹ And although Whitehead illustrates this with some great and widely felt symbols, such as those of ceremonial, he is more careful to emphasize the commonness of the mental phenomenon in such instances as words as symbols of their meaning, i.e. the entirely symbolic nature of language. In fact we have here the familiar theory that most often we do not perceive the object at all in the meaning of perceiving the *sensa*, but we perceive the meaning of the object.

However simple and even obvious this theory of symbolic reference is, it seems as though it can partially explain the mysteries of Jung's theory and those of Lévy-Bruhl. Jung believes, however, that the connection between symbol and meaning is inherited, while Whitehead maintains that only an intuition of "cause", or of a "causal functioning", is inherited; so that the first utters a doctrine of necessity, and the second, of conditional freedom. The difference is enormous and the evidence uncertain. Jung would, no doubt, accept all that Whitehead asserts about symbolism, but would add the inherited symbol unacceptable to Whitehead's theory.

Since Whitehead freely admits that symbolic reference

¹ *Symbolism*, p. 9.

may, and frequently does, lead to error, his theory would seem to cover nearly the whole ground of Lévy-Bruhl's facts, the mysterious element in his examples of the "pré-logique" working of the primitive mind lying in the fact that the connection between symbol and meaning is quite unrecognized by the savage. He associates a stone with a fear, a man with blood-guiltiness, because of something in common in his feeling between the objects. But he does not know what that something in common is. It is a mystical connection, and Lévy-Bruhl describes it as "pré-logique" just because of that mystic character which Whitehead's theory denies. It is true that the former makes a strong point of the fact that such "participations" are frequently held by a whole group, tribe, or even group of tribes, as apparently inherited associations, but, as we have suggested before, this fact may be accounted for by the savage's very effective methods of education as well as by the highly symbolical and suggestive nature of language itself which goes unobserved by its users and so provides a common though unrealized use of particular symbols; or by direct intuition of an emotion.

At first sight this would seem to clear up difficulties, but at the same time it opens new vistas. If Whitehead's theory of emotional, or "feeling tone" in perception, is true, in fact if we accept his theory of prehension, have we not before us a new, or rather uncatalogued, mode of knowing? We do not reason from *sensa*, but know through the emotions. This is immediate knowledge, or intuition; it does away with some of the Berkeleian difficulties of the unreliability of the senses; as far as perception through causal efficacy is concerned perception can be trusted: it is fact, though symbolic reference may err; it is not in opposition to reason; it explains all sorts of aesthetic and social and psychological problems, such as aesthetic emotion, intuition of the general attitude of a group of people, "herd instinct", etc. It would justify the common attribution of intuition to women, children and

very simple primitive folk; it would explain why it is so lamentably absent in highly intellectual or eminently scientific people who have grown to depend too exclusively on reason and the evidence of the senses, and so may have atrophied immediate emotional response. In short, profound and continued as have been researches on the emotions, by psychologists and philosophers alike, there seems a pressing need for further research especially, perhaps, of the peculiarly German experimental type.

Whitehead makes us, at least partially, realize what we have always instinctively felt, often inadequately acknowledged, even if the acknowledgment has been of the negative stoic variety, how large a part the emotions play in life, and how much more profoundly we ought to understand them before we can attain to that fulness of experience which the universe offers. If we wish to understand intuition it looks as though we must set ourselves to understand "feeling-tone" in all its varieties, and particularly as it manifests itself in animal emotions.

It has been a commonplace among men of letters from Plato to Carlyle, and is more and more frequently acknowledged by philosophers and psychologists, that the poet is a seer, a foreteller, a prophet, an interpreter, as well as a creator and entertainer. It may not, then, be out of place to add a note on Wordsworth in order to illustrate how widely held are the views we have just examined in the works of Jung and Lévy-Bruhl.

One or two passages from his poems have already been quoted, but only a re-reading of his works as a whole will make one realize how closely and persistently his experience coincides with Jung's theories. Our greatest contemporary literary critic has already pointed out how keen a psychologist the romantic poet is, and the, sometimes disgusted, reader realizes only too well his interest in pathology. There is (aesthetically) quite too much of *The Idiot Boy*, *Ruth*, *The*

Mad Mother, Her Eyes are Wild, The Thorn, We are Seven, Anecdote for Fathers, Goody Blake.

It is, however, his own mental experiences that are most interesting in connection with Jung's theories of intuition and its relation to the subconscious and universal mind. What is Wordsworth describing in the following passages if not Jung's "archetypes"?

I neither seem
To lack that first great gift, the vital soul,
Nor general Truths, which are themselves a sort
Of Elements and Agents, Under-powers,
Subordinate helpers of the living mind.

Those first-born affinities that fit
Our new existence to existing things.

In the following he acknowledges the universal consciousness:

Feeling has to him imparted power
That through the growing faculties of sense
Doth like an agent of the one great mind
Create, creator and receiver both.

Jung describes the working of the subconscious mind by aesthetic intuition in the following description (so like Goethe's description of some of his own experiences): "These words positively impose themselves upon the author; his hand is, as it were, seized, and his pen writes things that his eyes perceive with amazement. The work brings with it its own form; what he would add to it is declined; what he does not wish to admit is forced upon him. While his consciousness stands disconcerted and empty before the phenomenon, he is overwhelmed with a flood of thoughts and images, which it was never his aim to beget and which his will would never have fashioned. Yet in spite of this he is forced to recognize that his self is speaking, that his innermost nature is revealing itself, uttering things which he would never have entrusted to his tongue."

Wordsworth too has his "Aeolian visitations", "Gleams like the flashing of a shield":

the breath of this corporeal frame,
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.

The enormous power that Jung allows to folk-lore in fashioning our minds, particularly our subconscious minds, and more particularly our intuitions, is quite justified by Wordsworth's own experience:

Meanwhile old grandame earth is grieved to find
The playthings which her love designed for him,
Unthought of. . . .

Oh ! give us once again the wishing-cap
Of Fortunatus, and the invisible coat
Of Jack, the Giant-Killer, Robin Hood,
And Sabra in the forest with St George.

These mighty workmen of our later age.

.
When will their presumption learn,
That in the unreasoning progress of the world
A wiser spirit is at work for us,
A better eye than theirs, most prodigal
Of blessings, and most studious of our good
Even in what seem our most unfruitful hours?

And again on the same subject of romances and legends:

Dumb yearnings, hidden appetites, are ours
And *they must* have their food. Our childhood sits,
Our simple childhood sits upon a throne
That hath more power than all the elements.
I guess not what this tells of Being past,
Nor what it augurs of the life to come.

Ye whom time
And seasons serve; all Faculties to whom
Earth crouches, the elements are potter's clay,
Space like a heaven filled up with northern lights,
Here, nowhere, there, and everywhere at once.

This is as emphatically stated as even by Jung himself.

The familiar saying about the James's that William was a novelist who wrote psychology and Henry a psychologist who wrote novels might well be applied to Wordsworth and Jung, if poetry be substituted for novels.

It is interesting to note, too, Wordsworth's attitude. It is certainly not a sentimental one, rather it is, for a poet, surprisingly detached; he observes in a truly scientific spirit and his sympathy is often a scientific sympathy: such phenomena exist and so may be described.

Wordsworth, like Malvolio, thought "nobly of the soul". If the child comes into the world already provided with insight and knowledge, the instruments of his future intuitions, it is "trailing clouds of glory" that he comes, while Jung pictures him dragging into life "slime out of the depth", but both psychologist and poet have well-balanced minds, and while Jung adds "but it will be found that this slime contains not merely incompatible and discarded remnants of the daily life, or incompatible and objectionable animal tendencies, but also germs of new possibilities of life", Wordsworth acknowledges:

Caverns there were within my mind which sun
Could never penetrate.

Once again we are impressed with the necessity for further research into emotion before an adequate theory of intuition can be worked out.

Chapter V

WHITEHEAD

WHILE the studies in the preceding pages have been of men who have set their minds to the consideration of "intuition" and initiated some definite theory, Professor Whitehead accepts and uses the idea, but can scarcely be said to expound it; and it might seem almost out of place to examine his use and conception of the word if it were not for the deep interest of his metaphysics and the fact that without a belief in an intuitive faculty the "philosophy of organism" would fall to the ground.

Whitehead is so impressed with the inadequacy of language for the expression of thought and feeling, that he thinks it one of the main tasks of the philosopher to create an adequate set of terms; his own writing is made so much the more difficult by the necessity he feels to invent terms to express his ideas and to explain the exact use he makes of more familiar ones, that we might expect a very clear and definite and precise usage of so generally and carelessly employed a word as "intuition". But, though we may collect many apparently different uses under a wider and more general conception, he still seems to me to use the word, as does Spinoza before him, with two very different meanings, both vital to his philosophy and both constantly and repeatedly enunciated. These two it may be possible to reconcile under some still more general description, but their functions are so dissimilar that such an amalgamation seems to me quite undesirable. We need two terms to express two such important ideas.

First of all he uses the word "intuition", as he quotes Descartes using it, when he wishes to describe that mental stage in which a particular phenomenon (object, idea,

memory, theory, etc.) is grasped by the mind as an individual object; a stage which might be covered by the term "perception", if that word did not as a rule imply the grasping by the mind of an object presented to the senses, and exclude the grasping of an idea, or a memory, or a feeling, or a situation. This use of the term covers the idea of what I have called the miracle of knowing, that irreducible fact which occurs when the object is absorbed by the subject, when a thing not merely is, but is known. As has been said, there seems an urgent need for some term which means definitely and precisely this.

So Whitehead writes in *Adventures of Ideas*: "Our direct intuitions which we enjoy prior to all verbalization",¹ and in *Process and Reality*: "Our logical analysis, in company with immediate intuition (*inspectio*) enables us to discern a more special society within the society of pure extension",² where he makes it clear that the process by which our minds grasp the simplest object is the same in essence as that by which we grasp a subtle or abstract idea as a whole complete in itself. Again, in *Adventures of Ideas*, not only does he say categorically: "all knowledge is derived from, and verified by, direct intuitive observation. I accept this axiom of empiricism as stated in this general form,"³ but a few pages farther on he makes it clear that "observation" must not be too narrowly interpreted when he says: "this is an instance of direct intuitive observation which is capable of reduction to the sensationalist formula."⁴

We feel how valuable is this insistence on the one fundamental act of knowing and its exemplification in instance after instance of complicated as well as simple object of knowledge: sensation, idea, memory, work of art. This is what we feel Signor Croce ought to have meant. But Whitehead makes no confusion between intuition and expression, in fact, he goes farther than many psychologists

¹ P. 177.

³ P. 228.

² P. 135.

⁴ P. 235.

would allow and insists on the actuality of the intuition prior to any form of expression whatever, in fact or explicit: "in the process of forming a common expression of direct intuition, there is first a stage of primary expression into some medium of sense expression which each individual contributes at first hand."¹ "Mothers can ponder many things in their hearts which their lips cannot express."² Perhaps the "sense experience" may be understood as the minimum of expression necessary to the entertainment of a mental experience, but Whitehead does seem to imply that intuition is prior to any expression.

Here perhaps we come up against the difficulty which lies in his conception of the unity of a universe undivided into watertight compartments. In his theory of prehensions Whitehead conceives of a constant flux which is due to the "feeling" of one occasion for another or many others. Such a "feeling", or "subjective tone" he conceives is answered by a physical response of occasion to occasion, and all this on not only the human or even organic level, but throughout nature in all its manifestations. So sun and stone may be said toprehend each other, not only physically, but with a parallel mental feeling tone, perhaps in this most inorganic of instances, in the form of mere molecular recognition or acceptance.

The fact that Whitehead conceives of a mental response outside living creatures complicates his conception of simple intuition. At what stage may this mental response be dignified by such a name as intuition? If we say "only in the conscious mind" then we really do find it difficult to accept intuition without any form of expression whatever; but if we read him as using intuition of the unconscious or even animal mind (which I think he never definitely does) then we may take a physical response as the "expression" which our minds, educated by William James and impressed by Croce's reasoning, demand.

¹ *Religion in the Making*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.* p. 86.

However interesting and acceptable this meaning of intuition as stated and used by Whitehead is, it is not the most interesting in his philosophy. We are familiar with the idea, and, under one name or another, must perforce accept it as a fact. We *do* know in a mode different from mere physical response, and we must call the ultimate fact of knowing by some unambiguous name. "Intuition" seems to me rather more than adequate, it suggests the nature of the thing it names.

But Whitehead uses the word to express a mental act very different in its quality though not perhaps entirely so in its essence.

He conceives of the human mind as capable of piercing into the very nature of reality, whether that nature be physical or metaphysical, aesthetic or moral, religious or scientific. He states categorically that there is no ultimate truth or aspect of the world, no "first principle" which the mind is incapable of grasping in some flash of insight,¹ and his books are crowded with examples. He illustrates the difficulty of his subject by frequently giving instances of opposite and apparently contradictory intuitions, as in one of his great passages: "In our cosmological construction we are therefore left with the final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—that is to say, the many in one—flux and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the world. In this list, the pairs of opposites are in experience with a certain ultimate directness of intuition except in the case of the last pair."²

This passage illustrates what is a constant theme with Whitehead, the fact that, while intuitions are indeed veritable glimpses into the ultimate nature of reality, they often, in consequence of our limited understanding and still more limited knowledge, appear to be doubtful and even contradictory. So we have "fitting intuitions",³ "conflicting",⁴

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 5.

² *Ibid.* p. 483.

³ *Ibid.* p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 83.

"undeveloped",¹ "undesirable",² "tainted",³ "fortunate",⁴ even "dying" intuitions,⁵ since we may grasp for a moment a truth beyond our permanent hold, or see, or more clearly see, a truth or the beginning of a truth that seems to lead nowhere, or a truth that, born out of due time, is a hindrance not a help to civilization, or happen on one by chance as the Greeks on certain mathematical ideas, or on one that is undesirable because of the form in which it manifests itself. "The welter of particular actions arising out of such complex feelings with their core of deep intuition are in primitive times often brutish and nasty."⁶ Or they may be perverted and so tainted, and Whitehead quotes "that last infirmity of noble mind",⁷ or even done to death, for have we not seen "the undoing of the Christian intuition" as well as others that have wilted in the face of criticism?⁸

Whitehead has a clear faith that intuition may be relied on, but he realizes that the faculty, like that of the reasoning mind, has its degrees of clearness and importance. Consequently he finds that one of the main functions of philosophy is to attempt to reconcile intuitions when they conflict, develop them when they are feeble, and give them a local habitation and a name when they show an inclination to impermanence. Conflicting intuitions mean for him the necessity for further examination, an indication, not that the one or the other is mistaken, but that, being intuitions, both are true and we must, as metaphysicians or moralists or artists, find out how both may be true. So conflicting intuitions may be a greater help to progressive understanding of the universe than those that are generally accepted, and the actuality of good and evil may spur on the minds of theologist and moralist, as the reality of "the one or the many" spurs on that of the metaphysician.

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 220.

³ *Ibid.* p. 302.

⁵ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 218.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 372.

² *Ibid.* p. 372.

⁴ *Process and Reality*, p. 424.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 372.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 183.

The "moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that it should embody the adventure of hope",¹ with which Whitehead himself is so abundantly endowed, does not give rise to an easy acceptance of every passing wave of conviction; on the contrary Whitehead examines the grounds of any particular intuition with great care, and with equal care discriminates between what is really intuited and what is more or less fallaciously deduced from the intuition, as the whole of his *Religion in the Making* goes to show. He realizes that, grasped perhaps in a moment of insight, the intuition must be pragmatically established and held universally, or else, as he puts it in his mathematical idiom, the intuition becomes a function of the moment and has no necessary universal application. In short, the greater part of his work is a close examination into the most enlightening intuitions, their exact meaning, scope, origin and development. One has only to look at the headings of his chapters to see how absorbed he is in the conflicting intuitions of the world.

But the great problems that have interested philosophers through the ages and are still absorbing their attention because they are still unsolved, many of which Whitehead gives in the foregoing (p. 85) list of opposites, are not the only ones that he calls to our attention. One of the great interests of his work is the variety and unexpected nature of the unrealized intuitions that he points out; that is, the nature of reality that we assume without consciously entertaining. I suppose that his categories are intuitions, and many of them are surprising enough, but these do not stand alone. He finds that we have intuitions of probability,² of inheritance,³ of memory,⁴ of new mental material,⁵ of the society of our personal experiences,⁶ of final causes,⁷ of God as intuition, or put another way, of God as indicator of value.⁸ To some of these he

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.* p. 285.

³ *Ibid.* p. 233.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 233.

⁵ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 138.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 265.

⁷ *Process and Reality*, pp. 116, 145, 395.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 46.

applies his tests and his logic, and others he leaves to his readers; but, whichever it may be, the width and scope he allows to the faculty of intuition is apparent. It is quite evident that his philosophy cannot get along without it, and indeed, Whitehead implies that there is a rhythm in the history of thought where waves of intuitive insight are succeeded by waves of exposition and the elaborations of the scholar: the creative and the academic periods.

And this leads us naturally to the question of genius. Whitehead acknowledges the reality of genius readily, very readily; he is most generous in the bestowal of the name, and to him it is anything but an infinite capacity for taking pains. Life, he thinks, is "conceptual originality",¹ each living mind must do its own intuiting though that is most often the intuiting of the intuitions of others.² Genius comes in when (a) the obvious is analysed,³ (b) when a subject is created as a distinct topic of thought⁴ and (c) "The triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment".⁵

When these "completely novel intuitions" are formulated by genius they do not take on the "flitting", "conflicting" or "questionable" character of most of our intuitions, but are "once and for all" in their nature: "as if touched with a spark, a very few persons, one, two, or three, in some particular province of experience, express completely novel intuitions. Such intuitions can be responded to, analysed in terms of their relationships to other ideas, fused with other forms of experience, but as individual primary intuitions within their own province of experience they are not surpassed.

The world will not repeat Dante, Shakespeare, Socrates, or the Greek tragedians. These men, in connection with the tiny groups forming their immediate environments of asso-

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 250.

² *Religion in the Making*, p. 121.

³ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 75.

⁵ *Process and Reality*, p. 387.

ciates and successors and perhaps of equals, add something once and for all. We develop in connection with them, but not beyond them in respect of their definite intuitions which they flashed upon the world."¹

We note, as Whitehead does, that these examples are all of literary geniuses, for we must understand Socrates as Plato's Socrates, and it is easy to accept the statement that the intuition which is revealed in a work of art is once and for all of absolute and eternal value in its degree. But is this really so in other aspects of the universe? Have the moral intuitions of Moses or Confucius an absolute value? or the theological ones of David? or the metaphysical ones of Spinoza? Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas* seems to suggest otherwise. He hails Newton as undoubted genius, but admits the partial truth of his great intuitions, and so with the Greek mathematicians. Indeed the whole "philosophy of organism" preaches that while every actual occasion may and does enjoy "objective immortality" in so far as it is the datum or part of the datum of other actual occasions, nothing but "eternal objects" have absolute immortality. While at the same time every intuition is the recognition of a partial truth.

Whether or not this is the case, there seems no doubt that to Whitehead as to Spinoza the greatest heights to which the human mind can attain are intuitions which are the result of an absorption by a few and rare minds under favourable circumstances in some particular problem which is thereby solved with absoluteness and finality. In fact intellectual progress, as Whitehead finds the physical world to be, is atomic not continuous.

It may be noted here that intuition to Whitehead as to Spinoza is different from, but not opposed to, Reason, as it is with Bergson and Jung.

Before concluding Whitehead's articles of belief in regard to intuition we must consider his theological theories.

¹ *Religion in the Making*, p. 120.

He tells us that "final causation and atomism are interconnected philosophical principles"¹ and in fact they seem to be two, if not the two, basic principles of the "philosophy of organism". The doctrines of "feeling", "prehensions", "process", "God", as expounded by Whitehead, are nothing more or less than his belief in "the teleology of the universe with its aim at intensity and variety".² It is interesting to note that belief in a final as well as an efficient cause does not mean with Whitehead a belief in absolute determinism; indeed it is just here that he finds a loophole by which to let in human freedom; as far as "stubborn fact" is concerned, that is, the efficient cause, every "actual occasion" is determined, but every actual occasion has its various prehensions, possible and actual, and it is in the period when the actual is not yet consummated that the final cause is selected and decides which particular feelings shall dominate, and so which prehensions shall become actual. And the determining factor is, in the long run, God—God immanent and so we ourselves, as far as we partake of God's desire for intensity and variety. "He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness."³ Here Whitehead follows Spinoza's rather doubtful example and conveys his idea in a phraseology apt to stir our emotions and demand acceptance (or rejection) because of its connection with quite other worlds of meaning. I feel strongly that Whitehead is not living up to his own standard of intellectual integrity when he talks about the "tenderness" of such a "God" as he conceives. He is very conscious of the delusive suggestions of language and deliberately uses its suggestibility when expounding an intricate metaphysical doctrine. Perhaps, like Spinoza, he is a "gottgetrunkener Mann" in the sense that he is altogether carried away by the harmonious and absolute beauty of his intellectual conception. But we must feel that in both cases it is a conception, not necessarily an intuition.

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 26.

² *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 250.

³ *Process and Reality*, p. 490.

While it is difficult to forgive Whitehead for arousing our emotions, he cannot be accused of leaving his theory thus dressed up in borrowed plumes. He expounds it with exactness over and over again. "I do not hold Induction", he says, "to be in its essence the divination of general laws. It is the divination of some characteristics of some particular future from the known characteristics of a particular past."¹

"Either there is something about the immediate occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to memory and induction."

"Some people have the dominant mentality of the past, some of the present, others of the future, and others of the many problematic futures which will never dawn."² If we cut out the word "God", Whitehead may be said to hold that the mind is intuitively aware of what is valuable, that is, what is adventurous, and novel and intense. It is as though the spirit of the universe were an appetite for experience. It is not difficult to understand how Whitehead is tempted to call it "God". Such an appetite might remain for ever unsatisfied—even in the smallest particular, or be satisfied only by the merest blind chance, if there was no such thing as intuition of value ("vision", he frequently calls it). We get substantiated (by the philosophy of organism) the greatest claim ever made for intuition, that it can penetrate into, even create, not the fact, but the nature of the future. There are many possible futures, our prehensions decide which shall be actual, and our prehensions are determined by our intuitions into values³ and in the long run, to Whitehead, that means beauty. "The teleology of the Universe is devoted to the production of Beauty."⁴

The strength of this theory lies in its satisfactoriness. It establishes our naïve assumptions and convictions and fulfils

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 55 and 56.

² *Symbolism*, p. 75.

³ *Process and Reality*, p. 340.

⁴ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 341.

many of our deepest spiritual desires. It solves a goodly proportion of our metaphysical as well as moral problems, and in a less degree resolves our religious and aesthetic difficulties. It brings the universe nearer to the heart's desire, and, except perhaps for personal immortality and a personal god, all our deeper wants are satisfied. Metaphysically we find ourselves with no necessary, though with plenty of actual, ignorance—surely the condition of perfect intellectual happiness; there is no noumenal world to which we cannot attain; the senses are no bar between us and reality. Morally we are responsible beings, not only for our own development, but, in our degree, for that of the world at large; and this in fact as well as in theory, for we are creatures who are constituted, not only with a capacity, but with a necessity for choice. Evil is real, at least for the individual creature, and its continuance or its resolution into good lies, up to a point, in our hands, and that very reservation, “up to a point”, makes the fact only the more a fact, since the stumbling block, the “stubborn facts”, the material and mechanical world of actual occasions, afford just that difficulty which is necessary to morality. The spirit is not triumphant; in Whitehead's philosophy “blind physical purposes reign”, but it is actual, and potent and progressive.

Aesthetically, too, the “philosophy of organism”, as far as it is intuitional, is all we can hope for. It gives us personal value and dignity; it allows us vision and faith in the vision. If it does not grant an absolute Beauty, that is only because the Absolute is here, and now, and always, and achieved, and settled, and Whitehead's vision of Beauty is in the future, and unachieved, and progressive. No practical artist could desire more. In fact with our modern pessimistic scepticism we feel it is too good to be true; we are suspicious because we like it so much. We are weary of the deceptions reason has played on us, of an intellectual life which consists largely of the realization of the mistakes of our fathers, which puts upon our shoulders the responsibility of weighing every scrap of evi-

dence available, of discounting all our "idols" before we make any judgment, of deciding upon the reliability of our sources of information, our senses; and we turn eagerly and with hope to the idea of a different faculty, one above all reliable and sufficiently in our control to save our dignity, yet so far independent of our wills as to make our knowledge more a matter of innate capacity than the reward of a persevering struggle to perfect our tools. And, perhaps, too, our primitive man is anxious to obey his more brutal instincts which the reign of reason has taught him to restrain and keep in place, as serving our animal, but retarding our spiritual development. There is a recurrent desire to glorify brute force, natural inclination, to let the devil take the hindermost, to make might right. And we can call all such strong and primitive impulses "intuition" and obey them as pointing the way to a potent reality and away from a sentimentally reasoned, chivalric, and restraining morality. In short, unless we can find some other reason than its desirableness for accepting intuition as Whitehead describes it, our honest scepticism withholds us from it.

And can we find any other reason for accepting it? Metaphysically the doctrine is open to the same objection as is Spinoza's, whose whole theory, like Whitehead's, is based on a deeply-rooted conviction (intuition) of the nature of the universe, though it is elaborated in a most involved and difficult series of logical deductions. We have to accept Whitehead's initial intuition of creativity before we can accept any of his deductions, as we have to accept Spinoza's "Substance". This is, of course, an exceedingly profitable and enlightening thing to do, but except so far as "by their fruits ye shall know them", this temporary and experimental agreement is no proof of the reality of the faculty of intuition. Then again, as with Spinoza, the great intuitive revelations are only to those who in climate and country, in century and in school, in individual capacity and opportunity, are ready to receive them; and when they come they

seem to come in exactly the same form as the results of our reasoning come to us. We call it reason when we emphasize the *process* of attaining, when we note the premisses, or the particular instance necessary to the inductive analogy, and we call it intuition when our attention is centred on the actual first grasping of the new idea by the delighted mind. If such a grasping is intuition, what great discovery or novel idea of any kind can we point to and say "that is the issue, not of intuition, but of reason?" And if, as I am afraid, we can point to no solitary instance of a great, and novel, and universally accepted truth so claimed by reason, then what need is there for two terms? Why confuse the issue because of the degree of light we have received, and why annex the word "intuition" which is so necessary for naming our fundamental cognitive act?

Moreover, though in his studies of our religious, intellectual, moral and aesthetic nature Whitehead does examine and answer many of the arguments raised by thinkers who find they cannot allow of intuition along any of these lines, particularly religious and moral intuition, there are many he leaves unanswered, particularly the biological (or historical) argument which shows how the so-called intuition has actually risen, either in response to some animal necessity, by blind chance in the play of conditioned reflexes, or by projection of man's nature on to that of god, or earth, or universe, or object. It is true, of course, that often enough Whitehead's own theory makes such answers unnecessary, but this is not always so, especially in the case of the moral intuition on which Whitehead himself lays such stress. This is, however, no argument against his theory, rather one for examining it, and others, more closely. And here, really, is the heart of the matter. Until we understand the feelings and their development into human emotions more thoroughly, both in themselves and in their influences, we can make no ultimate judgment on intuition. In Whitehead's sense, at least in one of his senses (for occasionally he treats it as pure

revelation) intuition is a matter of feeling values, but feeling is still an unexplored country, or at least, only its fringes are known to us. If indeed they have that strong teleological bent Whitehead ascribes to them, there certainly would seem a faculty other than reason to lead us to a knowledge of reality in its larger and progressive, rather than in its static, aspect.

Here obviously Whitehead is in close agreement with Bergson.

Part Two



Chapter VI

RELIGIOUS INTUITION

AMONG people with a definite religious tendency there will always be found a few, of any period, creed, mental or moral standing, who claim personal experience of knowledge acquired immediately through the possession of a power which they, or we, call intuition.

When we separate from these those whose certainty of divine truth springs, though often quite unknown to themselves, from deeply impressed youthful teaching (and youth, in spite of its waywardness, adventurousness and scepticism, tends on the whole to believe what it is told); and those who are convinced by intellectual arguments (and such people though rare do exist among the young, for their faith collapses when they are faced by arguments they are unable to answer; our universities three decades ago knew many of them), and those whose conviction dies with their worldly prosperity or even with their belief in themselves, there still remain a few who, through evil and good report, with more or less violence, or astonishment, or devotion, assert and reiterate that their knowledge of certain spiritual facts comes to them directly, and is intuitive in nature. Such people we generally call mystics, and though there is doubtless a touch of mysticism in most truly religious people even if many would and do repudiate the idea, it is in the experiences and writings and conversations of the obvious mystic that we can most clearly see the workings of this disputed gift or faculty of intuition.

Before considering what can be said for or against the existence of the power they claim, and before making any close examination of its nature, if it may for the time being be considered to exist, it will be interesting to read in their own words the different descriptions given of it by those who have experienced its workings and claim to possess or to have possessed it.

Jacob Boehme was a mystic of the fifteenth century, unlearned or rather self-taught, a cobbler by trade, who at first with timidity but with growing assurance taught his religious doctrines, which were often in opposition to those of the scribes and pharisees of his day. In one of his dialogues the "Master" in response to a puzzled inquiry from his disciple says:

"When thou standest still from the thinking of Self, and the willing of Self; when both thy intellect and will are quiet and passive to the expressions of the Eternal Word and Spirit; and when thy soul is winged up and above that which is temporal, the outward senses and the imagination being locked up by holy abstraction, then the Eternal Hearing, Seeing and Speaking will be revealed in thee, and so God heareth and seeth through thee being the organ of *his* spirit, and so God appeareth in *thee*, and whispereth to thy spirit. Blessed art thou therefore if thou canst stand still from thy self-thinking and self-willing and canst stop the wheel of thy imagination and senses; forasmuch as hereby thou mayest come at length to see the great salvation of God, being made capable of all manner of divine sensations and heavenly communications."¹

Rudolf Eucken, a modern thinker of great learning and intellectual power, writes:

"While mystic intuition extinguishes all particular elements, aesthetic intuition seeks the unity, in and along the multiplicity alone.... But what is here offered as Knowledge is

¹ *Of the Supernatural Life* (edited by Bernard Holland, 1921), p. 14.

more of a Feeling difficult to grasp, is more of a calm absorption of the soul in Infinity than of an intellectual penetration into Reality."¹

Dean Inge, a twentieth-century divine, writes:

"In their objective aspect Body, Soul, and Spirit are respectively the world as perceived by the senses; the world interpreted by the mind as a spacial and temporal order; and the spiritual world. The organs which perceive the world under these three aspects are the bodily senses, discursive thought, and spiritual perceptions or discursive knowledge. Of these three the last alone perceives the world as it really is, *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is only when we exercise this highest faculty of our nature . . . that we are ourselves completely real and in contact with reality."²

Plotinus was a Greek philosopher of the third century A.D., a pagan, though not in ignorance of Christianity, which he appears to have examined and rejected. Concerning him Porphyry, a contemporary and disciple, writes: "There was shown to Plotinus the Term ever near; for the Term, the one end, of his life was to become Uniate, to approach to the God over all: and four times during the period I passed with him he achieved this Term, by no mere latent fitness but by the ineffable Act"; and Porphyry was not writing of what he did not understand, for he adds: "To this God I also declare, I Porphyry, that in my sixty-eighth year I too was once admitted and entered into Union." And this is how Plotinus describes the "Union": "And one that shall know this vision—with what passion of love shall he not be seized, with what desire, what longing to be molten into one with this, what wonderful delight! If he that has never seen this Beauty must hunger for It as for all his welfare, he that has known must love and reverence It as the very Beauty; he will be flooded with awe and gladness, stricken with a salutary terror; he loves with a veritable love, with sharp desire; all other loves

¹ *Knowledge and Life* (translated by Tudor Jones, 1913), p. 47.

² *Philosophy of Plotinus* (1918), p. 123.

than this he must despise, and disdain all that once seemed fair.”¹

Swedenborg, a religious teacher of a very decided mystical tendency, wrote in 1745, in describing Adam, the spiritual man: “he felt himself, as it were, rapt out of himself; but when he endeavoured to compose himself: lo ! he saw himself in the midst of the bosom of love...and...he heard these words spoken within himself...‘do not any longer enquire after the fountain, now that thou sittest in its veriest vein; perceive now that the love wherewith thou embracest me, is from mine...and thus mine from thine’.”²

Francis Thompson, a poet of the end of the nineteenth century and a Roman Catholic, writes:

One grass-blade in its veins
Wisdom's whole flood contains:
Thereon my foundering mind
Odyssean fate can find.

Epitomised in thee
Was the mystery
Which shakes the spheres conjoint—
God focussed to a point.

My one hand thine, and one
Imprisoned in God's own,
I am as God; alas,
And such a god of grass !
A little root clay-caught,
A wind, a flame, a thought—Inestimably naught.

And Tennyson fifty years earlier:

Speak to him thou, for he hears,
And spirit with spirit can meet;
Closer is he than breathing
And nearer than hands and feet.

¹ *Plotinus* (McKenna, 1917), vol. 1, p. 7.

² Swedenborg, *The Worship and Love of God* (1864), p. 105.

These illustrations can leave no doubt in a candid mind of the sincerity and conviction of their witnesses, and these are only a few chosen from numbers of others equally sure of their gift and its worth. It does not, however, necessarily follow that what they experience is exactly what they think it is, or that it possesses the value they claim for it. We must then examine the difficulties in the way of accepting mystical religious intuition at its face value.

The first of these difficulties lies I think in the objects of intuition. If we claim a second faculty for attaining truth or even comparative truth, if by some new and unexamined process we "know", then if the truth turns out to be not truth, even up to the level of our comprehension, if by other methods we might at the same period and with the same gifts (except for that of intuition itself) have come nearer to the truth, then this faculty of knowledge is only knowledge in the sense that to one absolutely convinced of an idea his conviction is knowledge sufficient to himself, which is arguing round an unprecise definition, while, if such a conception of truth be accepted, it makes the attainment of, or even approach to, a generally received truth unsatisfactory or insufficient.

What then are the objects of religious intuition as recorded by obviously sincere and trustworthy people?

Of dogmatic fact immediately given it is difficult to accept the truth even in a very modified form. William Cowper, the poet, for instance, a man of more than average gifts, of irreproachable morals and of a charming and affectionate disposition, as a result of a kind of mystical ecstasy, was convinced at one period of his life of his ultimate salvation, and lived for a short enough time in rapture; but this certainty was followed by an equally strong one that he was destined to eternal damnation. Now, the one conviction obviously contradicts the other; both could not be true and yet both were the result of a mystical intuition and held with such fervour as to affect the whole of Cowper's life and actions.

And if it is argued that it is only permanent intuitions that have value as knowledge, it must be asked in turn: "How do we know that an intuition is permanent?" A short life may leave it unaltered, but does poverty of experience mean permanency? An extended life might, and often has, dulled or even killed conviction.

St Teresa by an act of intuition was enabled to comprehend the dogma of the Trinity. William James tells us of a convert to Roman Catholicism who records: "I think I remain within the limits of veracity when I say that without having any knowledge of the letter of religious doctrine, I now intuitively perceived its sense and spirit" (after seeing a vision of the Virgin); and of a man who was unwillingly converted to complete religious scepticism by the same faculty.

It would not be impossible of course to justify all these convictions up to a point and to reconcile their apparent contradictions. When Dean Inge writes: "There are Christians who believe in the divinity of Christ because they have known Him as an indwelling Divine Spirit; who believe that He rose because they have felt that He has risen; who believe that He will judge the world because He is already the judge of their own lives", he shows us the way to such a reconciliation. No doubt we might argue, for instance, that there was a possibility of Cowper being saved as well as lost; in his earlier intuitions he saw clearly the first possibility, in the later ones the second. Or, again, if Cowper had had complete faith in the conviction that he was saved, doubtless he would have been; but he lost faith in the truth and consequently that particular truth died to give place to another. So doubtless there are many senses in which the doctrine of the Trinity is enlightening truth, and many points of view from which Roman Catholic dogma is true; we can find truth in almost any statement; but what is the value to mankind as a whole, we might almost add to the individual either, of such comparative and manipulated truths? Unless we ourselves hold a conviction intuitively made, have we not a greater respect for

what we are inclined to call an honest and straightforward truth?

We must on the other hand allow of the possibility of comparative and relative truth. Absolute Truth, if indeed there be such a thing, must almost perforce be incomprehensible to finite intellect, how much more so when that intellect (as we may hope is the case) is not yet fully developed, and in each particular case manifested in an individual mind perhaps not of the finest quality even as human intelligence goes. Truths must be adapted to the mind that is to receive them, so that it is possible to understand that intuition may show to one person one side or colour of a truth, and to another a different aspect or hue, which to a limited view may appear contradictory but which a broader knowledge might well harmonize; and after all it is to the advantage of the individual to come in contact with a partial truth, and of the race to know, even at second hand, of the claims to such a contact. Intuition, however, claims more than this—no partial truth but reality itself.

On the whole mankind accepts intuitively discovered religious truths only in so far as the inspiration of the moment or of the individual is subsequently justified by reason.

The learning by means of intuition of facts not previously known is a claim of genius. Though it may occur to a religious genius as to any other, yet since religious truths are so difficult to verify it will be better examined when we turn to the acquirements of scientific truth by the method of intuition.

There is one mystical idea which, though not unknown or unconsidered by metaphysicians, is so frequently met with in accounts of religious mystical experience, and has such an important bearing on general and rational, as well as individual and intuitive thought, that it demands special consideration. That is the idea of Unity. Among the records quoted at the beginning of the chapter (which were not chosen to this end), only that from Dean Inge (and he

suggests it here and elaborates it elsewhere) does not insist on some sort of Absolute in which the individual finds satisfaction and meaning; whether it be absolute truth, or absolute love, or absolute beauty, or even a vaguer yet absolute Divine; the idea of peace in union is given; and more than peace, of bliss.

Very frequently among religious mystics the conviction of unity arises from a personal experience of union, a union with the "Divine" or the "Absolute", in which the self is suddenly realized, not as a part of the absolute, which would be a contradiction in terms, but as of its essence. The revelation is then as much of the self as of the absolute. Plotinus seems to hold this view, and this would partly account for what seems antisocial or egotistic in his attitude; for it is not possible and perhaps is not desirable to communicate a revelation of the true being and nature of the self. "When you see that you yourselves are beautiful within," he says, "what do you feel? What is the Dionysian exultation that thrills through your being? this straining upwards of all your Soul, this longing to break away from the body and live sunken in the veritable self?" It is true that psychologists have sought in vain by analysis to isolate the self. Bradley has shown how deplorably metaphysicians fail at the task, so that he is fain to deny the self an existence in reality at all; and Descartes's "I know, therefore I am" no longer brings conviction of a personality. Physics, chemistry, even biology, encourage scepticism as to the real existence of the self, rather assume it has no more value, for instance, than convictions which are generally recognized as superstitions. Indeed, the nature of a superstition is so like that of an intuition as, except for its object, to be almost identical. Both are held with a conviction unshakable by reason. I have known an educated and cultured woman, wife and daughter of ministers of religion, who could not, even with the knowledge of the mortification and displeasure of her husband, bring herself to sit down thirteen at table. I have known a maid-servant who would

not burn the loose hair left on her mistress's toilet-table, because she knew it would bring misfortune to the latter. It is true that psychologists and anthropologists discover for us the origin of most superstitions, but so indeed can they find a supposed origin for most intuitions.

But Plotinus is sure of the reality of his self by conscious knowledge, and most men are sure unconsciously. Have we then, by the workings of an unrecognized intuition, a knowledge that a philosopher is aware of, with a deeper realization of its nature and truth? So "Know thyself" would take on a fresh meaning for the philosopher and bring a fresh hope, for it would mean "God and Heaven". Professor Whitehead seems to think so.

Many psychologists and men of religion suggest the possibility of other forms of consciousness than those of which we are commonly aware: James considers that the mystic's vision may be due to some such unrecognized form. Bergson that by it we get an occasional glimpse of the meaning of life—our life—and so of ourselves. Plotinus says that the very meaning of spiritual life is the realizing of the self in the spiritual world, and Dean Inge writes: "The religion where alone self-consciousness and self-knowledge exist—the realm of Spirit." Whitehead considers that a realization of the value of the self is a first step towards religion.

If this is a true reading of the facts, then it would seem that intuition is indeed necessary; for, as Plotinus warns us, though we may get to the self through the spirit, we cannot get to the spirit through the self: "But intellectualism does not mean self-ownership, it means turning the gaze toward the Primal." William Kingsland refers, in connection with mysticism, to "deeper regions of consciousness",¹ and Eucken remarks that "the modern world plumes itself on having abolished the cleft between man and the world by means of some form of immaterial doctrine".²

If it were only such men as Plotinus who had pondered on

¹ *Rational Mysticism*, p. 72.

² *Knowledge and Life*, p. 163.

the subject, we might say the wish was father to the thought, or that rational conviction had preceded intuitive, and was its origin, but we can hardly apply such reasoning to people of Boehme's type, and still less to the numerous simple unschooled men and women whose visions and convictions Evelyn Underhill and Dean Inge collect for us.

"Have we then here a certain and ultimate truth? Have the mystics, who, if not unanimous, at least form a great cloud of witnesses, solved once and for all the great metaphysical problem of the One and the Many? Are logicians satisfied?"

Not at all.

And this leads us to the second of the great difficulties in accepting intuition as a reliable means of acquiring knowledge.

The knowledge even if true (in any meaning of the term) is true only to the individual who has the intuition. He has no means except the emotional fervour which accompanies his own convictions, of handing on his newly acquired truth to his fellows. He cannot prove it; he cannot even show the process of his own conviction; indeed, so baseless does it sometimes seem that his assertions discredit more than his fervour confirms it. Of what value is the convinced enunciation of a view which is not new to thought backed by no new arguments? Even were this great experience recorded by the greater part of the human race it would hold no higher place than any other individual prejudice to the seeker after truth.

It is an interesting speculation whether, if intuition be a faculty not to be analysed into others more familiar or more generally accepted, its individual and antisocial tendency has given a biological bias against its dissemination and development. If our minds are the result of an evolutionary selection of the mental powers best suited to the animal preservation of the race, it may well be that other powers equally possible of development have been so persistently repressed as scarcely to be recognized or even acknowledged. Now that the struggle for existence is less marked among men it may be

that we shall develop a new type where approach to truth is along less practical lines. Such people are not unknown to history, or to art, or to us personally. Spinoza endows Christ with the most abundant intuitional gifts, and from the mere biological point of view Christ failed, his convictions brought him to an early, childless death. Laurence Housman pictures a practically incapable character in Brother Juniper, the idea of "God's Fool" being indeed not uncommon in literature or in superstition. Some of the most charming people we ourselves know, and some of the most charming traits in others, would, we realize, be of little use in the rearing of a family. It would be an extraordinary and ironic outcome of the "dole" idea in the social system if it gave rise to a race of men biologically and perhaps rationally unfit but endowed with a faculty for perceiving divine truth. Browning has attempted such a character (but without intellectual inferiority) in his Lazarus. Perhaps the real man of religion is as near to such a product as the struggle for existence has allowed to come into being.

A further difficulty, and an offshoot of the one just considered, lies in the relationship of intuition and rational intellect. We can find no agreement on this point among those who claim the divine vision. Some mystics put the two faculties in opposition to one another: only by ignoring, lulling, or entirely crushing the intellect can one hope to arrive at the proper state of mind and body for the vision. Christ, in spite of all his own great intellectual gifts, warns his followers "except ye become as little children". The passage at the beginning of this chapter is a clear statement of Boehme's views; a complete emptying of the mind is often the first step towards the desired state taken by the Eastern mystic.

Others, e.g. Eucken, claim that without opposition the two faculties have different objects, they are contrasted rather than opposing faculties. The intellect seeks apparent truth, useful truth, truth as we have found it in our evolutionary

development, in fact, the rational mind seeks thoroughly to understand "Appearance". But intuition seeks "Reality" and by it alone can ultimate and absolute truth be attained. He, from the religious point of view, sees intuition very much as Bergson does from the biological. Reality may be God, or Life, but however it is conceived, intuition brings the individual into immediate contact.

Dean Inge, who seems to be expressing his own views as well as those of Plotinus, writes: "Dialectic, then, is the study of first principles which leads up to intuitive wisdom. It passes through logic and at last rises above it."¹ Here there appears to be no opposition, no real contrast except so far as means and ends, steps and summits are contrasted. Intellectual effort is a precursor of intuitive, a clumsy but necessary faculty, though perhaps it will not always be necessary, for the Dean pictures a time when "we shall no longer reason because we shall know intuitively; in which we shall not talk because we shall know each other's thoughts". He, again from a religious point of view, seems to see intuition as did Spinoza from the scientific. But at present at least he acknowledges that: "The mystical state never occurs except as a sequel to intense mental concentration."² In another passage, however, we find that he speaks of intuition as preceding and inspiring intellect: "And St Peter, in the vision of the sheet, learnt that God is no respecter of persons or of nationalities. . . . In such cases the highest intuitions or revelations, which the soul can in its best moments just receive but cannot yet grasp or account for, make a language for themselves as it were, and claim the sanction of external authority, until the mind is elevated so far as to feel the authority not less Divine, but no longer eternal." There is much in the history of the human race to support this view of intuition, which will be dealt with in another place when we are considering the world as "a realm of ends".

¹ Dean Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. II, p. 90.

² *Christian Mysteries* (1912), p. 18.

James, on the other hand, while accepting up to a point the reality of the mystic vision, and while doing away with some of the difficulties of accepting it by the reflection that mystical states may possibly be superior points of view: "windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world. The difference of the views seen from the different mystical windows need not prevent us from entertaining this supposition", yet acknowledges and even insists that mystically acquired knowledge must endure the sifting and testing of reason. Reason then is not an aid to intuition but intuition an aid to reason, providing it with matter to put in form and order—another view of the relationship.

In the works of both Professor James and Dean Inge we find indications of that double nature of intuition which we have pointed out seemed to exist in the mind of Spinoza. All occasionally speak of intuition as though it might be applied to those most fundamental of ideas on which we build the superstructure of our thoughts, and however much we may simplify what appears simple, and however far we may push back the origin or birth of an idea, so that the word "idea" becomes altogether too developed and specialized a conception to indicate so rudimentary a thing, yet our mental life is built on mental foundation and as that cannot be called reason, nor yet sense, it is not impossible to conceive of it as intuition. The two meanings of the term then, the primal and the ultimate mental achievement, have this in common, that both are their own satisfaction and proof. As Plotinus explicitly states and as all the mystics imply, the truth given us by intuition is its own standard—we can make no appeal—we know, or we know not.

Nevertheless the two forms are so different in their nature that these common characteristics can hardly justify us in giving them the same name.

We turn then from the difficulty found in understanding intuition in its relation to reason as set forth by those who claim to have studied and experienced both, to that of the

variety and complexity of its forms or nature which would lead one to deny its ultimate unity, and to attempt to give its different manifestations or concomitants different names and to see if any of these may be isolated and distinguished as intuition itself.

What, then, may the experiences known as "intuition" be reduced to by a mind sceptical of the reality of this so little understood faculty?

Rational Judgment perhaps.

Judgments are not always made as the conscious conclusion of a conscious logical process. They are sometimes made so quickly that one is scarcely aware of their mental antecedents. In the intuition of the religious mystic, however, there is nearly always a strong emotional element. Now we may imagine these two states of mind acting and reacting upon one another. The mind is filled with longing towards a God, and after the habit of human loves, desires a clear knowledge, both sensuous and mental, desires to come into direct contact or union; as love of a countryside makes one long to be walking its moors or fishing its rivers, a longing so great that on some occasions absence causes a certain loss of mental or physical balance, as in the case of Emily Brontë; or perhaps a promising career is sacrificed in order to be in the land one loves; the experience is so common as to find a universal understanding and the poets have expressed it for us over and over again. Even a child understands *My Heart's in the Highlands*. Lamb pines out of London and his friend Wordsworth in it; one loves the streets and "old familiar faces", the other the hills and cataracts which "haunted him like a passion".

So in smaller matters. Every child wants to come into possession, to hold in its hands the flowers it sees and likes. Lord Elgin purloined the marbles he admired, Lamb went shabby to possess an old folio, women do inconceivable acts of folly to obtain jewels and even clothes; the miser's hoard is an example of the possessive nature of love at its most illogical, and the marriage union at its most sublime.

When a fervid mind loves God the very nature of its humanity makes it seek union. The wish then may be father to the thought and that may be the end of the matter; the thought having entered the mind through the gates of desire may enthrone itself there unquestioned, and by an involuntary act of deception believe that it has what it desires. To this end a certain quality of imagination is requisite; the type is well worked out in Tennyson's *St Agnes' Eve*. Sometimes indeed the "involuntary act of deception" is replaced by a deliberate judgment that what is urgently and widely desired is likely to be possible of achievement. Such a judgment is not limited to mystical or religious philosophers, but is found throughout the history of thought and is particularly prevalent at the present day. A determination "to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis" is the moral counterpart.

But the interaction of emotion and judgment may be more involved and subtle than this. When the wish has given birth to the thought, the thought may in its turn take up the wish; may cogitate on the relationship of creature and creator; or on the evolution and dissolution of the individual; or on the difference between Appearance and Reality; or on the meaning of change and permanence; or on the relationship of the physical and the mental; or on the origin and destiny of the universe; or on a thousand other objects which lead the mind to the idea of Unity, to an Absolute, and possibly away from the difficulties of accepting such an idea. The mind then acquiesces. But if that is all, if the mind consciously acquiesces in an idea, we get, not a mystical intuition, but a philosophical conviction. It is when the mind is unconscious of a definite agreement with its idea, when, having come only to the verge of a formal acceptance it is wrung anew with the agony or ecstasy of desire, and it is the desire, not the logical process, that ultimately gives birth to the conviction, then we may have an experience which at first glance looks like immediate or inspired knowledge, for the part played by the wish in forming the judgment is ignored.

When, in addition to the mental and emotional gifts required for the above process, the man of religion possesses also a vivid imagination or symbolic faculty, so that having conceived an idea he turns it into some sort of imagery, generally visual or auditory, his conviction, his immediate knowledge is confirmed by a sign: St Augustine heard a voice which told him to do what all his life his mind and conscience had been telling him to do. The form that the "demon" of Socrates took we do not know, but it seems to have been some sort of oral imagery. St John's cravings were satisfied by the elaborate visions of the Revelation. Spinoza in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* works out with great care the result of this imaginative gift combined with a high moral standard on the prophets and seers of the Old Testament.

In such cases then "intuition" may be reduced to judgment, emotion, and perhaps imagination, acting and reacting on each other. It is true that such an interaction may give rise to a most interesting experience, and one which may possibly not be able to occur in any other way, and so the result may demand a name of its own; but to call it Intuition confuses the issue, first, because the knowledge is mediate not immediate, and secondly, because it obviously need not be true.

Recent psychical and psychological studies have cast many surprising lights on the processes of the mind, especially what is called the subconscious mind, and these are considered in their place; but while we are examining the claims of religious men and women to immediate knowledge of divine truth we may well note that many of the cruder examples of sudden conversion occur when the herd instinct is in full play. We do not yet understand the workings of the instinct: how far it is mental, how far physical, but no one, I imagine, would call mere obedience to its promptings the work of intuition. So with telepathy. There seem to be grounds for believing in the existence of such a faculty though we as yet know little enough of its workings, but if ever we can at our will, or at

his will, read another person's thoughts we shall scarcely call the gift intuition, partly because there will be some conscious mental adjustment, if only in the deliberate exertion of will power; and partly because the knowledge of the ideas in another person's mind, though true in the sense of being true knowledge of the existence of a fact, is yet not a universal or divine truth, nor even a particular truth seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. It may be agreed that a deliberate adjustment of mind or will is necessary to the most authentic act of intuition; the difference seems to lie in the fact that when the science of telepathy has been worked out, we may exercise the gift at our will; in the case of religious intuition the revelation seems to come, at least partly, from without, to be external, to require divine agency as well as human. Jacob wrestles to gain his end but the angel must acquiesce.

An apparent confusion in the mind of the Eastern mystic between the positive and negative absolute which has given rise to such ideas as nirvana may give rise also to what Dean Inge (without explaining the term) calls a "negative intuition". Now there is something universal about the idea of absolute negation, and we know from the mediaeval and scholastic definitions of God that mere negation is not naturally repudiated by the human mind; but since it seems likely that every negative implies a positive, negative definitions and negative absolutes are in reality just a confession of ignorance, and a confession of ignorance can hardly be called an intuition if that is the immediate knowledge of a truth; and even if we accept the idea of a negative truth it is only with the hope of one day arriving at the positive that is implied.

So with the trances and various states of mind induced by the exercise of self-hypnotism, etc. We do not thoroughly understand these workings of the mind, but we repudiate any resulting mental conviction as an intuition because we miss the external reality as well as the immediacy of the knowledge gained during the self-induced mental state. And likewise

when the hypnotic state is not self-induced, when the conviction is externally imposed, we deny the workings of intuition however firm the assurance of the patient of the truth of his information, and however ignorant he is of its origin, since it is not immediate and comes from a fallible source.

It may appear that because a faculty does not behave according to a preconceived idea we reject it as intuition while we ought to keep an open mind and be willing to form our definition according to our facts, but at present we are considering the claims of religious mystics to immediate knowledge of divine or universal truth, and we do not find that claim substantiated by the experience and practice of hypnotism and kindred forces, though it is likely enough that, could we find an unequivocal example of such intuition as we are looking for, any of these half-known and partially understood powers, or other powers still less known or even totally unknown, might form a necessary adjunct, as might a particular type of mentality, will power, imagination, etc.

Again suspicion is thrown on the actuality of intuition by the suggestion that it is merely an invention for giving to man what reason has refused him. Many men ardently desire a future life, a personal god, an assurance of forgiveness and of an absolution from sin, a belief in a divine element in their own nature; and many men with little or no proof ardently believe that they possess all or some of these. Reason refuses to supply the ground, or at least all the ground for the belief, so intuition is claimed. It must, however, be remembered that neither the desire for, nor the belief in, these is universal; that it differs from time to time, between people and people, according to tradition, education, outlook, temperament, experience; it may be present at one period of a man's life and absent at another, and either state may precede the other. Were the beliefs not only not rational but inexplicable we might perhaps wonder whether they were given by some immediate faculty of knowledge, but the fact is that they can be

explained easily enough: experience itself, of whatever sort, is so vital to, so essentially a part of, mind (if it is not mind itself), that man cannot imagine, though he may conceive, himself not existing; then again it is hard for one to face the thought that to what has given one most delight, love, beauty, etc., one will one day "become a sod". And yet again, the passion for justice, especially perhaps in modern man, makes a close inspection of this life almost intolerable, unless he comforts himself with the idea of a subsequent straightening out in the form of reward to the virtuous, and at least self-revelation, if not punishment, to the wicked. In short there seems every inducement except the facts of the case to persuade the majority of men to accept some or all of these possibilities as realities, and there is little need of intuition.

We have most of us experienced times when our bodies are more alive than usual, that is, more quick to respond to external objects, when our senses are peculiarly alert: we see things, ordinary things like cows and trees, bigger and brighter than usual; we see the contrasts of light and shade more emphatic; or we hear ordinary sounds as more melodious, or sonorous or even thunderous than usual, or we may feel a tingling in our fingers as they touch, or in our bodies as they are touched. There may be many reasons for this physical alertness, reasons mental, as when our faculties are on the stretch from something imparted; or emotional, as when we hear what is expected and desired though only whispered, or not even whispered, or possibly merely physical, as the excitement brought by sea or mountain air after long residence in town or inland or lowland. There is no doubt, however, that what passes through our minds in circumstances of such physical exhilaration has more force and weight than it would have under more ordinary conditions, and should an idea of real importance to one's conception of life enter or seriously occupy the mind at such a time it might carry with it a weight of conviction which could afterwards

be described as intuition. Wordsworth gives us examples of such experience over and over again:

To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.

And one of these "thoughts"—"faith" he calls it, he might well have called it "intuition":

And 'tis my faith that every flower
Enjoys the air it breathes.

While on the one hand a philosopher must guard against taking as absolute truth attractive ideas conceived during a state of physical excitement, on the other hand he must beware of thinking of a "mere" heightening of the senses; for a clearer sight, sharper hearing, etc., must of necessity get us nearer to truth in some directions if it also upsets our proportions. There seems to be, at least among the more civilized races, and in those among the more philosophic type, a tendency to inertia, passivity, self-depreciation, more than is good for either the mental or spiritual enlightenment of man. Wine perhaps has its uses in stimulating to action, physical and mental, if only in the additional self-confidence it brings, and Mr Stratton¹ tells us of intoxicants, poisons, etc., used among primitive people in their initiatory rites, to stimulate visions, ecstasy and a feeling of union with the divine. We may need a physical as well as a mental and spiritual stimulant to enable us to approach nearer to, or even come into the very presence of, truth.

Another difficulty that prevents one receiving intuition as an accepted phenomenon of religious life at the first glance, is the fact that while some people receive its revelations unexpectedly, or by divine grace, or by the workings of divine agency, others can induce or partially induce its manifestation. In the East the trance or state of coma which precedes or accompanies the condition of unity with the divine is induced by tricks on the body which can be taught to dis-

¹ *Psychology of the Religious Life*, pp. 109-10.

ciples, who can thus force, with more or less success no doubt, according to their gift, the conditions under which divine wisdom is attained. Dean Inge quoting from Philo tells us "the bacchanals and corybantes continue their raptures *until they see what they desire*", which corresponds with the Christian saints "beating the gates of heaven with storms of prayer"; it may be that physical exhaustion subdues the body and sets free the spirit to find truth; or it may be that the physical organs that regulate the mind losing control, mental fancies riot without discipline, and those that have been most recently and frequently in activity assume a prominence which is easily mistaken for authority. It is not, however, true that the ecstatic *always* sees or hears what he desires or expects.

That revelation so often comes to the mentally undisciplined or physically diseased is discouraging to one searching for a higher order of knowledge, but there is some explanation if we believe with Boehme that only by subduing or nullifying the reasoning activity of the mind can a proper condition for the functioning of intuition be brought about. The initiation into most religions involves physical preparation; even the working of the spirit among the Society of Friends requires a certain environment and peace of body. The conditions under which the mediaeval Christian saints received their visions and achieved the very presence of God were often more exacting on their physical than on their mental or moral side.

That the bodily state can help or hinder the understanding and reception of truth few could deny; but it is natural to expect that a sound body will be the best physical condition for a sound mind, that a distortion of the organs of sense through which we must receive at least the material from which mental experience is made, might lead to a distortion of the truth itself. And here, no doubt, we get lost in the fog of doubt as to how far the senses or the human mind do convey any permanent truth, and how far they supply us

with a distorted truth perverted to suit our needs, or at least a partial truth, all that is necessary and not injurious to our animal well-being; in short the question of the evolution of the mind arises, and how far that has resulted in the perceiving of truth, or in the making of a truth sufficient for the preservation and development of life. That problem we put on one side as too big for us. If a balanced physique and healthily working sense organs will not help us, it is difficult to see on what grounds we can hope that a degenerate body will lead us any nearer. Yet how many times have we been warned that madness (disease) and genius are near allied. Even here we must keep an open mind. Many great religious mystics have certainly repudiated the body and often suffered from its defects. Plotinus had an exceedingly delicate constitution, suffered constantly from disease, and as Porphyry said, seemed to be ashamed of being in the body.

How then does the examination of this claim of men of religion to be gifted with a faculty of immediate knowledge leave us?

It leaves us sceptical but impressed.

Sceptical because the objects of intuition as described by them are so often trivial, contradictory or partially untrue; because those who claim to have experienced the gift give different and contradictory accounts of the relationship to rational thought and to emotion; because there are simpler, or at least better understood ways of explaining the mental experiences often put down to intuition; because we are conscious of our ignorance of the workings of the mind, and are aware that there are many mental processes at present only partially understood which need examining, and that, while intuition may be an ultimate means of attaining knowledge, it may also be a complex of known or unknown processes or of both; because the unsatisfactory phenomena which attend its manifestation, and the unsatisfactory characteristics of many of those who claim its possession, add dislike to scepticism.

We are, on the other hand, impressed with its desirability, with the variety and number of those who lay claim to its possession, and with the high degree of wisdom and experience possessed by a few of these claimants; we are impressed with the small difficulty found by the majority of those who have not experienced it themselves in accepting its existence; with the satisfaction it gives to the mind, a satisfaction notoriously absent from other forms of thought because it brings a conviction of ultimate reality.

That blessed mood
In which the burden of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened.

We are impressed too with the way the experience seems (in spite of varying evidence) to absorb the whole of the personality: thought, will, emotion, so different from the one-sidedness of most of our mental experiences.

If on the one hand we are sceptical about any claim to immediate and ultimate truth, on the other we may allow of a higher truth than thought can show us, and a surer and nearer way to it than the reasoning process.

We are impressed that modern thought tends on the whole to make it easier rather than more difficult to believe in intuition, whether that thought is in the direction of metaphysics, psychology, biology or physics itself. And finally we are impressed with the fact that in spite of many an explanation, historical and psychological, without some such faculty it is difficult to account for the widespread if not universal "faith" in a spiritual world.

Chapter VII

MORAL INTUITION

WHILE no one will deny that there are such things as notions and actions which may be distinguished by the term "moral", and no one will pretend not to understand when such are spoken of or referred to, yet quite a large number of thoughtful people refuse to allow either to the moral idea or moral actions a self-origin or an ultimate value, but make them arise out of and depend upon other parts of our nature.

Some, as for example, the Behaviourists, describe a moral action, as they do any other action, as a mechanized reflex, conditioned or instinctive; others say that the moral motive is the reason or excuse improvised *after* the action has taken place; the Hedonists find that the right is always that which is most advantageous to the individual and productive of the pleasures which existence brings, or, in its more modified form, to the society in which he lives, whether that society be considered narrowly as the immediate family or widely as all that has life in the universe, and so indirectly though not primarily to himself.

If any of these theories is the truth and the whole truth, the case is settled against the existence of moral as distinct from any other intuition, and the meaning of the term need not be inquired into, but though I think we must agree to much that all these theorists say, we need not immediately accept their findings as the whole truth.

Nobody can examine modern social life with any attention without agreeing that a very large proportion of what goes under the name of moral behaviour is largely mechanical, the manifestation of ideas that have not been thought but impressed, and which express themselves in thought, word

or action when the necessary stimulus is applied. If such were not the case the burden of our responsibilities would be too great, we should feel too heavily the "weight of chance desires"; we are happy and fortunate in being able to profit by the experience of our ancestors and in letting them make ninety-nine per cent of our moral decisions for us. We may, however, have reservations as to the one per cent that remains.

There are few who will not admit that sometime in their lives there has been so strong a feeling of decisive action, so much vigour of mind exercised, so much mental conflict involved in arriving at a decision, as to preclude any possibility of mere mechanical obedience to law; when it has rather been a case of the active *making* of law, of fixing future determinations. Such convictions may of course be fallacious, but so long as they are felt by the majority of people their very existence prevents the final acceptance of the behaviourist doctrine in its extreme form.

Neither has there been any proof that a precise moral stimulus will give rise to a precise moral effect, whether in feeling or thought or action; nor has it been convincingly shown that the general or vague results have not been separated from their general or vague stimuli by some unanalysed working of conscience. The answer "yes" to the question "are you well?" may occur ninety-nine times out of a hundred without its being a precisely conditioned reflex. The answer has been the same, but thought has occurred between question and answer.

The hedonist, however, does not refer only to habitual actions but to considered and deliberate deeds, to beneficence for instance, the devotion of a life to a cause, the pursuit of truth. The egoistic hedonist argues that the doing of the deed gives so much satisfaction to the mind of the doer that the pleasure felt in its performance outweighs any pain involved. Not only does this theory of motive seem repugnant to common sense and to truth, but it ignores the fact that such pleasures can hardly be foreseen and so cannot act

as motives; at the best they can only be an unforeseen or at least unreckoned-on reward, and an examination of the cases will show that the reward is often not realized. Again, as has, too, been amply shown elsewhere, it is a common experience that the pleasures that come in the pursuit of ends other than pleasure are generally acuter and more satisfying than those deliberately sought after: there must then be an intuition that such action will result in happiness or the hedonistic philosophy, in even its most moderate form, must be rejected.

It does, moreover, seem highly improbable that if the "moral faculty" is really an approver and encourager of selfish action however refined, it should publish its approval of the disinterested, and its detestation of the self-seeker as its most characteristic and far-reaching judgment.

We may, moreover, ask whence the necessity or even possibility of inventing the idea or the word "moral" if the reality does not exist or cannot be distinguished from others, such as "expedient" or "useful".

Though historians may succeed in showing us that great moral reforms, such as the abolition of slavery in America, were the results of economic conditions, they have not proved the absence of the purely moral idea, but only that it may be quickened, as may other faculties, by fortunate conditions, and retarded by adverse, and that, though an end in itself, it may be used as a means.

As for altruistic hedonism, its theories by no means contradict those of a morality which is an ultimate value. If happiness is really the *summum bonum*, morality, like sense and reason and beauty, will help its attainment in a way that is unique and so an end in itself. Just as it may if perfection or experience be the end of life. But the chances are that though it may be the *summum bonum* it is not the goal of life.

Many of the world's great moral teachers have been repudiated sometimes even to the death, and sometimes without having produced offspring, so that neither the individual nor

his society judge that either he or they would gain benefit from his morality. The ethics of Christ are as high as the human mind has yet conceived, but few, unless a rare Shelley, believe that they would materially benefit any society in which they were exactly and consistently followed; in our own time and land we have before our eyes the alarming prospect of a race-deterioration because of the humanitarian treatment of its unfortunates.

It is, however, true that practices whose inspiration has been the general good may go on mechanically, according to the nature of habit, when the results no longer increase the well-being of men.

Since then we may accept at least the possibility of morality as a real entity there is no reason why we should reject the possibility of a moral intuition. And indeed it seems clear that if we can establish morality as a unique value we have established a moral sense, and whether we call it sense or conscience or intuition is really only a matter of nomenclature. The conception may at least be examined.

What is a moral intuition?

The term may mean: (1) The immediate unreasoned knowledge that one of several actions or courses of action, performed or capable of being performed, is right as distinct from wrong or less right (mystics). (2) Or this faculty of immediate moral conviction may be evolved under certain physical, mental or emotional conditions (Green). (3) It may claim as its object an absolute and static good (Hutchinson), or the best under the circumstances (Sidgwick), or it may lay no claim to the possibility of an absolute good but mean the reaching after some not yet realized end, a dim groping in a direction felt to lead to a greater good, the pursuit of the soul after its own perfection. That is, it may claim good as an ultimate human value, bringing with it a "conviction of significance" (Alexander). (4) Or it may lay no claim to judge between actions but to be only the *a priori* power of realizing the notions "right" and "wrong".

(5) Or it may mean the indissoluble connection between possible good action and duty: "ought" (Kant, Janet). (6) Or again it may mean that certain virtues are recognized immediately and without reason as being good as distinguished from bad or indifferent. (7) Or more vaguely it may mean the individual realization of being part of a moral whole and so bringing into harmony the contrary characteristics of the part when considered in abstraction from its whole and when considered as functioning in the whole; that is, at the same time moral intuition may be finite and absolute, fluent and stable, temporary and permanent and so satisfying to the different sides of man's nature.

There are certain problems connected with these various conceptions of moral intuition, the most important being immediacy, infallibility, relationship to an absolute Good, universality, position among the values, connection with conduct, origin, sphere of action, precision.

First then: have moral ideas an immediacy which distinguishes them from other forms of knowledge? The question is debatable. As has been shown above, many thinkers consider them derived, and moral action but a kind of reflex action or reasoned behaviour with certain peculiar characteristics.

Others take up a more doubtful position. Bishop Butler, while claiming that the moral faculty is a fundamental part of our nature, a kind of internal sense, calls it alternatively "conscience" and "reflection". He ascribes it to human beings but not to animals, because the former being self-conscious have the power to reflect on their own actions and to place them under one of two natural classes, "right" and "wrong". Butler seems¹ to claim that every action is naturally put immediately on reflection into its right moral class, and that the agent has no more doubts as to which of two alternative actions is right at the time and which wrong. This, in spite of Butler's worldly as well as moral wisdom,

¹ On the whole and in spite of the part he acknowledges is played by reason in moral decision.

we feel constrained to deny, from both observation and personal experience. There are many circumstances in which all the possible ways of acting are both right and wrong. Who, for instance, is to decide on the question of Cavour's political action? "Cavour said quietly to his friends one day: 'If we had done for ourselves the things which we are doing for Italy, we should be great rascals'. The magnificent integrity of Cavour's character and the entire disinterestedness of his public conduct lend peculiar force to this saying. It must indeed be confessed that he bequeathed to the statesmanship of the new Italy the old traditions of duplicity, which have sometimes become low cunning in the hands of successors with neither his virtues, his abilities nor his dire necessities for an excuse. But before we condemn Cavour we must decide whether without a large degree of duplicity he could, supported by England alone, have made Italy against the will of a hostile Europe—against the destroyers of Poland, 'the man of December', the Pope, and the perjured dynasty of Naples. This question I am unable to answer, and I believe that no answer, however confidently given, can be anything better than a reasoned guess."¹

People whom I have asked have told me that they have no doubt whatever as to which is right or wrong between one possible line of conduct and another, as soon as the problem has been put and considered.

The experience of others is contrary. They have been faced with two absolutely alternative lines of conduct, each of which when carefully considered has aroused repulsion, as involving actions low in the moral scale, and the ultimate line taken was the result probably of the strength of the passions involved, but apparently of a careful weighing up of the moral *pros* and *cons*. And though now, long after the event, they can realize that it was emotion and neither reason nor morality that made the final decision, they cannot yet determine which course would have been the higher morally.

¹ Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, p. 32.

This may possibly be a matter of gift. Intuition, like feeling and reason, may be greater or less in its initial power, or in its development; it may vary even in its mode of manifestation: it may bring immediate conviction to one person and a problem to another, but invariable immediacy must, I think, either be denied to moral intuition, or the realization of right or wrong and the various degrees and orders of right and wrong be put down to another faculty.

This gives rise to the question whether, immediate or not, the moral conviction can be relied upon; whether it is infallible. Only a few men, and they of the mystical type, will make such a claim. People go through years of moral pain who have merely broken a conventional law, or even a custom, which their ignorance or thoughtlessness or habit of mind has confused with a moral law. Many moral decisions sincerely made are afterwards regretted as mistaken. The philosophers have told us often to know ourselves lest we be led astray by either ignorance of the many idols which deceive our minds, or by ignorance of our own ignorance, and, since perfect self-knowledge is impossible, so will the infallible moral judgment be impossible unless we can establish its immediacy, its freedom from the weaknesses of the intellect. Browning has attempted to picture a man gifted with such immediate and infallible moral judgment in his *Lazarus*, but just because that knowledge is immediate and does not come in the wake of reason he can neither explain it nor wholly follow its guidance, and so lives harmless, not without charm, but rather at odds with the world.

Along with the question of infallibility comes that of the nature of the good that intuition recognizes. The mystics claim an absolute and static good, glimpses of which come to men in their intuitions. Hutchinson seems to accept an Absolute when he says: "The constitution of nature is ever stable and harmonious, nor need we fear that any change in our constitution should also change the nature of virtue,

more than we shall dread the dissolution of the Universe by a change of the great principle of Gravitation."

T. H. Green, though he considers that the faculty of moral intuition develops gradually along social lines, yet holds that the divine goodness does not change, but only the power of seeing it. The belief in an Absolute Good is held, too, by a great many theologians and by most religious people.

The difficulties of accepting any Absolute are very present to the minds of twentieth-century thinkers. It is impossible to imagine an absolute good except as a mere name to describe perfection along some line of values, whose consummation our human mind is quite incapable of grasping.

It is an undoubted fact, however, that though our mind cannot grasp the idea of an Absolute Good, it can grasp after it; it has at least conceived it, however vaguely, and the fact that the idea has been conceived and yet lacks all precision and definition and evades all power of description, seems to point to a possible intuition.

A distaste for, as well as the felt danger of fascination by, the idea of an active absolute like Descartes' God, needs not and does not preclude the possibility of moral intuition. On the contrary the intuition may be an idea at the dawn; the feeling of being on the path of a final good which has not as yet been realized, such as Professor Alexander suggests, and the moral faculties may be those which lead one, more or less surely, according to their development, towards some end, quite undefined except that its nature is moral. Such a view does away with the difficulty of accepting both a static god and a fluent world.

M. Paul Janet has the idea of a moral intuition developing along definite lines towards a Perfection or Absolute, and points out the similarity of the moral ideas arrived at by different nations at different times and under different circumstances, and that the similarity increases along with civilization, or rather with the mental advance of moral practice and theory, while he at the same time rebuts any

idea of morality and hedonism being synonymous terms. Hobbhouse's *Morals in Evolution* is very convincing along the same lines. He points to the great moral codes of the world, the Eastern sacred books: Vedas, Zend-Avesta, the Mosaic Law, the teachings of Confucius, and shows how much there is in common of a general moral tendency or direction in spite of the enormous discrepancy in detail. Studies of savage primitive customs, too, though with far greater diversity, on the whole impress one with the sameness of the general moral tendency more than with the presence of standards and customs that our own moral standards prevent us from understanding.

There may then be an intuition of an ultimate Absolute Good, which has assuredly however not yet been experienced.

One of the strongest and most reiterated arguments against the reality of moral intuition has been that not only do private intuitive judgments lack infallibility, but moral codes differ so much between time and time and race and race as almost to preclude the possibility of a general moral sense responsive to similar stimuli. A practice regarded as moral by one set of men is regarded as immoral by another and vice versa. If the Chinese carry reverence for parents to the point of worship, Darwin tells us of a South American people who in times of scarcity smother their old women in the fumes of the fires that are to cook them for their children's table. If modern England feels that the care of the child is one of the first duties of the State, dozens of peoples have practised infanticide with the same moral purpose.

Is moral intuition, supposing it to exist, a universal faculty? If we limit it to an immediate knowledge of the ideas of "right" and "wrong", perhaps we may agree, at the same time allowing that its growth from the germ may be developed and retarded according to circumstances. It is an experience more or less immediate, infallible, universal, according to the wideness or the narrowness of the claim made for its working and the scope given to its exercise. We should hardly allow the claim to belong to humanity to be

made by a man with absolutely no power of distinguishing between right and wrong. R. L. Stevenson has pictured such a creature in Mr Hyde, and Shakespeare perhaps in Iago, but we feel the unreality though we are fascinated by the concept of the former; while the latter is felt to be, though real, yet inexplicable, unaccountable, "a devil not a man" and "Even the devils", St James reminds us, "believe and tremble". Falstaff has been described as quite amoral, and some theorists say that little children make no distinction, while others assert that many of the higher animals, e.g. dogs and elephants, make a rudimentary one. But Falstaff himself boasts of his morality, and half the amusement he brings us lies in the twist he gives his immoral actions in order that they shall appear moral. He comprehends the distinction only too well. No mother would ever allow that her baby was quite without the idea of wrong, and I doubt whether any nurse who has had continuous charge of an infant would declare that the moral faculties showed themselves later than the passions and the mental powers, or at any rate were merely the result of the two latter.

Those who allow of a moral intuition often give it the place of supreme authority in the human mind; every thought, every action, however laudable from other points of view, is repudiated by our lips, if it ranges itself unmistakably in the class "wrong", and if many people agree that an action while not "right" is expedient, they are really only saying that their eyes are fixed on the end and not on the means, that evil *may* be done *if* good may come of it, which is another problem altogether, and does not take away from the authority of the moral law within us.

Butler, Hutchinson, Hume, Kant, Whitehead all give it priority to reason and, the first two at least, authority over every other sense or faculty. Priority in the evolutionary sense seems hardly possible unless with Spinoza's meaning that the preservation of one's own life and the fulfilment of one's functions are in themselves ethical. But in the

sense that the moral idea is the foundation of reason the claim of priority is understandable. As Professor Whitehead says: "The preservation of such faith [in reason] must depend on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual actions—that it should embody the adventure of hope."

The claim to supreme authority comes naturally to the mind of a bishop, possibly to a philosopher considering the ethical problem, and perhaps more naturally to the ancients than to the moderns. It is doubtful whether the typical artist would allow that goodness was in itself higher than beauty, or the scientist allow its claims over a knowledge of reality. *The Sleeping Clergyman* has lately presented the problem on the stage. The man in the street, however, would probably agree readily enough to give Good priority over the Beautiful and the True. Immediate, infallible, universal or not, moral intuition may still be a reality, and if so, if some people have convictions that certain lines of action are right and others wrong, what is the relationship of that conviction to the ensuing action? St Paul has answered the question satisfactorily to most of us. There appears to be no *constraint* to obey the conviction, and its clarity or vagueness seems to have little to do with its effect on action. Indeed it may happen that the very people with the gift of moral intuition most developed are also those with the clearest idea of the delights of the senses, or the glory of power, or whatever lure is opposed to the fulfilment of its demand.

Nevertheless there does appear to be something more than the mere knowledge that one action is right and another wrong. There does always seem to be the urge, however weak, to act according to the dictates of conscience, and perhaps among the few great moral characters of the world, it is in reality irresistible. In drunkards and degenerates generally it is all but absent, though probably never quite.

It can hardly be said that the connection between moral knowledge and action points to an evolutionary origin rather

than to an intuition *a priori* and fundamental to the idea of humanity, since there has always been a tendency to crucify those who are more especially endowed. But an evolutionary origin would not do away with its reality, for why should not a power of moral intuition be evolved, along with instinct, reason, imagination? It might indeed lessen its claims to be an ultimate value (I say only "lessen") but not to be a characteristic of humanity, and one ultimately if not originally separable from utility. In this respect goodness and beauty may be in much the same position.

We arrive then at a general conclusion that, if by moral intuition we mean *a priori* knowledge of the meaning of the ideas "right" and "wrong", a great deal has been and is being said for it. If we mean that the sense of right and wrong is invariably accompanied by some urge to do the one and refrain from the other, much is to be said for that belief too. If, however, we mean an authoritative injunction always under all circumstances to follow certain rules of conduct, such as to consider the greater happiness of others before the lesser happiness of ourselves, to act justly, to speak and act the truth invariably, and to approve of others when they behave in this way, and invariably disapprove of them when they do not follow these injunctions, there is much less to be said; but yet thinkers are not agreed in denying existence and authority to such intuitions. Every age indeed finds upholders of this type of moral intuition.

Hutchinson writes: "The forms which win our approbation are, all kind affections and purposes of action; or such propensions, abilities or habits of mind as naturally flow from a kind temper, or are connected with it; or show a higher taste for the more refined enjoyments, with a low regard to the meaner pleasures, or to its own interests; or lastly such dispositions as plainly exclude a narrow contracted selfishness; or a highly feverish, angry, envious or an ill-natured temper, leading us naturally to hurt others; or a mean, selfish sensuality." Kant acknowledges an imperative intuitive in-

junction not to perform any act which we would not allow to be right if the whole world performed it. Henry Sidgwick allows that the conviction of happiness as a legitimate goal of action is a moral intuition; Butler adds the binding force of justice and veracity; Janet the sense of different qualities of "good" and of moral obligation; Dr Broad allows benevolence certainly and perhaps others, and Whitehead's fundamental "adventure of hope" has already been quoted.

If, however, by moral intuition we mean a command guided (though it may be influenced) neither by reason nor emotion to every or any particular action which entails moral behaviour, experience constrains the majority of thinkers to deny it.

The objection that moral action is guided by hedonistic ends is no objection to the reality of intuition, since the two are in no real opposition; on the contrary, the conviction that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the highest moral aim is itself often considered as a moral intuition.

Neither is there any reason to think that the comparatively late appearance of the moral idea in the development of life is any objection to its reality; mind itself developed late and possibly too as a mere means and not an end, and yet there is no agreed denial of mind.

Nor do the lack of authority, the unreliability, the occasional contradictoriness of what may be considered as moral intuitions really form a decisive argument against them, since our senses and our reason too often deceive and betray us, being neither perfectly developed nor perfectly trained, yet if we refused to accept their guidance we could not live.

There does not then seem to be a conclusive argument against the reality of moral intuition, nor any for it. But there does seem a possibility to almost every type of mind, a probability to many, and a certainty to a few.

Chapter VIII

AESTHETIC INTUITION

THERE seems a greater readiness to assent to, or allow, or concede the possibility of intuition in the realm of beauty than in that of any other form of mind activity; intuition, that is, which is not merely some aspect of primitive perception, but mental working at the higher or even highest levels. Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer among the classics agree, Croce, Whitehead, Inge among the moderns.

The reason is not far to seek. Beauty is the most profound, the most insoluble, the most fascinating of all the mysteries life presents. We can make some attempt at explaining the laws of Nature or of thought, the workings of morality, the power of religion, or, if we can make no attempt to explain them, we do see some reason, some use in them; we at least can make a guess how such conceptions come to take possession of our minds. But beauty, even when we have learnt Gulliver's lesson, and even if we have learnt the far more difficult lesson Epstein has to teach us, remains a mystery.

There is, first of all, the mystery of its appearance. Why among things beautiful is the whole different from the sum of its parts, not merely in the creation of a new whole, for that is common to all kinds of synthesis, but in the sudden and apparently causeless appearance of something quite new and of a different nature from what preceded it? Why does the fourth note make a "star" and not merely a new phrase of four instead of three notes? In other realms new things appear, but life produces life; idea idea; material substance material substance; while beauty is made not from beauty (necessarily) but from alien things, sounds, colours, lines, from ugliness itself.

There is a second mystery: the absence of any touch of utility, not only in beauty itself but in the appreciation of beauty. Men have been known, in desperation at the apparent lack of so essential a motive to mental or any other activity, to ascribe a utilitarian origin to the recognition of the beautiful; the beautiful woman, for example, having the form preferred because it will most easily and successfully produce offspring; and in all art as distinct from Nature, a suitability to purpose has sometimes been claimed as an essential to perfect beauty. But I do not think that any such claim has been made out with respect to inanimate or even animal nature.

Then there are the sudden appearances of new appreciations, as, for instance, that of the wilder mountain scenery towards the end of the eighteenth century in Europe, or of the more terrible aspects of the ocean, or the present-day tendency to find beauty in the slag heap or the engine room, or to make beauty out of what is in itself repellent.

Form must no doubt have a content, but the beauty does not lie in the content. It lies in the form, in "the light that never was on sea or land".

Though we may account for the fact that the big-hipped, deep-breasted woman is not nowadays acclaimed as the most beautiful, no consideration of utility will account for the preference of the form of the gazelle over that of the gorilla, or the elephant over that of the penguin, or the boa-constrictor over that of the pig.

Again there is the mystery of the power of beauty. It is inexplicable in its nature and in its origin; apparently it does not help life in general and history shows it does not help it in the particular. Beauty and anguish still walk hand in hand the downward slope. Bohemia and Grub Street do not speak worldly success. Yet the power of beauty is second only to that of the will to live. "Was this the face that launch'd a thousand ships, and burnt the topless towers of Ilium?" It not only produces its creative artists, but its Samsons and Antonys, its "greenery-yallery-Grosvenor-Gallery-foot-in-

the-grave-young-men"; its negroes transformed by rhythmic sound, its mannequins, its globe-trotters, its fashions. The products of human labour and invention spent in the providing of that which satisfies or tries to satisfy the craving for beauty must be out of all proportion to that spent on actual necessities. "Oh, argue not the need", cried Lear. Such power is of course largely felt unconsciously; but when considered it seems inexplicable unless as an intuition of an ultimate value.

It is not surprising then that men are willing to recognize a mysterious mental faculty to account for so curious a mental working; and the strength of the claim of intuition in the aesthetic field is increased by the direct evidence of artists themselves. I quote from the poets, partly because I am more familiar with their utterances than with those of other artists, but largely because they are after all the most articulate; they attain to beauty more indirectly than workers in materials other than words; they have to achieve their end through two mediums, words as the material and the meaning of words as the content, neither of which separately nor the two together, have anything necessarily in common with beauty.

The poets then have given their testimony that the beautiful thing is realized by them either before, or in the act of, or even without subsequent creation, not through the workings of the reasoning faculties, not in virtue of its substantial nature, nor by a perception of its moral or religious significance, but inexplicably and immediately, by a mysterious yet absolute act of knowledge which may well be described as intuition.

The sounding cataract
 Haunted me like a passion.

WORDSWORTH.

Just when we are safest, there's a sunset touch,
 A fancy from a flower-bell, someone's death,
 A chorus ending from Euripides,—
 And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears.

BROWNING.

Rome's azure sky,
 Flowers, ruins, statues, music, words are weak
 The glory they transfuse with fitting truth to speak.

SHELLEY.

Hath white and red in it such wondrous powre
 That it can pierce through th'eyes unto the hart,
 And therein stirre such rage and restlesse stower,
 As nought but death can stint his dolours smart?
 Or can proportion of the outward part
 Move such affection in the inward mynd,
 That it can rob both sense and reason blynd?

SPENSER.

Coleridge recognized not only the intuition of beauty but the loss of the gift. "I know, not feel, how beautiful they are", he says of the clouds in the days of his declining poetic power, and this acknowledgment by a man who was not only one of the very greatest of English artists but also a psychologist and philosopher of no inconsiderable power and insight, throws a light on the nature of aesthetic intuition.

It can be lost.

Darwin, too, is said to have regretted a similar though not so profound a loss. If it can be lost, can it be gained? Common experience teaches us that it cannot be communicated. We may be put into the right frame of mind for recognizing beauty in sight or sound, but we cannot either convey our personal realization of some particular beauty or receive another's. Here it is unlike reason which is eminently communicable, and more like religious experience. And yet it would seem that the power of intuiting beauty can be educated. Given the faculty (and in one degree or another, with immense difference in the degrees certainly, most people have it), it can be trained if only by increasing the sensibility of eye and ear.

And here it is to be noticed that such training is the training of the senses, not of the intellect; the power of analysing or identifying or discovering the technical methods by which

artists get their results is a matter of the intellect not of the aesthetic powers. The poets most conscious of their own technical skill are seldom the very greatest. Milton was right in spirit when he said of the greatest poet: "Sweetest Shakespeare, fancy's child." And Tennyson, by just so far as he is self-conscious as an artist, is the less a poet.

And here we are led to the difficult question of appreciation. Can we group under the same heading the appreciation that leads to the apprehension of the yet uncreated, and that of what is existent? Croce says that we can; that the aesthetic experience arises only with expression, and that when we grasp the artist's work for the moment at least we are, by dint of sympathy, the artist, and go through his experiences; and by an argument not quite so clear he applies the same thing to the aesthetic appeal of external nature. I find it difficult, however, to believe that appreciation is the same power manifested in a less degree as creation. Carlyle and Ruskin both had the former in an acutely sensitive form in respect to both external nature and poetic art. Both were great artists in prose, both made quite unsuccessful attempts at writing poetry. The same appreciation of painting and knowledge of its technicalities belonged to Browning, who in vain practised the "alien" art. Are there then two kinds of aesthetic intuition: that which perceives created and that which conceives uncreated beauty? If so, the examination of its claims to reality becomes more complicated since it is not a simple but a compound mental function we are seeking.

If we allow religious intuition, we mean an immediate knowledge of a spiritual world, not the power of working miracles. If we acknowledge moral intuition, we mean the immediate unreasoned conviction that an action or a type or class of actions is right or wrong, not the power of doing the right or resisting the wrong. If we acknowledge intellectual intuition, we mean the immediate solution of a problem unpreceded by any connected chain of reasoning, not the power to apply, or explain, the knowledge. In each case the first is a

knowledge, the second a skill. The same thing would seem to apply to aesthetics. If we are going to use the word and accept the idea of intuition, it looks as though we must limit it to the knowledge of the presence (internal or external) of beauty and find some other explanation and name for the power of publishing beauty. Perhaps the artist, with his highly educated sense organs and his equally highly developed powers of imagery, goes through a process of trial and error until he achieves the experience which he intuits as aesthetically satisfying, and then uses his skill in expressing his intuition. This seems the more likely as we not only have people whose powers of recognizing without being able to express seem highly developed, but we have degrees of creative power, e.g. the pure imitation of photography which, according to the selective power of the photographer, may be merely reproduction or verge on creation; the skill of the copyist with its tendency to exactness or its individual variation; the fourth rate, third rate, second rate poet, painter, sculptor, architect, who would seem to show degrees of skill in the use of material rather than in the possession of a gift so immediate and absolute in its nature as intuition. (That is always when, and if, we have convinced ourselves that the last cannot be expressed in terms of more familiar and accepted workings of the mind.)

If this is the case and we may fairly discriminate between the realization of the presence of beauty and the skill in using a material so as to express that intuited beauty, may not such an intuition be ascribed to exceptional sensibility in the development of the sense organs? Schopenhauer says that we must only gain the power of perception purified from all subjective taint and we have assured aesthetic intuition. Here again there is no discrimination made between the power of intuiting and the power of expressing, nor any denial of the possibility of the former without the latter as in the case of Croce, and, I think, a quite undue over-emphasis of the physical side of perception. Milton was blind when

he wrote all but his earlier works, Beethoven deaf, and though of course their genius would have been quite impossible unless during the early part of their lives they had seen and heard, yet they are a convincing proof that more than acute senses and the power of sustained attention are necessary to the artist (necessary as they are to both artist and scientist):

A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him
And it was nothing more,

are lines written in an attempt to describe a man devoid of aesthetic feeling.

We should make a clear distinction between intuition and imagination: a distinction often not adequately made even by those philosophers who use and analyse both terms, i.e. Kant, Whitehead, Croce.

Imagination is the power of combining images or ideas, i.e. in finding between them a before unrecognized relationship, but intuition consists in the realization—perhaps as Professors Housman and Abercrombie would say, a physical realization—of the presence of beauty brought about by the combination. Professor Housman tells us how, though the first verse of a poem came to him easily, it would almost seem spontaneously, months passed before he could successfully achieve the third verse, i.e. before the various combinations of images which he tried were intuited by him as satisfying the aesthetic sense.

The theory of aesthetic intuition seems to reconcile the claims made for relative and for absolute beauty. If beauty is absolute, one side or aspect may be intuited by one person, another by another. It is notorious that different types of beauty are especially appreciated by different nations, at different historic periods and at different stages of the development of the individual, as by the different sexes. All these may be aspects of the absolute beauty to be found in the universe, otherwise we have to accept some form of solip-

sism, which, of course, we must do if evidence falls that way, but, at least as far as this aspect of the realization of beauty is concerned, it does not. For we have the acknowledged claims in all the different arts, i.e. a sure final agreement upon some objects whose appeal is so varied in type, or so overwhelming along a few particular lines, that, at least after alien local and periodic prejudices have disappeared, it is universally acknowledged; and we have the final rejection of those objects which once made an appeal, and therefore must have possessed beauty in some aspect, but whose appeal is too narrow, too insufficient to form any substantial part of the being of beauty.

Is it possible to reduce intuition of beauty to any other faculty of the mind with which we are more at home, and so gain a more compact and coherent image of man's mentality?

If we say it is a judgment we must answer ourselves: "a judgment of what but beauty?" which remains unexplained. If we say it is a kind of satisfaction in which we recognize (though often unconsciously) the useful, we have already shown that this is not the case. And even if we did not accept this finding and affirm that though we often cannot see the connection, the connection is, or has once been there, we are not showing that the useful is anything more than an invariable accident of the beautiful, as it may be of the moral.

If we say that beauty is just a kind of pleasure, we have to admit that it is not a pleasure that leads direct to physical well-being, but a pleasure in beauty, i.e. in the recognition or intuition of what is beautiful.

Mr H. G. Wells suggests that the origin of a conscience or sense of sin may be found in the early teaching of her sons by the mother that they must not interfere with the women of the group who belong exclusively to the father or "Old Man", and this combination of maternal love and fear of and respect for the father aroused a horror at the idea of displeasing the one and angering the other, which accounts for the feeling of guilt and the idea of sin, and, particularly, for

the almost universal disgust at the idea of incest among human beings, though not among animals. A similar origin has been found for the religious feeling in the love for the giver—the sun, river, etc., and fear for the destroyer—hunger, flood, etc. May not the feeling for beauty have a similar origin, which, like the religious sense, has developed so far from its origin as to be unrecognizable? Magic and religion both require ceremony. The first drawings were probably hunting-magic. But why did religion require ceremony (or beauty) and hunting-magic evolve the aesthetic in drawing?

It may be possible that the thing desired was held to be in the power of the desirer when something very like it was present, and so the rain was “danced” to a patter, and an outline of the animal made on the wall of the cave, and so a satisfaction in such actions, productions, even places, grew up, and becoming alienated from its origin, grew into a love of beauty. But this will never explain why sheer imitation (which is *not* beautiful) should develop into and lead to a love of beauty. Though it may account for the origin of drawing and dancing it does not account for the *art* of drawing and dancing.

Without accepting such origins to the religious and moral feeling we may point out that if they were accepted it would probably be largely because at the present time both religious and moral conduct *is* closely connected with physical well-being, with position and success in the world, while no such happy accompaniment goes with the love of beauty, except, of course, so far as it provides an outlet for man’s craving for beauty, the development of his personality.

Granting all this, is there any need to use a new word, especially one with such a mysterious association as “intuition”? Why not talk of the recognition, or the knowledge of beauty? The practice can only be justified if we find a peculiar form of knowledge or recognition here which it is useful and even necessary to discriminate. Truth is its own

measure: we recognize, we know a truth immediately and directly; we cannot prove any but a derived truth. We recognize and know beauty, perhaps not so immediately and directly, but we can neither prove nor explain it. We may perhaps allow ourselves to say that we intuit truth and beauty or that we have an intuition when we recognize that a fact is true or a concrete object beautiful, but then we use the word in two different senses; the first is the fundamental act which accompanies all knowing; the second involves a double mental action: a normal knowledge of beauty followed by the realization of the fact that this particular object is beautiful; or, if we prefer the simpler statement of the action, we place the object in the class of the beautiful, i.e. we must already know the beautiful or have a potential knowledge. We must, in fact, allow beauty as an ultimate value.

Either, then, there is such a thing as aesthetic intuition which cannot be expressed adequately in any other terms, or the beautiful must be reduced to the useful. I feel I have refuted the latter alternative, but am not so sure that I have established the first which Richards repudiates so vehemently.

Nevertheless he seems to me essentially mistaken. Grateful to him as we must be for the constant and so necessary reminder that beauty is, from one point of view, in the beholder and not in the object; that it is our response that has value not the stimulus, yet his argument seems either fallacious or to lead us straight to solipsism.

The following is his definition of value: "Anything is valuable which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or *more important* appetency."¹

From this he deduces: "When we look at a picture or read a poem, or listen to music we are not doing something quite unlike what we were doing on our way to the College or when we dressed in the morning",² since on all these occa-

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 48.

² *Ibid.* p. 16.

sions we are following our impulses, and the value of the impulses differs only in so far as they are more or less far-reaching, satisfying and developing to our personality.

He describes art: "The arts are our storehouses of recorded values. They spring from and perpetuate hours in the lives of exceptional people, when their control and command of an experience is at its highest. . . ."¹

But Richards does not explain why we desire these records. What value are they to us? Are they more efficacious in producing impulses of high value in us than our own experiences and appetences? And, if so, why? The answer must be either: (a) That the experiences of the artists are so overwhelmingly superior to ours that just to be aware of them is one of the most valuable experiences open to us; or (b) Art is a means to an end and that end is knowledge. It teaches us about other people's experiences; or (c) There is a peculiarity about this *type* of experience that attracts us, arouses our appetite, satisfies our impulses in a way that walking to the College or dressing in the morning does not.

To (a) it must be answered that one's own experience must of necessity be more vital, more real, more personal and so more valuable, *as an experience*, than the recorded experience of any one else, however superior that person or that experience may be. It is an appetency only if we share the experience and so make it our own; or when it is *not* the record of the experiences of others but our own experience that we enjoy before a work of art. In the first case it is not the conception of the idea but the realization of beauty that the spectator and the artist have in common. In the second the experience before the picture that is our own and not the record of another person's is an *aesthetic* experience.

(b) at first sight would seem to be what Richards means. Art he believes *is* a means to an end, that end being our activity, and does not differ essentially from any other impulse to energy. Why then do we discriminate the enjoy-

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 32.

ment of art from any other mental pleasure? Richards answers that on the whole it gives a freer play, a less obstructing activity, a more pervasive satisfaction than other impulses. He even goes so far as to say that "compared with the experience of great poetry every other state of mind is one of bafflement".¹ But there are many religious people who find that peace which passeth all understanding and who are deaf to poetry. Did Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius and perhaps Socrates not know something of it, and many another in less degree perhaps? It seems as though Richards, following Whitehead closely as he does, yet misses the force of the latter when he puts intensity as well as variety of experience as our final ends. The contentment of mind which Richards convincingly describes comes, I think, rather to the man who sees one particular value in life with intensity, than to him who experiences the variety. Is it a cry of desire from a lover of the arts? Matthew Arnold had the same belief. "He saw life steadily and saw it whole", he says of Goethe with the utmost sincerity; but the psychologist does not see Goethe so. The width of knowledge and understanding Richards ascribes to the artist may be true of some, but surely a candid examination of history will make us deny it to the majority. The greatest of the Elizabethans may have possessed it, but the Romantics certainly did not see life steadily, and the poets of the Augustan era did not see it whole. Even if this were not so, the difference between the impulses to art and to walking and dressing is not one of degree alone, or why should the experiences of, say, running and winning a race mean so much more in the development of a personality than, for instance, admiring a Christmas card?

Richards then must admit some quality or qualities which discriminate aesthetic from other experience. He tells us of "availability of past experience" of "normality". "As a basis for every art therefore will be found a type of impulse which is extraordinarily uniform which fixes the framework,

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 252.

as it were, within which the rest of the response develops.”¹ Now it may be true that every artist has to a high degree the availability of past experience, but so has every athlete; a satisfying normality, but so has the morally motivated man; a steadying framework to his impulses, but so have most deeply religious people. The characteristics are too general to be used as distinctive marks; yet the aesthetic stimuli are to us, as to him, distinctive, or how could any of us talk of art at all?

Even if we accept Richards’ neural theory of the mind and admit that *all* experience is a matter of afferent and efferent nerve fibres, so that *all* experience is, from one point of view, similar in nature, we should still be free to discriminate between the different stimuli that set the mechanism working. There may therefore be the *type* that arouses our aesthetic consciousness, and it is quite certain that psychology in its present state of development cannot say that activity resulting from neural disturbance is uniform in quality. He tells us that psychology will have nothing to do with “aesthetic” as differing from other emotion; but psychology so far in dealing with emotion measures neural response only in quantitative terms.

This leads us to (c). If we say that the aesthetic impulse differs from others because of its stimuli, we are not forgetting Richards’ warning: “We shall never understand metre so long as we ask, ‘Why does temporal pattern so excite us?’ and fail to realize that the pattern itself is a vast cyclic agitation spreading all over the body, a tide of excitement pouring through the channels of the mind.”² Neither do we forget that a very similar pattern arises in different bodies from the same temporal pattern. Richards admits that unless a certain percentage of the lines of the pattern are the same in different minds the same work of art is not being discussed. But what makes them measurably the same? The sameness of the object. So that though it is true enough that it is the subject who experiences beauty (or peculiarly fashioned neural

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 193.

² *Ibid.* p. 140.

responses) it is the object that is ultimately responsible. Why not then admit that beauty is the term that best explains or conveys that appetency towards a peculiar class of experiences? Richards seems in the end to have nothing against it except a horror of mystery: he admits the appetency, he admits the peculiar organization of the neural responses; he admits that he cannot explain consciousness of any kind—that it is a mystery. What he seems to refuse to admit is the “Intuition” or recognition in the object of what will bring forth that particularly organized response. Any one who can face the mystery of the fact he so powerfully describes, “the pattern itself is a vast cyclic agitation spreading all over the body, a tide of excitement pouring through the channels of the mind”, need not boggle at the recognition of the stimulus to that pattern.

Taken to its extreme, Richards' theory would lead to solipsism. He does not openly allow of the adequate place of the object in his psychological theory, but he quite consistently repudiates the idea that the difference between the neural response in similarly developed minds is fundamental or even very great. He has no use for the critic who sees “Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt”. In fact, though his theory would seem to lead to extreme idealism, his practical criticism does not. And yet he will not allow of absolute values; nor of the intuition of the principal classes of value or appetencies, nor even of such a guide and organizer of experience as Whitehead's “God”. I feel his position is illogical and that he abuses rather than disproves intuition. If he cannot follow Whitehead so far as to believe that “the teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty”¹ (with its capital B), he would lose nothing of the value of his teaching in clearing up vague and sentimental and idle superstition on the subject of beauty, and on the other hand he would avoid what is illogical in his position if he could accept Whitehead's definition: “Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience.”²

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 341.

² *Ibid.* p. 324.

Chapter IX

GENIUS

BEFORE leaving the psychology of intuition we must pause over the subject of genius. The word is often loosely used to imply an exceptionally high degree of talent; more properly it is sometimes used as the power of expressing the essential quality of a particular period and race at its richest and best, or perhaps even a little sublimated; in short the genius is the superman of his generation. Such men are Leonardo da Vinci, Beethoven, Rousseau, Tennyson. But as I understand it, genius implies something more than this: it not only expresses but influences its place-time. I offer the following somewhat awkward definition for want of a better. "Genius is mental power working in a creative direction where fineness of quality or largeness of scope is so far in excess of the normal as to alter permanently some habit of thought or action in a large group of people." This conception would include such a recluse as Spinoza and such fireworks as Mahomet, as well as most of the commonly accepted types, and is moreover interesting from the point of view of the student of intuition.

There are people (e.g. Ward) who allow of genius in the artist alone and who would deny it to the purely rational thinker, holding that the scientist observes accurately and records his observations in descriptions made in the interest of one particular point of view; that the mathematician merely deduces, and that the philosopher combines the two methods. And who will deny that the very greatest scientists, mathematicians, philosophers are ultimately artists? Nevertheless it is interesting, from the point of view of intuition, to examine in what different directions and under what circumstances genius is manifested.

It is in this last connection that I think, before examining the accounts that great men have given of themselves, it would be well to consider Herr Kretschmer's interesting book on *The Psychology of Men of Genius*.

His studies have brought him to three main conclusions:

I. That the occurrence of genius is very largely geographically limited.

II. That its workings tend to occur in cycles or periodic undulations.

III. That it is so closely connected with mental disease that in a large number of cases men of genius are either liable to attacks of insanity, or die insane, or at least have insanity in the family. "Nietzsche's hero was supposed to combine utmost health and sanity with the highest genius. Such a combination does not exist."¹

Now, however true it may be that in Europe a cross between the Nordic and Alpine races has been most prolific of geniuses, it is not difficult to find examples of genius in most regions of the earth. In the Far East there is Buddha, even if we deny the appellation to Confucius: in the Near East Mahomet, if the naming of Christ appears irreverent; and, if there is an absence of written historical record, there are the remains of Aztec civilization in South America which point to aesthetic genius. The Sphinx must have been the conception of a man of genius.

Geographical distribution then need not make us assume that genius is a purely biological function.

The question of periodic recurrences of special capacity, and of the relation of genius to insanity, however, again lends interest to the consideration of intuition. If the distinction between the mental power and scope of the average man, or even the highly talented man, and the genius, is that the latter makes use of a part or a power of his mind neglected by or absent from the former, we naturally inquire why there

¹ Kretschmer, *The Psychology of Men of Genius* (translated by Cattell, 1931), p. 155.

should be cycles. First of all, of course, we ought to ask whether in the majority of cases such periodic returns of skill do occur. Kretschmer says that they do, but he does not give enough examples to bring conviction. But assuming for the moment that he has not been deceived by his interest in a few arresting instances, what can this recurrence of power and of barren intermediate periods imply, with regard to a theory of genius as intuitive? I am far too ignorant to attempt an answer, but life, human life no less than animal, is so rhythmical in its incidence, physically, and, in consequence, mentally and probably spiritually too, in its shorter periods, its day for instance, its months, its working sections, week or term or season, its springs and summers, its autumns and winters, that it is not difficult to believe there may be some more spacious rhythms whose undulations occupy years and are therefore less noticeable though quite normal. Kretschmer, however, relates the periodic increase of mental capacity to similar periodic manifestations of acute derangement in insane persons, and, partly in consequence, connects genius and insanity. He instances the well-known fixation of the mind on one idea to the exclusion of the evidences of the senses; as Bernard Hart says, the fact that a woman in an asylum occupies much of her day scrubbing floors does not appear to her incongruous with the fact that she is queen of the world. A genius, Kretschmer thinks, may fix his mind so obstinately on one idea that everything in his life has interest only as it bears on that idea, until, by a "short circuiting", he eventually leaps suddenly from a particular instance to a general theory, as Galileo, seeing a swinging lamp in the church formulated the law of oscillation of the pendulum. I quote a vivid instance given by Kretschmer:

"As a ten-year-old boy the sight of a mill at work brought him [Robert Meyer] to the question of the conservation and transformation of energy, in connection with the related problem of perpetual motion. He worried at this one idea and it began more and more to take full possession of his

mind. On an ocean voyage in his twenty-sixth year, which he had undertaken as ship's doctor on his way to the Dutch Indies, he was led by a couple of chance observations to the decisive ideas which set his mind on fire. One was the observation of the steersman that after storms the sea was warmer than before. Then in the docks at Surabaya he was called upon to bleed a sailor and he noticed that the venous blood here, in the tropics, was not dark red, as in cooler zones, but bright red. With one of those sudden leaps of thought which were so characteristic, he derived from this fact of biological heat regulation, the law of the mechanical equivalence of heat. That glance at the bright red blood of the sailor had so impressed him that in the following weeks he forgot to write up his diary, and, full of this one idea, took the next ship back home. On the way home, after suffering from rapid changes of mood between gaiety and misery, he broke out in violent 'deliria', attacks of sudden excitement and mental disturbance which lasted for days."¹

Kretschmer deals with the case of Robert Meyer at length in order to illustrate his theory of the close connection between genius and madness; but to us the passage quoted is a particularly vivid instance of that "sudden leap", "short circuit" or "intuition" by which men of genius often arrive at some vital theory. The fact of the "sudden leap" is familiar to us all, and if it is not always a case of judgment so rapid as to be unrecognizable, what other name for it is there than "intuition"?

But to return to the question of insanity: we recall Jung to mind and remember that in his view intuition is a faculty of the subconscious, and that the subconscious manifests itself blatantly only in pathological cases. Kretschmer's theory, then, is in accord with Jung's, for the subconscious intuitive faculty "peering round facts" and drawing unconscious conclusions (*sic!*) may arrive at a new truth or a satisfactory solution long before the conscious mind, while the final obtrusion of the subconscious into consciousness naturally results in mental abnormality. In many of the examples of

¹ *The Psychology of Men of Genius*, p. 141.

men of genius whose minds we are studying this theory would seem to hold, and to some of them at least periods or touches of insanity cannot be denied, notably Rousseau, possibly Goethe, but not possibly, I think, David, or Marcus Aurelius, or Ford, or Spinoza, or Shakespeare: and if we limit ourselves to the exceptions I think we have disproved the idea that genius and madness are necessarily allied, though not that they frequently are. If then we choose our examples of genius, other than artistic genius, or that of abstract thought (where the presence or the absence of madness is of no importance), with care, I think we may regard Kretschmer's book as an interesting account of the relationship of genius and madness rather than a proof that that relationship is constant or necessary, and so may pursue our search for intuition in the mind of the genius without getting entangled in the morasses of pathology.

We have already considered the claims made by Spinoza to intuitive power in the region of rational intellect, but we have not been able to see his mind in the working. It is obvious that even in the case of a person gifted with exceptional introspective powers this can never be achieved, but the *Confessions* of Rousseau offer something approaching it. I propose then to examine his descriptions of the working of his own mind and particularly of how his ideas came into being.

ROUSSEAU

In Rousseau we have genius hardly to be denied, and as far from the kind which springs from an infinite capacity for taking pains as may well be imagined. It seems an inborn gift of such strength as to demand development in spite of all the hampering circumstances of his mind and character. When one reads his *Confessions* one hardly believes him capable of the simplest school task until one remembers that he has himself written those very confessions and that he moved many people of both sexes and of all grades of social standing to serve him, and that he altered the views of a whole nation, perhaps of a whole civilization, on certain intimate and practi-

cal as well as theoretical points. And yet the record of his life is not so much crime after crime (and crime and genius are not necessarily unallied), as folly after folly. One can hardly imagine more purely silly actions in small matters or more foolish ones in great. His lack of self-control in every kind of emergency was only equalled by the stupidity of his obstinacy; and his sudden and overwhelming passions (for men or women, or game, or art, or mode of life) by the dullness of his reasoning and memory. He spent years and years on music to which he was really devoted and achieved so little in the end that people doubted that he had ever made of it any study at all. On different occasions he was taught Latin by people he liked and by people he did not like, under circumstances when he wanted to learn and under circumstances when he was indifferent—and he was absolutely rejected as an entrant to an ordinary seminary for candidates to the priesthood. He shut himself up for weeks in the sudden passionate determination to master the difficulties of chess, and came out from his retirement scarcely able to remember the different moves when faced with an actual game.

And yet an undoubted genius.

I quote some rather long passages from his *Confessions* because here we have at first hand a great man's description of the nature of the workings of his own mind in a connection where there seems no reason to doubt that he is telling the truth, at least as far as the truth is clear to him. I propose then to examine the passages in order to see whether there seems to be any mental working other than intelligence as ordinarily understood and one which may fitly be described as Intuition.

“Cette lenteur de penser jointe à cette vivacité de sentir, je ne l'ai pas seulement dans la conversation, je l'ai même seul et quand je travaille. Mes idées s'arrangent dans ma tête avec la plus incroyable difficulté. Elles y circulent sourdement; elles y fermentent jusqu'à m'émouvoir, m'échauffer, me donner des palpitations; et au milieu de toute cette émotion je ne

vois rien nettement; je ne saurois écrire un seul mot, il faut que j'attende. Insensiblement ce grand mouvement s'apaise, ce chaos se débrouille; chaque chose vient se mettre à sa place, mais lentement et après une longue et confuse agitation... Si j'avois su premièrement attendre, et puis rendre dans leur beauté les choses qui s'y sont ainsi peintes, peu d'auteurs m'auroient surpassé....

“Je n'ai jamais rien pu faire la plume à la main vis-à-vis d'une table et mon papier: c'est à la promenade, au milieu des rochers et des bois, c'est la nuit dans mon lit et durant mes insomnies, que j'écris dans mon cerveau, l'on peut juger avec quelle lenteur, surtout pour un homme absolument dépourvu de toute mémoire verbale, et qui de la vie n'a pu retenir six vers par cœur. Il y a telle de mes périodes que j'ai tournée et retournée cinq ou six nuits dans ma tête avant qu'elle fût en état d'être mise sur le papier... Je n'écris point de lettres sur les moindres sujets qui ne me coûtent des heures de fatigue; ou si je veux écrire de suite ce qui me vient, je ne sais ni commencer ni finir; ma lettre est un long et confus verbiage; à peine m'entend-on quand on la lit.

“Non seulement les idées me coûtent à rendre, elles me coûtent même à recevoir. J'ai étudié les hommes, et je me crois assez bon observateur: cependant je ne sais rien voir de ce que je vois; je ne vois bien que ce que je me rappelle, et je n'ai de l'esprit que dans mes souvenirs. De tout ce qu'on dit, de tout ce qu'on fait, de tout ce qui se passe en ma présence, je ne sens rien, je ne pénètre rien: le signe extérieur est tout ce qui me frappe. Mais ensuite tout cela me revient; je me rappelle le lieu, le temps, le ton, le regard, le geste, la circonstance; rien ne m'échappe: alors, sur ce qu'on a fait ou dit, je trouve ce qu'on a pensé, et il est rare que je me trompe.”¹

“La marche a quelque chose qui anime et avive mes idées: je ne puis presque penser quand je reste en place; il faut que mon corps soit en branle pour y mettre mon esprit. La vue

¹ *Œuvres de Rousseau*, Tome xxiii, pp. 87-93. *Confessions*, Livre iii, pp. 233-5.

de la campagne, la succession des aspects agréables, le grand air, le grand appétit, la bonne santé que je gagne en marchant, la liberté du cabaret, l'éloignement de tout ce qui me fait sentir ma dépendance, de tout ce qui me rappelle à ma situation, tout cela dégage mon âme, me donne une plus grande audace de penser, me jette en quelque sorte dans l'immensité des êtres pour combiner, les choisir, me les approprier sans gêne et sans crainte. Je dispose en maître de la nature entière; mon cœur, errant d'objet en objet, s'unit, s'identifie à ceux qui le flattent, s'entoure d'images charmantes, s'enivre de sentiments délicieux... D'ailleurs portois-je avec moi du papier, des plumes? Si j'avois pensé à tout cela, rien ne me seroit venu. Je ne prévoyois pas que j'aurois des idées; elles viennent quand il leur plaît. Non quand il me plaît. Elles ne viennent point ou elles viennent en foule; elles m'accablent de leur nombre et de leur force."¹

"C'est une chose bien singulière que mon imagination ne se monte jamais plus agréablement que quand mon état est le moins agréable, et qu'au contraire elle est moins riant lorsque tout rit autour de moi. Ma mauvaise tête ne peut s'assujettir aux choses; elle ne sauroit embellir, elle veut créer. Les objets réels s'y peignent tout au plus tels qu'ils sont, elle ne sait parer que les objets imaginaires. Si je veux peindre le printemps, il faut que je sois en hiver; si je veux décrire un beau paysage, il faut que je sois dans des murs; et j'ai dit cent fois que, si j'étois mis à la Bastille, j'y ferois le tableau de la liberté."²

Here there are certain points to be particularly noted if we are to get a clear idea of the workings of Rousseau's mind in the process of artistic or intellectual creation.

(a) The presence of a multitude of vaguely connected ideas.

(b) The ideas are not at his command but come and go in his mind apparently without his intervention.

¹ *Confessions*, pp. 340-1.

² *Ibid.* p. 355.

(c) For their synthesis there seems to be a necessity for a certain isolation of mind, that is, his mind must be freed from any immediate necessity for activity.

(d) The influence of suggestion is negative.

(e) When expressed his ideas seem to him to have lost their original vivacity, and the images their brightness.

(f) There seems to be a necessity for either some considerable length of time between the first appearance of the confused ideas in his mind and their synthesis, or large open spaces seem to serve the same purpose, i.e. he demands amplitude of time or space.

(g) Synthesis sometimes comes without reflection.

(h) Rousseau emphasizes the creative nature of his syntheses of ideas rather than their clarifying or amplifying or explanatory character.

(i) The consummation, though not always the preceding steps of the synthetic process, brings happiness.

(j) A big part is played by images other than verbal ones.

(k) The mental process is accompanied by unusual physical manifestations.

(l) The presence of such words and phrases as "me jette", "l'immensité des êtres", "s'unit", "s'enivre", "rien ne me seroit *venu*", "mon imagination ne se monte", "parer", suggest an external force working on Rousseau's mind.

Among these characteristics there are some which obviously may be compared with those which are manifested by people who show signs of a possible religious, or artistic, or intellectual intuition, and others which as emphatically are not in accord.

The characterizations notable in religious mystics are isolation of mind, inability to express the full force of the realized idea, the joy of consummation, the part played by images, the felt pressure of some external force.

The characteristic not in accord with those experienced by religious mystics is the negative influence of suggestion.

The intuitional qualities of aesthetic experience which correspond with the above are: isolation of mind, the loss of vividness in expression (this indeed would seem to contradict Croce's thesis that the aesthetic experience *is* the expression and vice versa); the creative rather than analytic nature of the process; the joy of achievement.

Those not in agreement with aesthetic experience are: the absence of reflection, accompanying pronounced physical manifestation, and, perhaps, the presence of an external force.

Manifestations common to "intellectual intuition" (always supposing this to be irreducible to other and more verifiable mental functions) are the presence of many vaguely connected ideas: isolation, the passage of some length of time, the satisfaction brought by achievement.

Those not experienced in intellectual intuition are: no dependence of ideas on the thinker's will, the negative influence of suggestion, the absence of reflection, the necessary presence of images, concurrent physical manifestations, the felt pressure of an external force.

Now if Rousseau's mind was not religious, it was certainly highly emotional; the aesthetic quality of his work is undoubted, it holds as high a place in literature as in the history of ideas, so that it would not be surprising to find, if his mind worked partly by intuition, that it exhibited signs common to those experienced by religious, aesthetic and intellectual claimants to intuitional powers; nor would it be surprising if the varied qualities of his mind prevented it from corresponding exactly with one type. The qualities common to all these types are isolation of mind, final pleasure, and creation, all quite possibly present in any mental functioning, intuitional or otherwise. On the other hand, some of Rousseau's mental manifestations do not seem compatible with the better understood, or perhaps more readily accepted, forms of mental activity.

Rousseau himself endeavours to explain some of his own peculiarities. He remarks again and again in the *Confessions*

on the slowness of his mental processes, e.g. the length of time it took him to find a suitable repartee, or even expression of sentiment. He notes the difficulty he has in concentrating, both when there are distracting attendant circumstances and when he is bored by the sameness of his occupations. He has observed in himself an almost total lack of verbal imagery with an accompanying superabundance of other mental images, which unfortunate combination must of necessity make the precise expression of ideas an exceedingly slow and difficult and, apparently, unreasoning task (since reason is so much a matter of words). But before all other explanations Rousseau places the preponderance of feeling over reason. Feeling had to have its way before reason was allowed to manifest itself and was an invariable companion to any process of reason.

If we accept any of these explanations, it is possible, perhaps, to explain Rousseau's mentality without introducing any intuitional faculty. The presence of strong emotion together with the difficulty of getting into a state of mind necessary to the working of reason, and that working being of an almost non-verbal variety, must of necessity produce a very curious experience. Even then, can this strange combination of mental qualities account for the negative influence of idea, of image, of will? Can it account for the feeling of external power?

Then we have to ask whether Rousseau was correct in his diagnosis. Was feeling predominant? Almost any page of Rousseau's works contains a more than average number of ideas, and many of them with some degree of originality. There is no doubt of the tremendous part played by passions in his life, but there is certainly much doubt as to whether their influence was as great on his positive intellectual achievements as on his practical actions or on the stillbirth of certain types of idea. Often perhaps a certain emotional excitement seems necessary to bring thought to the birth, but the emotion is not necessarily predominant, and often it seems to be

comparatively absent, as for example in so many of his reflections on men and manners in general and not in particular.

Then again Rousseau does definitely try to think: he does not wait empty-headed and empty-willed for "the spark from heaven to fall".

Neither, as far as we meet the actual ideas and not Rousseau's account of them, do they appear to come out of the blue. There is always some practical situation or experience which gives rise to them (though their birth may occur long after the experience), more often than is apparent in most writers.

In spite, however, of all attempt at reduction to perception, reason, judgment, there remain the real difficulties of the negative influence of suggestion; of the negative or at least indifferent function of the will; of the absence of verbal imagery. (Can reason work without words, actual, or in the form of mental image?)

Does the supposition of intuition, however, help to an understanding of this extraordinary mind? It is difficult to think of an intuition which is not the result of concentration and prolonged reflection. Or was Rousseau perhaps mistaken in imagining the absence of these? But then omit these characteristics, and both the exceptional character of his mind and the value of his self-revelation disappear. Certainly Rousseau's ideas were always on subjects in which he took a lifelong interest, i.e. man's passions, his misfortunes, his faults, his capacities, his happiness. We may have then some pronounced form of subconscious reasoning such as Jung's theory would explain; or more probably such subtle, perhaps emotional, prehension of the relevant world as led him, half unwilling and half eager, prepared in some directions, blank in others, to an unexpected glimpse of reality, to an intuition of some aspect as significant. To a nature so plastic, so unbalanced, so receptive and sensitive, such partial and episodic "visions" might come if we accept Whitehead's metaphysical theory and take Rousseau's mind as the prehending subject.

Signor Croce has given us an interesting theory of aesthetics, but we do not read in his books an account of the artist introspecting and describing his own mind as it produces a work of art. Goethe does this for us in his autobiography, which it will be interesting to examine from this point of view.

GOETHE

Goethe is widely accepted as a genius of the first rank, and has left us an autobiography and a number of letters from which we may gain some idea of how his genius worked, and what he himself thought about its manifestations.

Now Goethe had quite exceptionally great intellectual powers. While Rousseau failed, and failed, and failed to learn Latin, Goethe learned English in four weeks; he went to his university to study law and took on medicine as well, in addition to experimenting in chemistry, perfecting the classics, composing, and leading a gay and often highly emotional life. Nothing he wanted to learn seemed to give him any trouble whatever.

In addition to these gifts Goethe acknowledged, and indeed insisted on, others of a quite different nature, differing in degree of intensity, in mode of manifestation, but nevertheless having qualities in common.

I enumerate these in what seem to me ascending degrees of importance:

- (1) Faith in omens and auguries.
- (2) Faith in prophetic dreams in specially endowed individual or family.
- (3) Direct artistic inspiration.
- (4) A readiness to let the above direct his course of action in matters great as well as trivial.

Of these only (3), i.e. direct artistic inspiration, comes within our line of inquiry, for direct aesthetic inspiration is what we may mean by the intuition of the artist; but it is only, I think, by examining the minor manifestations of

mystical powers that we can make any judgment as to how far we can explain it along strictly rational lines.

"By chance I had a handsome pocket-knife in my left hand, and at the moment, from the depths of my soul arose, as it were, an absolute command, according to which, without delay, I was to fling this knife out into the river. If I saw it fall, my wish to become an artist would be fulfilled, but if the sinking of the knife was concealed by the overhanging bank of willows, I was to abandon the wish and the endeavour. This whim had no sooner risen in me than it was executed. For, without regarding the usefulness of the knife, which compassed many instruments in itself, I cast it with the left hand, as I held it, violently towards the river. But here I had to experience that deceptive ambiguity of oracles, of which, in antiquity, such bitter complaints were made. The sinking of the knife in the water was concealed from me by the extreme twigs of the willows, but the water which rose from the fall, sprang up like a strong fountain, and was perfectly visible. I did not interpret this phenomenon in my favour, and the doubt which it excited in me was afterwards the cause that I pursued these exercises more interruptedly and more negligently. . . . For the moment at least the external world was spoilt for me."

This seems childish enough, but Goethe, though young, was not a child. The incident stands on a level with the twentieth-century practice of opening the Bible and putting one's finger on a text at random in order to find a guide at a critical moment; but Goethe was no Enoch Arden, nor Annie Lee, but a highly educated and extremely clever man. What impresses us is, not the impulse, which is a common enough experience, but the lastingness of the impression, so that, although no definite direction was given by the augury and its influence on his life was merely negative, Goethe records it in his *Autobiography*.

Its value for us is that Goethe was predisposed to interpret experience mystically. Indeed he often seems more Russian

in temperament than German, with his sudden impulses, his waywardnesses, his strong though transitory emotions with their power to work him up into physical fever.

(2) Goethe tells us that his grandfather had prophetic gifts well known to himself and his wife generally, but less circumstantially known to his family, of which his grandson gives us one not-very-convincing example. Goethe remarks that, as far as he knew, the gift was not transmitted to the rest of the family. But later he recounts a pre-knowing of his own: "I now rode along the footpath towards Drusenheim, and here one of the most singular forebodings took possession of me. I saw, not with the eyes of the body, but with those of the mind, my own figure coming towards me on horseback, and on the same road attired in a dress I had never worn—it was pike-grey with somewhat of gold. As soon as I shook myself out of this dream, the figure had entirely disappeared. It is strange, however, that eight years afterwards, I found myself on the very road to pay one more visit to Frederica, in the dress of which I had dreamed, and which I wore, not from choice, but by accident. However it may be with matters of this kind generally, this strange illusion in some measure calmed me at the moment of parting."

It is clear here, by his insistence on the pure accident of the dress, that Goethe desires to convey his conviction of the super-rational element in this experience. It is also clear that if we wish to be sceptical, we may be so even without the aid of Freud. He remembered the dress very vividly and might easily be self-deceived as to the strangeness of having such a dress as well as the "accident" of wearing it on this particular occasion. At the same time he speaks as if he were endeavouring to sooth his conscience in deserting a very charming girl, to whom he had been making love for some considerable time, and whose affections he had won. The idea that he was not really parting for ever but would come back some day must have helped to palliate his conscience, as he says it does the pain of leaving Alsace to which he had been attached.

Moreover Goethe tells us elsewhere that his imagination raised in his mind such vivid images that he himself could scarcely distinguish between image and reality. "I had soon put together in my imagination a little piece of the kind, of which I can only say that the scene was rural and that there was no lack in it of kings' daughters, princes or gods. Mercury, especially, made so vivid an impression on my senses, that I could almost be sworn that I had seen him with my own eyes."

A vivid imagination, and an uneasy conscience, and a wish not to be taking a final leave may account for the vision, while an unconscious memory and desire for fulfilment of the prophecy may as possibly account for the fulfilment, more especially as the intensity of the first impression had a marked effect on the young man's spirits.

If, on the other hand, one is going to accept manifestations of the supernatural, why not on the evidence of so great and clear-sighted and, on the whole, unprejudiced a mind as Goethe's?

(3) By far the most interesting account of the working of his mind given by Goethe is that in which he describes the conception, the invention, the creation of his literary works. He tells us they had one of two origins: either they were the work of rational intelligence making and working on a carefully thought-out plan; or they were the result of almost instantaneous inspiration. Among examples of the latter he describes the making of one of his longer books, *Werther*, and of his shorter lyrical works. These two accounts are most instructive reading: "All at once I heard the news of Jerusalem's death, and immediately after the general report, the most accurate and circumstantial description of the occurrence, and at the moment the plan of *Werther* was formed, and the whole shot together from both sides and became a solid mass, just as water in a vessel, which stands upon the point of freezing is converted into hard ice by the most gentle shake. . . . Jerusalem's death, which was occasioned by his un-

happy attachment to the wife of his friend, shook me out of the dream, and, because I not only visibly contemplated that which had occurred to him and me, but something similar which befel me at the moment, also stirred me to passionate emotion, I could not do otherwise than breathe into that production, which I had just undertaken, all that warmth which leaves no distinction between the poetical and the actual. I had completely isolated myself, nay, prohibited the visits of my friends, and internally also I put everything aside that did not immediately belong to the subject. On the other hand I enhanced everything that had any relation to my design, and repeated to myself my nearest life, of the contents of which I had as yet made no poetical use. Under such circumstances, after such long and many preparations in secret I wrote *Werther* in four weeks without any scheme of the whole, or treatment of any part being previously put on paper....

"Since I had written thus much, almost unconsciously, like a somnambulist, I was myself astonished, now I went through it, that I might alter and improve it in some respects."

We may easily follow the stages of creation here:

- (i) Prolonged contemplation of the subject (suicide).
- (ii) Resulting masses of ideas and feelings with no cohering principle.
- (iii) A sudden, actual, intimate and moving example of suicide.
- (iv) The harmonious self-arrangement of the isolated facts into a whole.
- (v) The feeling of being an instrument rather than an agent when contemplating the finished work.
- (vi) The discovery that in spite of the inspirational nature of its creation the harmonious whole might be made yet more harmonious.
- (vii) The polishing of the work of art.

If we are inclined to think that perhaps this is the ordinary

mode of rational creation described in a somewhat extravagant manner we need only look at Goethe's descriptions of the making of some of his other great works, the *Egmont* or *Iphigenia*, for instance, where the general plan is carefully thought out, the reading up and meditation on the subject follow, and the final putting into form takes place slowly and deliberately with months, perhaps years of delay between part and part.

All the stages of creation from (i) to (vii) expressed in the making of *Werther* have their counterpart in religious vision, in intuition of God, or God's will, as described by the mystics; by moral intuitants:

We cannot kindle when we will
 The fire that in the heart resides;
 The spirit bloweth and is still,
 In mystery our soul abides:
 But tasks in hours of insight will'd
 May be through hours of gloom fulfill'd.

With weary hands and bleeding feet
 We dig and heap, lay stone on stone;
 We bear the burden and the heat
 Of the long day, and wish 'twere done.
 Not till the hours of light return
 All we have built do we discern.

And surely too there is a general resemblance to the intellectual inspiration or intuition which results in the sudden and unexpected solution of a problem, the "short circuit" of Kretschmer.

Nevertheless it is not impossible that this is a perfectly rational procedure:

- (i) The consideration of the subject from as many angles as possible.
- (ii) Unsuccessful experiments in arrangement.
- (iii) An external but related incident which gives a new idea as to arrangement.

(iv) The working out of the new idea which proves successful.

(v) The delight in success which after prolonged failure seems almost miraculous and gives rise to extraordinary energy of execution.

(vi) The finishings and polishings.

Goethe's second description of the creation of his works, apparently mostly his shorter and lyrical poems, though he does not directly say so, will prove more difficult to fit into any ordinary rational working of the mind.

"I had come to look upon my indwelling poetic talent altogether as Nature; the more so as I had always been compelled to regard outward Nature as its proper object. The exercise of this poetic gift, could indeed be excited and determined by circumstances; but its most joyful, its richest action was spontaneous—nay even involuntary. . . .

"In my nightly vigils this same thing happened; I therefore often wished, like one of my predecessors, to get me a leathern jerkin made, and to accustom myself to write in the dark so as to be able to fix down at once all such unpremeditated effusions. So frequently had it happened that after composing a little poem in my head I could not recall it, that I would now hurry to the desk, and at one standing write off the poem from beginning to end. . . . In such a mood I liked best to get hold of a lead pencil, because I could write most readily with it; whereas the scratching and spluttering of the pen would sometimes wake me from my somnular poetizing, confuse me, and stifle a little conception in its birth. For the poems thus created I had a particular reverence. . . .

"This very Nature, however, which thus spontaneously brought forth so many larger and smaller works, was subject to long pauses, and for considerable periods I was unable, even when I most wished it, to produce anything, and consequently often suffered from ennui. The perception of such contrasts within me gave rise to the thought whether it would not be my wisest course to employ on the other hand, for my

own and others' profit and advantage, the human, natural and intellectual part of my being, and so, as I already had done, and as I now felt myself more and more called upon to do, devote the intervals when Nature ceased to influence me, to worldly occupations, and thus to leave no one of my faculties unused."

Here, if there has indeed been preparation, it has been completely unconscious; if there has been some external circumstance to suggest a centre of unity, it has come unrealized; if the resulting form is not immediately fixed, it is lost; there is no mention of any realization of imperfection, indeed the feeling of reverence in the author for his work seems to preclude it. The feeling of agency is overwhelming, a recall to a recognition of his individuality or existence destroys the creative influence. Goethe believes in the instantaneous inspiration and makes a vivid contrast between this and the observable natural working of his mind; even plans how to fill up the interval until "the spark from heaven" shall fall again—and seems very ready to regard the "human, natural, intellectual" as the lower of the two functions, to be put aside as soon as any sign of the other begins to manifest itself.

There may have been unconscious meditation, some dream or urge which served as a nucleus, and gave the necessary emotional impetus to action, but, if so, all was unconscious to one who was a deep thinker, an introspective egoist as well as a great poet. We may have here, then, a first-hand description of intuition of the aesthetic type, i.e. an immediate and unconditioned creation of a beautiful form, where the agent is among our greatest and the object is among our loveliest. But if so, what works the miracle? Of whom is he the agent?

We may be able to believe that our eyes are opened to see beauties we have been blind to; but the beauties must be there. We cannot conceive of a god who composes a poem, however perfect, on a brook, and then hypnotizes a man in order that he may record it; or put in another, perhaps more acceptable way, we may be able to accept the idea of a

man's mind flooded by a new and moving experience which he attempts to express in some concrete form; but we cannot believe that intuition unaided by skill gives him the form. Here then is either some curious subconscious working of the mind, or else Goethe's absorption in his task blinds him to the fact that it is a task, that his mind, far from being idle as a mere agent, is moving so swiftly as to appear still and be driven completely off the track by the smallest obstacle. We are all familiar with the shutting out of sights and sounds and thoughts during absorbing mental work. On the other hand the frequency of the experience at night (not Rousseau's nights when sleep refused to come), during or immediately after sleep, inclines one more to the theory of a subconscious working of the mind.

For, as we have shown before, aesthetic intuition cannot lie in both experience and skill, but only in the former. If we are interested in the intuition of the artist, it is Goethe's experience that interests us, not the writing of his poem. He may have had an aesthetic intuition of the brook, but it was not intuition but skill that was required in the composition of the poem, even though an intuition of the finished production may again have satisfied him aesthetically.

If these accounts of Goethe's experiences are literally true and not the result of his highly romantic nature with its predilection for the supernatural, his record lends great force to a theory of artistic intuition which works, not in aid of, or in the wake of, reason, but as an independent activity. And even if the account is unconsciously exaggerated, Goethe's whole account of himself inclines us to belief in a mental function which is emotional rather than rational in character.

MARCUS AURELIUS

Again we have discussed the theories of several writers on ethics, but not the working of the mind of an ethical genius. This I find is a more difficult task. Goodness and religion are so often inextricably mingled in practice that our conclusions

as to *ethical* psychology may well be mistaken if we take, say, Moses, as our example. Spinoza in his life seems to me to achieve moral grandeur, but we have already used his words in discussing intellectual intuition and, moreover, in his letters he speaks of his theories, not his actions. Buddha is too mythical. Marcus Aurelius then, seems a fitter example. Moral conduct is to him the highest achievement: his religion is not of great consequence. He writes not only of his ethical theories but of their bearing on his conduct and if "genius" seems too strong a term to use in regard to him (bearing in mind the creative and influential elements insisted on in our definition), yet, I suppose, his example and writings have affected not only the Stoic philosophers of his own and later days, but a large number of individual readers through a long period of time. It may, then, be profitable to make a short study of his book.

It is difficult to trace any suggestion of an intuitive faculty in the note-book jottings of the Roman Emperor. His meditations appear sincere and are so frank in their statement of the case, in their focusing of the facts as, a mere tyro would imagine, to satisfy the psycho-analyst. His is a case of truly moral greatness, for he knows temptation: he has bad blood in his veins and bad people around him: a bad wife, a bad colleague, a bad son. If we may judge him from his bust in the British Museum, he had the typically sensuous physiognomy: the prominent eye, the full lip, the rounded contour. As far as we know, he lived an austere, self-disciplined life, moderating apparently fine affections in obedience to his ethical creed. He seems to have had no, or little, artistic bent, nor even appreciation, unless we take his self-warnings against indulgence in beautiful word or phrase as implying that he felt an inclination towards mere beauty that he considered unworthy. His life was devoted to duty, the domestic and friendly duties of the natural man as well as those of colleague, soldier and ruler.

We inquire as to his motive and he tells us that it was rational conviction of the Stoic doctrine. He behaved just so

because it was rational, or in Stoic phraseology "natural". Nature was his god; but not Spinoza's deified nature, nor Wordsworth's spiritual one, rather a cold, strictly logical and scientific nature which found no place for emotion nor (in spite of his public and politic honouring of the gods) for religion. His philosophy seems to be the worship of reason above all other human faculties, and if he erred, it was because he read reason's message narrowly, not because of a withdrawal of any part of his allegiance from her service.

There seems no trace of intuition here. We must remember, too, that this most moral of men persecuted the Christians at a period in their history before they had declined too far from the teaching of Christ. If there had been any ethical intuition could such a mighty current have passed him and swept around him without his nerves feeling one vibration? But he seems to have felt none, and persecuted from highly moral and statesmanlike motives.

On the other hand it seems impossible to believe that such purposive and strenuous, such powerful and successful moral action was inspired by merely intellectual conviction. Emotion guides our actions, sometimes aided by reason, often justified by reason, and sometimes without any connivance of reason at all. Aurelius must have had a strong emotion towards goodness; we feel inclined to say a love of goodness for the sake of goodness; a whole-hearted and personal worship that he could not give to the gods. Since he was quite unconscious that goodness, as goodness, had any intrinsic value, had indeed any being, the feeling must have been aroused, one may be tempted to think, from an intuition of the moral value which he projected on to reason.

The enumeration of his gratuities, which we find in the *Golden Book*, though it certainly bears the stamp of the conscientious man doing his duty, does at the same time convey the idea of a man with a keen appreciation of any ray of morality penetrating the darkness of his world. He notes carefully, but apparently sincerely, the wifely qualities of the

dissolute Faustina, and the friendly ones of the worthless Lucius. He is tender over his children though the eldest was Commodus. He leaves the impression of a man with a great thirst in a land where no water is, but who has the power of the divining rod.

Marcus Aurelius then denies the possession of any mental gift leading to moral action other than reason, but we may, perhaps, guess at one, not understood or even recognized, and, so, awkward and creaking somewhat in its working, but without which neither his views nor his conduct would have been possible. It is true, too, that the most moral of men are often insensitive in particular directions: Spinoza enjoyed watching a spider with a fly.

It is not as though Marcus Aurelius showed any great interest in the social value of moral conduct; he makes little enough attempt to improve the corrupt world in which he lived unless by example, for though he speaks publicly in honour of the Stoic philosophy, he is strict in rebuking and punishing only himself. He seems almost indifferent to the faults of others and aims at self perfection. All which argues intuition of an ultimate value rather than reasoned conviction of expediency.

We may conclude perhaps that though Aurelius was himself unconscious of any intuitional gifts and would have repudiated any such suggestion, it is difficult to explain his moral fervour without such assumption.

Signor Croce adds utility to the three classic values, and if we discriminate religion from ethics, as I think we must, there arises the question of religious genius. Mr Henry Ford seems a good example of a genius along utilitarian lines and David of the religious genius. I choose this biblical character rather than a more modern saint such as St Teresa or even St Francis as being on the whole a more healthy and normal human being, and in preference to Wesley or Woolman as more distinct from the moralist.

HENRY FORD

It seems arbitrary to make any kind of judgment about the genius of the business man from the study of one particular example, but a comparative study would require a book to itself, and, consequently, a specialist, while we are searching for indications of intuition in genius rather than its necessity. I take Mr Henry Ford because he wrote a book on his work, which to some small degree opens his mind to us, and because he justifies the appellation of genius according to our definition since he created a business method of astonishing coherence, stability and success, and since he undoubtedly affected his "space-time". A study of Mr and Mrs Webb's work on Soviet Communism will show how his methods have been adopted by a body so alien and even antagonistic in outlook and abstract idea. One can turn from Ford's chapter on the men in his shop and their opportunities and desire for promotion to that on the Soviet factories since 1930 and hardly realize that in the one case it is the works of the great capitalist owner that are being described and in the other those of the great Communist State.

Ford seems at first sight an excellent example of the genius who is a man with infinite capacity for taking pains. "With these ends in view we worked nearly fifteen years on a design and spent some millions of dollars on experiments."¹ It reads like Darwin or Newton at work. One is amazed, not at the experimenting, which must be inevitable in successful creative mechanics, but at the minute and prolonged labour.

So far there seems little sign of intuition. Neither is there much evidence of those sudden flashes experienced by Robert Meyer and Goethe; on the contrary everything is most carefully thought out and most minutely calculated. But what does connect Ford with Meyer and so with Kretschmer's idea of genius is the persistent circling round one idea. That idea, to describe it by its result, was the motor car produced

¹ *My Life and Work*, p. 201.

cheaply enough to be at the service of the average man. The thought developed very early and persisted throughout life. In early youth he dallied for a time with watches. "Even then (seventeen years) I wanted to make something in quantity", and in 1917-18 the War turned him to the motor tractors in such urgent demand for farm work in England, but by 1919 he had again turned his attention to cars.

The idea that beset him was undoubtedly neither means of communication alone, nor price alone, but the two combined. Just as in his youth watches had attracted him by the quantity he handled (three hundred, he tells us, he tinkered with in his spare time), and by a calculation of price he reckoned he could make watches as cheap relatively as cars, but was put off the experiment by the thought that while every man would need a car, not every one would need a watch!

It is the place that he found for price that made Ford a creative genius in the business world. "My idea was then and still is that if a man did his work well, the price he could get for that work, the profits, and all financial matters would care for themselves, and that a business ought to start small and build itself up out of its earnings. If there are no earnings then that is a signal to the owner that he is wasting his time and does not belong to that business. I have never found it necessary to change those ideas."¹ "I determined absolutely that never would I join a company in which finance came before the work or in whose finances a banker had a part."² "We first reduce the price to a point where we believe more sales will result. . . the new price forces the costs down."³ This does not seem so strange to us until we consider how absolutely alien it was to the business methods of his generation, what opposition his devices aroused, and the wide prophecies of his failure.

Two other qualities seem necessary to the genius who is a man of business. One is his influence over men, and the

¹ *My Life and Work*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.* p. 40.

³ *Ibid.* p. 146.

other the faculty for seeing the weak spot in a business organization, and, accompanying it, the power of seeing what is requisite and missing. Amidst all the general vulgarity of his outlook one is impressed with the magnetism Lord Northcliffe exerted over the men he used; the faculty with which he recognized just the "stunt" that would take the public fancy. The former is apparent in every chapter of *My Northcliffe Diary* by one of his editors. The following is a typical extract: "April 13, 1922. This morning I was in my bath at 7.30 when the Chief [Northcliffe] telephoned. 'Have you read that paragraph in the paper from Paris this morning?' he asked, 'saying that Paris is not in favour of the short skirt for women? What a great talking point! Every woman in the country will be excited about it. We must start an illustrated discussion on "The battle of the Skirts": Long versus short? Get different people's views. Cable to New York and Paris. Get plenty of sketches by well-known artists—photographs and drawings illustrating the comparisons between the long and the short skirts. Get hold of back numbers of *Punch*, with illustrations of the ugly long skirts of a decade ago. Print as many as you can. Get people like Arthur Ferrier and Gladys Peto to draw pictures of the modern girl in her alluring short skirt. Plenty of legs.'"¹

Ford, too, not only, apparently, possessed this assertive and controlling personality but required it in the successful worker under him: "A man may, by his industry, deserve advancement, but it cannot be possibly given him unless he also has a certain element of leadership."² His readiness in discerning the weakness in an affair in which he becomes interested, as well as the ability to find the remedy, stands out particularly clearly in the concerns immediately connected with cars but not their actual manufacture: in for instance the school he establishes, the hospital he runs, the railway he manages.

The question of personality, particularly the personality of

¹ Clarke, *My Northcliffe Diary*, p. 262. ² *My Life and Work*, p. 97.

the natural leader is one which we do not understand, and which for the good of the world, as well as for its psychological interest, is a pressing subject for research. My own experience of it suggests no connection with intuition, since it seems so often to involve an ignoring of other people's personalities and an absorption in the ends immediately in view. The eye of the expert would seem to explain the faculty for discerning the essential, i.e. it may well be the result of long experience. If, then, we take Henry Ford as a typical example, we may explain his genius as a combination of intensive absorption, close application and strong personality, with experience. And nothing else?

He himself describes Edison "one of my closest friends" in a way that suggests himself or his ideal of himself. "He believes that all things are possible. At the same time he keeps his feet on the ground. He goes forward step by step. He regards 'impossible' as a description for that which we have not for the moment the knowledge to achieve. He knows that as we amass knowledge we build the power to overcome the impossible. That is the rational way of doing the 'impossible'. The natural is to make the attempt without the toil of accumulating knowledge. Edison is really the world's greatest scientist. In addition, he has the constructive and managerial sense. He has not only had visions but he has made them realities."¹ "Vision" is an overworked symbol, but Ford is no sentimentalist.

When we read an account of Northcliffe we notice that his subordinates refer to his "Uncanny instinct" which he calls his "sixth sense" (he was a journalist), and we are told: "he aimed at the results of thought without thought itself. His outlook was mainly emotional."² But Ford makes no such claim. On the contrary, he insists on work.

Nevertheless, a reading of his book reveals a large number of such expressions as:

¹ *My Life and Work*, p. 235.

² Clarke, *My Northcliffe Diary*, p. 15.

"All of which I conceive to be *merely elemental common sense*."¹

"All of this *seems self-evident* to me."²

"*Inevitable principle*."³

"We *just* develop an idea."⁴

"These are the principles on which the production of my plant was built up. They all come practically as of 'course.'"⁵

"Undoubtedly . . . indubitably."⁶

"*No one will deny* that if prices are sufficiently low buyers will always be found."⁷

In short Ford finds self-evident a great deal that was intensely surprising to his contemporaries. He accepts his ideas simply and proceeds to materialize them. He does seem to "have the vision": he accepts it as sight and uses it. I do not mean that he had a vision of the Ford automobile which he proceeded to make a reality, though this seems to be true; but rather that he saw business truths hidden from his fellows, with reasonable clearness and simplicity, as for instance the relationship of finance and work, of profit and "service"; worked on that understanding, and created a new business method. It will be remembered that Jung, describing a type so very different from that of Ford, considered that the intuitive might well turn out a business man, and insisted on the creative side of intuition which "builds into the object just as much as it takes out".⁸

An eminent musician describes genius as "special insight", and if the emphasis is put on "special" this suggests intuition, and particularly the form of intuition which may be thought to serve the business man. It lacks, however, the creative and effective qualities on which our definition insists. It has been noted that Northcliffe's outlook is described as mainly "emotional", or as I. A. Richards describes the same thing, a

¹ *My Life and Work*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 74.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 77.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 141.

² *Ibid.* p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 75.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 255.

⁸ *Psychological Types*, pp. 462-3.

neural complex or general tension of the nerves. Now, if we combine the ideas of "special insight" and general neural condition with Whitehead's prehensions and their creative functions, we perhaps get an idea of what Ford means by "vision" or we mean by business genius. In short a state of mind at once highly perceptive, highly suggestible, with an itch to make. This again corresponds with a part of Jung's description of the intuitive, though it implicitly denies the absence of judgment noted by Jung. Genius would occur, then, as a degree and balance of these qualities.

Such a conception would apply to forms of genius other than business ones, in fact to recognition of the five values enumerated, and would make intuition a state of mind rather than a separate function, and one not only found in genius, but necessarily found.

DAVID

David, as Shakespeare, might perhaps be better taken as a sort of general genius, a person of such intense vitality, of such varied powers as only by accident to excel in one. As we feel that Shakespeare might have risen to equal heights as philosopher, politician, governor, so David was perhaps a leader of men as triumphantly as he was a worshipper of God, and it is by the richness and fullness of his story rather than the intensity of one particular gift, that we place him among the geniuses.

Nevertheless it is in religion that he seems to reach the summit of his powers, for in that all his other gifts meet, or at least were offered.

The first sign of religion is perhaps, worship, adoration, devotion, a state of mind involving a high degree of emotion—love; a deep humility without which the awe, which distinguishes sacred from profane devotion, is absent; a conviction of one's acceptability, or necessity to, or even oneness with the Deity. Then follows confidence and with confidence mental and physical prowess that seems almost

supernatural. Then perhaps a faculty for recognizing the Godhead in unexpected places and circumstances, and a delight in publishing the recognition and in praising generally. Such are the signs of the religious man, and in the religious genius we should expect to find them manifested in a high degree. In addition, too, there are meaner, more doubtful, less universal, though still common characteristics such as faith in and dependence on some physical symbol or medium, self-glorification, conviction of salvation, etc.

All these characteristics David had in a degree that has made his Psalms an almost universally accepted medium for praise, and his story one of the wonders of history and literature.

But for us the interest lies in the question as to whether this religious force is dependent at all, and if so, to what degree, upon intuition; that is, in this context, upon immediate recognition or understanding which cannot be ascribed to particular upbringing or general custom, to injunction or taboo.

It seems true that David felt a peculiar and personal relationship between himself and God. There was more than a general conventional attribution of his prowess to God when he offered himself as champion against the Philistine giant: "The Lord that delivered me out of the paw of the lion, and out of the paw of the bear, he will deliver me out of the hand of this Philistine."¹ And when he shouts: "by thee I have run through a troop; and by my God have I leaped over a wall."²

This peculiar relationship, too, betrays itself in the phrase: "I will love Thee O Lord my strength," where Hebrew scholars tell us a special word is used here for "love" and a special form of it, indicating close and tender affection.³

Can this conviction of a special relationship between God and himself be put down to the general Hebrew attitude that every detail of life and behaviour was interesting to the Deity?

¹ 1 Samuel xvii, 37.

² Psalm xviii, 29.

³ *Century Bible*, Psalms I, p. 96.

There is an exuberance about it which points to something deeper than teaching, convention, or even conviction, and it accompanies David throughout his life.

David, too, seems peculiarly sensitive to the presence of God, shown not merely in his statesmanlike and politic care of the "ark", but in something more universal: in the imminence of God in the forces of Nature.

"Then the earth shook and trembled; the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken, because he was wroth.

"There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured: coals were kindled by it.

"He bowed the heavens also, and came down: and darkness was under his feet.

"And he rode upon a cherub, and did fly; yea, he did fly upon the wings of the wind.

"He made darkness his secret place; his pavilion round about him were dark waters and thick clouds of the skies."¹

Here again David seems to be expressing something beyond a primitive animism. He is not terrified by the thunderstorm because God is in it. He glories in the manifestations. He hears God and is not afraid, and this fearlessness before God is again characteristic of his whole life, and stands in marked contrast to the customary attitude of the Hebrew of early times. He may be said to have had an intuition of Deity quite beyond the culture of his day. It is interesting to note that sometimes it is on this ground and on this ground only, namely a religious insight beyond his contemporaries, that modern scholars have denied most of the Psalms to David. In fact they deny a religious intuition which tradition and, to some extent, document attribute to him. But without questioning their decision when made on linguistic or historical grounds, it seems to me that to decide that David was incapable of the sentiments ascribed to him is begging the question from a religious point of view. Was Christ "capable" sociologically?

¹ Psalm xviii, 7 ff.

There does, then, seem to be in the religious genius some special gift which may be considered intuitional in nature. Whether such intuitions are intuitions of a truth, a partial truth, or aspect of truth, is another matter, they at least come as revelation or unstudied convictions.

I suppose it follows that if there is genuine religious intuition there must be something to intuit. The importance of the question and the care we ought to take in coming to any conclusion is then apparent. The study of only one example of religious genius, and that a partly mythical one, is obviously inadequate, but at the moment all we are seeking is signs of intuition in genius, and, on the whole, a mythical David is as good an instance as an historically verified one. Job would have done as well since the thoughts have been thought. We are not attempting proof, only wondering and finding illustrations.

Always, then, or almost always, when we study closely the mentality of men and women of genius we find something unexpected and out of the ordinary, not only in the degree but more particularly in the nature of their qualities.

Where it is degree it often approaches insanity of the unbalanced type; a particular neural system or group of ideas overworked or worked out of proportion to the other nerve systems, or vital groups of ideas. Such seems Kretschmer's theory.

Richards suggests that the genius is the possessor of a neural system so plastic and sensitive to every stimulus as to lack enduring coherence and stability, and so give the impression of insanity to a narrow-minded and unimpressionable world.

Either of these theories which assume that true genius is "to madness near allied" may apply to particular men (Kretschmer refuses to allow the possibility of genius to women), but a study of a number of actual cases quickly shows us that it does not apply to all. A genius may be very normal except in one direction, as he may be very abnormal; he may even

be humdrum (Kant). The artist tends to the abnormal, the philosopher and scientist to the normal. It is perhaps on this account that genius has been denied to any but the former. But if that is the case we are just offering a synonym for artist when we talk about a genius.

If our definition of genius is accepted, "mental power working in a creative direction, where fineness of quality or largeness of scope is so far in excess of the normal as to alter permanently some habit of thought or action in a large group of people", we must either be contented with the theory that the genius is normal except in the degree of his talents or else we must find some peculiarity of workmanship.

In the accounts given of themselves by the five men we have selected as showing different types of genius, there does seem to me to be, on the one hand, an extraordinary amount of what may be considered as non-reasonable, that is, thought and actions which cannot be justified by reason; and on the other hand a large percentage of idea and practice which, while fitting in admirably with the particular circumstance and at the same time producing something new and wonderful, is almost as inexplicable to its author as to us.

It is difficult to resist the idea of a subconscious mind. It would account for so much. But perhaps this is nothing other than shelving the problem. To dismiss all the difficulties we meet with in analysing and explaining the conscious mind, by referring them to the subconscious, seems too easy a task.

Perhaps it would be more profitable to study the part played by feeling. All these men, and not least Marcus Aurelius, were deeply stirred emotionally. If we dare assume that what their genius showed them was indeed some fundamental aspect of reality, we must guess that genius lay in seeing reality with such intense emotion as to open the eyes of the mind. Or, if this seems too mystical an idea, it may be that we really have, as Whitehead suggests, a power of learning and understanding directly through the feelings without the interposition of reason. It is remarkable how

every writer on intuition implies the working of some very strong emotion. This is true not only of a Rousseau and a Goethe but of such men as Spinoza and Plotinus who in their doctrines utterly repudiated the passions as earthy and material and offensive to the spiritual and reasonable—as the enemy of understanding.

“What do you feel in the presence of the grace you discover in actions, in manners, in sound morality, in all the works and fruits of virtue, in the beauty of souls? When you see that you yourselves are beautiful within what do you feel? What is this Dionysian exultation that thrills through your being? This straining upward of all your Soul, this longing to break away from the body and live sunken in the veritable self?”¹

“From this we clearly understand in what consists our salvation, blessedness, and liberty, namely, in the constant and eternal love for God, or in the love of God for man. And this love and blessedness is called in the Scriptures ‘Glory’ not without reason. For whether this love has reference to God or the mind, it can rightly be called mental satisfaction, which in truth cannot be distinguished from glory.”²

Psycho-analysts tell us what extraordinary things our suppressed emotions make us do, and why should unsuppressed emotions, well nourished and cultivated, have less power? It seems to be a verifiable fact that under the influence of some strong feeling, we hear and see more finely, and since we hear and see with our minds it seems to follow that we may, too, think and imagine more finely.

Whenever, or almost whenever, we come to a pause before some psychological doctrine, we find ourselves confronted with emotions, and whether intuition is in reality emotional knowing, that is, whether there is a real and peculiar approach to reality through feeling, or whether feeling merely motivates and enhances the mental powers, so that when these

¹ *Plotinus* (translated by McKenna), vol. I, *Tractate on Beauty*.

² *Spinoza, Ethics* (Everyman ed.), p. 219.

powers are exercised in a superlative degree we may expect to find more intense emotion, we do not know. But always we find our ignorance of our emotional nature a stumbling block to the understanding of our rational nature.

In all these examples, then, we find:

(a) Abnormal mental functioning of the kind which seems to imply subconscious or unconscious mental activity.

(b) Strong emotion often unrealized by the genius himself who confuses it with the intensity of his convictions.

(c) Strong belief in the significance of particular ideas and achievements, not only at the moment but permanently. This is equally true of Ford as of the others, for he believed he had found a permanent theory of successful industrial production.

(d) A power of holding to their convictions and working out their theories amid an opposing world. (This perhaps necessarily follows from (c).)

(e) A feeling in the man of himself as an agent and follower, and expounder of something outside himself. (This is probably not true of Ford.)

We must emphasize again that the intuition of the genius as examined here is not judged by his productions, that is by his skill, but by his mental capacity to sense, feel, understand, and synthesize, that is by the variety and intensity of his impressionability and creative imagination. To produce a concrete genius craftsmanship must be added to intuition.

Chapter X

TELEOLOGY

WE must take a very different view of intuition according to whether we consider it as a means of grasping the nature of a static world and static values, or as a means of teaching us how to adapt ourselves to a future world and its developing values, or again as a means of creating a future world with its values. All three views have been held; the first for instance by Spinoza, the second by Bergson, the third by Whitehead.

If we accept either of the two latter we are at the same time accepting the principle of teleology; we are denying a purely mechanical sequence; we are admitting a final as well as an efficient cause; but we are not necessarily rejecting any doctrine of the absolute other than the purely mechanical.

It is then very important to make clear to ourselves what grounds we have for entertaining any teleological theory, and to balance these with what may be argued against its probability.

First of all then there is naïve assumption. It comes quite natural to us, and to the most primitive people as to the youngest child to believe, or rather perhaps to act on the assumption, that our future is the cause of our present action. A man works hard at his business in order to be abler in the future to give his children a good education; a young savage goes through the pains of the initiatory rites in order to enjoy in the future the advantages of an acknowledged manhood; the child screams or coaxes in order to get a sweet.

If this naïve assumption is questioned, it rapidly becomes reasoned conviction. You ask what your friend is busy thinking about and he answers that he is working out an answer to a question that he thinks may be put to him the next day. You point out that what he is thinking about now

must be caused by what he was thinking about a moment ago, and that thought by that of the previous moment, and so on *ad infinitum*, since thought depends on the brain, and the brain being composed of molecules must follow chemical and physical laws in a direct and unswerving path. Even if the parallel working of brain and nervous system with mind is not accepted, yet ideas themselves are brought to birth by an equally mechanical associative process. He replies that this is not so, cannot be so in his particular case: that he had not dreamed of such a question being put to him until he had read that evening's paper where a reported speech had made him realize the possibility of an awkward dilemma. It was the question that was to be put next day that was the cause of his present cogitations. Next day you point out that the anticipated question had never been asked and therefore could not have been the cause of his reflections; but he answers that the putting of such a question was a possible future event which drove him to the analysis of his problem, not the question itself.

In short, naïveté assumes teleology in the shape of a final cause, and common sense supports it when questioned.

Secondly, science itself, especially very modern science, either assumes or asserts a teleological principle, up to a point. If we consider only the material world and the exact sciences which describe it, we observe what appears to us to be a developing order; while any study, superficial or profound, of geology, botany, zoology, makes it almost impossible to believe in the workings of blind chance, even if we could define what we mean by blind chance. Though the physical laws are understood as a description of how Nature does behave, not how it must, there remains no reason why Nature should always behave in these particular ways, no reason for regularity, repetition, for effect following cause, no reason in fact for the uniformity of Nature. Either, then, we must say that there is no uniformity but that our minds are constructed in such a way as to arrange in order what is

in itself disorderly, or we must admit a uniformity. If we deny the necessity for this and put the apparent order of Nature down to the peculiarities of our intellect, then we are admitting an order or laws of the mind, that is, a mental uniformity.

Is it possible to accept the reality of order, whether it be of atoms, of sequence, of position, or of mental behaviour without admitting a realm of ends? "Blind physical purposes reign", says Whitehead, but they do appear to be purposes, if only such very general purposes as the seeking of greater variety and complexity. If then in the world of matter we are compelled to admit, even though we cannot understand, a general tendency or direction, so much the more is its truth thrust upon us when we consider life. The very meaning of life seems to be the seeking of ends, whether we consider it in the first manifestations of the different paths it follows to the end of self-multiplication, which eventuate in the great divisions of animal and vegetable life, or in its most complex workings: the stem grows up towards the light *in order that* the plant may get oxygen, carbon dioxide, etc.; it grows leaves *in order to* store and manufacture food; it develops coloured petals *in order to* attract insects to its stamens, which in their turn expose their pollen *in order to*—and so, endlessly. And though of course it is true that these "in order to's" must not be interpreted as conscious intentions or even necessarily as of a mental nature, yet we can have no real doubt that life is a clear manifestation of a realm of ends—physical or mental.

When consciousness develops into self-consciousness, not only do we act as though we had ends in view, but we are convinced that there are such ends. Hence we must make a nice distinction between the motor, and often unconscious, end which is sought in instinct, and the mental end which self-consciousness follows. Science observes the first, examines, classifies, acknowledges, and is ready to assume it as the basis of further theory. As James Ward points out, because

the swallow does not realize the end of her migratory impulse, we should not dream of denying that end. So in addition to the ends man himself recognizes, such as the satisfaction of his immediate needs and desires, there may well be other ends which he has not clearly in view, and yet which incline his actions in certain directions which apparently lead to no immediate good: towards contemplation of beauty for instance, or to moral conduct with no biological or sociological purpose, such as that of the man sinking alone in a submarine who chooses to die in the full possession of his manhood rather than drunk or in a panic.

As when mere matter most closely resembles life, in the crystal for instance, we see indications of what life itself more clearly manifests: growth; as where vegetable life resembles animal most closely we see signs of what is more fully developed in the animal: sensitivity (*mimosa* or insect-eating orchids); as where the animal most closely resembles the human we are familiar with a phenomenon which we see fully developed only in the human: self-consciousness; so it may very well be that when in human conduct we observe tendencies to action and thought which do not, as far as we can see, pertain to man as a merely human animal, we may perhaps guess, or hope, that here we have indications of another nature, possibly a spiritual, working towards ends we cannot clearly understand and yet are free to understand if we can.

Analogy is always a dangerous mode of reasoning, but it sometimes leads to truth.

Science then assumes and demonstrates, though it does not always postulate, a teleological principle in things, and cannot therefore act as a deterrent if we choose to make such an hypothesis in attempting to solve our metaphysical difficulties, though it does warn us by its own mistakes against too rash application and too ready conclusions.

It is almost impossible to hold any but one metaphysical theory unless some teleological principle is accepted. It is

true that we can postulate an Absolute, but any such theory along with all its implications leaves us little ground for hope, and only curiosity as a spur to any kind of energy. It is part of the nature of man, as distinct from animal, to desire to alter things: though the wish to exercise power is one of the gravest dangers to his character, it is part of his very essence. Any wholehearted Absolutist theory which faces the consequence of its faith with clear sight and unfaltering conviction must (at least it appears so at first view) take away all the sweetness and much of the dignity from life. Few people have faced it honestly. We marvel at Spinoza who could rest content, even blissful, with the mere contemplation of perfection, and wonder whether, if he had not had the pleasure of the labour of expounding his philosophy, he could have gone on content with its mere contemplation. Almost everything we know about him suggests that he could.

Everything then except an Absolutist theory or one of inevitable ignorance, such as Kant's, assumes or asserts the power of a future over the present, whether it be theological, or materialistic, or spiritual; whether we suppose the meaning of the world to be an approach towards a perfect physical harmony, or a progressive realization of certain values, or a development of personality, or an expansion of the spiritual world itself in the direction of complexity, variety, or depth; if, in short, we give the world and life any meaning at all, we, by so doing, declare our faith, though it be only animal faith in the power of the future over the present.

This apparent emptiness of metaphysics without teleology is no more a proof of the teleological nature of the world than is the assumption of our common sense; but it certainly goes to swell the evidence. Indeed, if it is of no avail to speculate except on the understanding that there is meaning in human appetites, emotions, aspirations, then we must suppose the meaning in order to speculate, or in other words speculation involves, except in a very few cases, an accep-

tance, conscious or unconscious, of a teleological quality in the heart of things.

There is, it is true, the type of person whose thirst for knowledge is greater than his moral, or aesthetic, or utilitarian impulses, and to such a one a static and absolute universe is as full of meaning as a teleological one, and a teleological function itself just a fact along with all the other facts. But so much of possible human experience is denied to him that his evidence is not weighty.

At first sight Art would seem to be indifferent to the questions of change and progress: to be interested only in what is. We know that the artist is the man who hears sounds and sees sights, as distinct from the ordinary man who hears and sees meanings, and no doubt there are artists who are content to see and to create mere colour, or line, or mass, or sound patterns. But that is not really what art and the artist mean to the world; it is only a part of their nature and function. It is notorious that many of the greatest men of literature have announced an end other than the aesthetic by reason of which they have laboured, whether it be Spenser with his direct aim "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline", or Shelley with his more philosophical conviction that "the great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause". Where no such declaration has been made, in most cases the intention is apparent. The very origin of Greek tragedy points to an end other than the purely aesthetic, and though we may pause at the thought of Shakespeare, we cannot know him well without realizing the urge he had to express his crowding thoughts, that is, to convey them with power so that they might influence men. Very probably this was unconscious in Shakespeare and others, but it is only in the purest lyric that we can really believe that the construction of beautiful form is the only motive present in the mind of the poet.

But literature differs from the other arts in that the

material is words, and words must convey meaning as well as sound, so that in reality it is the combination of sounds and meanings which is the true material for the poet's manipulation, while all other artists have a simpler material devoid of reasoning in itself.

Can we then say that the work of the architect, the painter, the sculptor, the musician is without aim other than the production of a pattern, the underlining, or elucidation, or outlining, the revealing, of what is beautiful in a world which is what it is, which is static. Is it not true to declare that, with almost every kind of artist, meaning is combined with the marble, or the pigment, or the sound, or the mass, to give him the material he needs? It is difficult to consider a Gothic cathedral, a Greek and Hindu temple and deny any difference between them except a difference of pattern. We are almost compelled to admit that they embody different moral, or intellectual, or religious, or utilitarian meanings, different spiritual aspirations other than the aesthetic.

The primary aim of the artist may be to express himself and his ideas, but there is nearly always (though truly not quite) a secondary desire to move, to influence, to alter the rest of the world or some special section of it. The great artist seems to move through three stages: first he contemplates or evolves his idea, then he expresses it, then he looks for its effect on the world. An artist cannot exist without an audience. It is not true to say that he expresses merely for his own satisfaction and delight. His appreciators may be imaginary, in the distant future, even in the spiritual world, as with Browning's Abt Vogler, but exist they must or art would cease to exist too.

There appears then to be a teleological function in art itself. It must move, and movement means change, and change means development. There is anticipation of an end though that end may be the purely aesthetic one of realization of Beauty.

It does seem true, however, that the contemplation of

beauty is less dependent on a future than any other human action. We can understand the eternal satisfaction of the mind in the contemplation of perfect and static harmony in a way that we cannot understand any other satisfaction in the eternal contemplation of a mere Absolute.

Perry considers that to anticipate a future is indispensable to intelligence and we must confess that the eternal exercise of an idle curiosity seems contemptible on any except aesthetic grounds.

If then we accept a teleological principle, as I think we must, we proceed to attempt to discover what part, if any, intuition plays in helping the human mind to recognize the final causes involved, and to understand their significance. This means a final revision of the subject of value and the values.

Chapter XI

THE VALUES

It is quite impossible to come to conclusions about intuition, and particularly the possible objects of intuition, without first considering the vexed subject of values.

We must then examine what is meant by "value" as far as the matter concerns intuition.

Value may be described in many ways: anything has value when it has significance for another entity. This describes it at its broadest: so water has value for the crystal as for the plant, for fish, for men. Food, knowledge, beauty have value for man. Man has value for the cosmos. The cosmos has value for God.

In this aspect of value, what does "intuition of value" mean but a knowledge, conscious or unconscious, that that entity has significance, with a resulting appetite or endeavour to construct a relationship between the entity feeling the significance and the entity which is significant, that will satisfy that appetite? The two (or more) entities in question may, and probably often do, partake of both natures, the seeker and the sought. It is the cause (mental or physical, or both) of the resulting unity which is the intuition.

We can, of course, call it a law of Nature, but on the whole I think it must be agreed that "law of Nature" conveys less of the essence of the phenomenon than does "intuition". But whatever term is used the residual inexplicability remains.

The same thing applies if we describe value as that which has interest, though perhaps this term confines the relationship to mental and spiritual facts as they are commonly understood, that is, one party to the relationship must be human or spiritual.

On the other hand anything may be of value, not because it has significance or interest to anything or any one at all, but in its own right. It is valuable for itself and to itself, and is essentially indifferent to everything else. This is hard to conceive, for, though we may recognize many things that are valuable for themselves, we find that most of them are held as anything but indifferent by, or else are dependent on, minds. The highly developed personality has, perhaps, a value in itself, and would continue to have that value even though it ceased to have any relationship whatever, but a personality permanently outside society has no meaning, is a fiction of the mind, even as an ideal it assumes an environment. The only instance of an entity that has value only for itself is *the Absolute*, the complete universe mental and physical as Spinoza conceived it.

If we understand value in this sense, what connection has it with intuition? The answer involves a problem which I could not solve, or attempt to solve, even were it necessary. But it does not seem so since intuition must of necessity involve two entities, and the only Absolute which could therefore conceivably have any connection with intuition must be one which is still partially imperfect, that is, in which the parts of the whole may still be distinguished as incompletely absorbed. Such a part may have an intuition of the whole of which it is a part, or of itself as a part; or the whole may have an intuition of the part, or of itself as incomplete without, or complete with this part. I realize that to talk of parts of an absolute is incoherent, but then so is the conception of an absolute which can be concerned with nothing but itself. We are limited by words but not by facts since Spinoza himself experienced such intuition as has been described, and, we are led to believe, so do Eastern, and sometimes, Western mystics.

If, however, we omit the idea of indifference we get another view of value. Like the Absolute, something may have value for and in itself regardless of whether or not it has significance

for others. It is difficult for many people to believe that the "gem of purest ray serene" that "the dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear" has absolutely no value unless it is seen by an appreciative eye. The argument that God's eye sees it, however we understand God, does not satisfy. But even if we agree that beauty is in the eye of the beholder and only there, we can see still that the gem may be considered to have an absolute value if its contemplation by the appreciative eye is an end in itself, not a means to something else, as, for instance, the development of the personality of the beholder, an incitement to action, an increase in experience, and so of the complexity of the universe. We may have the idea of significance and the idea of an absolute combined.

To this conception of value the idea of intuition is vital. If anything or any class of thing has value to a mind just so far as it is contemplated, and to no other end, how are we to know, or recognize, or select such things or such classes? Our biological urges will not push us there and point the finger of instinct. Our intellect will hardly take us and explain, for there is no reason for the value. Only feeling perhaps. But "feeling" is still a confused idea; if pleasure, or the desire for pleasure is meant, feeling must be denied, for the contemplation of such absolute values is often painful, sometimes unendurable. "But I cannot tell", says Bacon; "this same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candlelights." No man can see God and live.

If we are going to make, or even suppose, such a claim for intuition as that it indicates value, we ought to attempt to understand what we are about, and first of all to examine whether there is indeed any reasonable ground for positing objects or classes possessing such value. To begin with, what are these objects or classes? or at least what are some of them?

Truth; Goodness; Beauty; Personality; Utility; the Holy;

Peace; Order; Perfection; Experience; the Eternal; Happiness; Freedom. All these, at one time or another, have made specific claim to value, absolute in that they are ends in themselves, but without any claim to indifference, since an end must be someone's end; the concretion of their abstract value depends on definite appreciation.

A glance at the group will, I think, enable us to make a distinction. We can divide the claimants into two classes: those to which an origin seems quite clear and understandable and those whose origin eludes us, when we are forced to fall back on either the idea of no origin, or on revelation: on their eternal or their revealed nature.

The difference between a reality and the concept of the reality has been variously argued. Kant seemed to make the matter clear enough when he pointed out how different was the existence of a hundred dollars and the conception of the same; and that the latter did not by any means imply the former. Oman says, however, that the ideas which we have in this connection called "values" "cannot be mere natural products, because a natural product cannot be ahead of what has produced it",¹ from which it would appear that Kant would not grant the existence of an entity, God, for instance, because we have a clear idea of that entity, while Oman implies that we could not have the entity except through the existence of what is conceived in the mind. Tennyson makes the same appeal when he infers "the type of perfect in our mind" must have sprung from an existing or possible perfection; and so "we name the name Eternity" because there really is, and we intuitively know there really is, such a thing.

Now while I think it is easy to show how the concept of perfection and eternity may have grown in our minds without our acknowledging the actuality of their existence, since what we find wrong we may put right, at least in our minds, so that we build up little by little until there is nothing more to add, and, since, in a way, it is even easier to think of the

¹ *The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 108.

eternity of the soul than it is to think of its nonentity, for we know what is but are ignorant of what is not; yet when it comes to such concepts as Beauty and Goodness, and Holiness, and particularly Beauty, I cannot see how they can have been born in our minds without some real existence. If beauty is just suitability, or what arouses our general emotions, or expands or satisfies our natures as a whole, how has it gained a special name for itself when beautiful objects do only what useful objects do? What discriminates such objects from good dinners, or swimming, or working out a mathematical problem, or making a discovery in science? So with morals. If moral actions are just the best policy in the long run, why are they called moral rather than politic, or useful?

In the above list of values which are absolute in the sense of being ends in themselves and not a means to some other end, it seems to me possible to get the ideas Utility, Peace, Perfection, Experience, Eternity, Freedom, Happiness and perhaps Truth either through reason or through reasoned experience (deduction), which makes intuition unnecessary; but I can find no certain origin for Goodness, Beauty, the Holy and Order, other than revelation, or vision, whether such revelation be *a priori* or *a posteriori*, and it is difficult to find a word to fit the phenomenon of the immediate recognition of goodness or beauty or holiness in a given situation or object more suitable than intuition.

The question of Truth is, I think, rather different from the others. On a coherence or correspondence theory it is deducible from experience and is but a name to suit all kinds of pragmatic agreement among ideas and facts. The recognition, however, that a particular idea is truth, whether at the moment it is verifiable or not, as for instance the idea of free will, or an ordered universe, may well be considered to come through revelation or intuition.

Value may have still another implication. Something may be of value and yet be a means, and not an end in itself. So the power of recognizing and enjoying or realizing beauty,

goodness, holiness, etc., may be considered as a means to personality, or to peace, and yet be very valuable since they lead up to what is conceived as the supreme value, understood actively as Personality, passively as Peace or Harmony or Unity, that is, a condition in which all the different values are present or enjoyed in such perfect balance as to do away with discord while exercising and expanding the spirit to its utmost capacity. Spinoza experienced this ultimate harmony intellectually as bliss; Richards explains it as a physical state of the body; Schopenhauer as a negation of will; eastern philosophers as a negation of the ego; Whitehead as peace.

M. Paul Janet includes among the intuitions which are our means of enjoying values (whether they be considered as means or as ends), the intuition of degree in value. "If any one were to demand that I should prove that thought is worth more than digestion, a tree more than a heap of stones, liberty than slavery, maternal love than luxury, I could only reply by asking him to demonstrate that the whole is greater than one of its parts."¹ Not only the value, but the degree of value is, he thinks, revealed in intuition.

There seems, then, to be a case for hypothesizing that the knowledge of value may come through revelation, through reason and, we now add, through feeling, through vision, and perhaps through will. We shall try to understand what grounds we have for considering, not only what part is played by intuition in this recognition of value, but what the intuitive procedure is.

With regard then, first, to the realization of value through the intellect: it is clear that while deduction is an intellectual process it always necessitates something previous or more general than the conclusion from which the deduction is made. If we say that moral conduct is a means to expanding our personality or making the more complex development of life possible, we place personality or society as our ends. We then accept them as ultimate and absolute ends, or we dis-

¹ *Theory of Morals*, p. 48.

cover that they are the means to something more ultimate, personality, shall we say, as a means to variety and intensity and complexity, society to another aspect of evolution. These in their turn must be considered either as ends in themselves or as means to a further end, and so on. But we cannot go back very much farther, and so always we must posit either some one, or few, ultimate principles, or we must admit blind chance, or accept solipsism. In the first case we come to something which we can know only intuitively, the "starry heavens above us and the moral law within"—or something else. The second must of necessity be unsatisfactory as a result of reason, since it negates reason which is in its nature orderly, and the orderly arrangement of entities which reason serves. Solipsism then seems our only intellectual refuge from intuition. As Santayana puts it: either "animal faith" or absolute solipsism. Yet even here reason fails without intuition, for even solipsism involves an intuition of mental order, or an instinct for selection and arrangement, and if we speak of an "instinct for selection and arrangement" are we not merely using a synonymous phrase for an intuition of the value of certain experiences and of the order in which these experiences are received?

The same line of argument holds for induction whether we understand it as a conclusion drawn from a multitude of instances, when an intuition of the value of statistics is necessary, or as a process of analogy where equally an intuition of the intellectual value of analogy is demanded, or of a particular inferred from a particular where a similar animal faith is required.

So always it seems that the clear light of reason when it plays on the origin of the values is dimmed by the shadow of intuition.

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motive
And the act
Falls the shadow.

We have dealt with the possibility of arriving at the idea of values through vision when considering teleology. Vision, I think, must be distinguished from revelation as implying futurity rather than an eternal absolute, and so involves the whole problem of teleology. But if, for the moment, we accept the reality of such a principle inherent in the universe, it remains to us to show exactly what bearing it has on the recognition of values. The word itself as applied to the subject of value implies intuition, for teleology does not mean a merely reasoned deduction of a probable future (Hume has shown once and for all that there is no such thing), but an immediate conviction of the same, more or less indefinite, certainly, but, except by sophists, unquestioned.

Bergson has a vision or intuition of life itself moving along an indefinite but predestined course. The path of life is predestined not on the sole account of any first cause, though there is the element of first cause, nor on account of a final cause as it is usually understood as a kind of magnetic ideal, but rather of an immanent cause which shares much of the nature of a final cause. The evolutionary process has been guided not solely by material law, as its failures and diversities witness, nor by a God, as the same witnesses testify, but by the nature of the specific entities. So he expounds how eyes extraordinarily alike are developed in species extraordinarily different, because of the nature of light itself; its essence consists in an effort to function in a peculiar way, and its influence persists until in any medley of circumstances such effort is successful. Bergson then intuitively by a teleological vision the progress and development of life: an ultimate harmony out of a present variety. However little he seems to prove his point, we cannot deny that it is the realization of the value of order and harmony that sets his theory going.

If by vision, however, we intuit not the essential nature of definite entities but the working of a God towards an end, a God who is himself the sum of the values hypostasized and harmonized, that intuition may take the form of a movement

towards an inevitable end, "some far off divine event, to which the whole creation moves". This idea along with its author, Tennyson, has become highly unfashionable of late, but we must allow that it has a very strong and widespread appeal. It had been discredited by science, especially perhaps by the first two laws of thermodynamics; but this objection is nowadays, I think, negligible; we feel ourselves to be at the beginning of a new science of physics, not governed in our thoughts by the findings of the old, though we must not contradict them. A more serious objection lies in the suggestion of passivity, final achievement. We feel that the very essentials of our nature lie in activity and the seeking of variety of experience; nothing final appeals to us as human animals. Yet here perhaps the crux of the matter lies. Is it possible that we have a vision, an intuition, of our natures so modified as to be capable of satisfaction in a final state of ourselves, of God, of the universe? It seems to me that there are very strong indications. We have an intuitive distrust and dislike of disorder, of discord. The aim of the scientist is not, nine times out of ten, to improve the conditions of human life, but to bring mental order out of mental confusion. If his ideal was fulfilled and the universe lay before his mental eye absolutely coherent, absolutely orderly, absolutely understandable, could he rest in the eternal contemplation of that perfection? Spinoza seems to have achieved such a condition and describes the state of his mind in terms bordering on ecstasy, not on boredom. Spinoza is among our highest. The idea is distasteful to our weaker natures, but perhaps not so distasteful as the idea of perpetual disorder, discord which finds no solution, contradiction in the heart of things. Keats, with his characteristic restlessness, even in the middle of the great passage in which he expounds the evolution of beauty, drops on the same idea of intellectual satisfaction:

to bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstance, all calm,
That is the top of sovereignty.¹

¹ *Hyperion*, Book II.

And Laird warns us not to confuse climax and termination.¹ Throughout the ages something of the kind has been the conviction and the solace of all religious people, though we know that the real issues have not always been candidly faced, indeed could not have been. The solution of blind faith in God is only another way of describing an intuition of a not quite understandable end.

But the vision of God does not always take this form of a guide towards some perfect end. He may, and is, often understood as a guide along certain paths, persuading us that they are in themselves lovely and pleasant: God is conceived as an indicator of the values, giving us immediate recognition, not only of the fact that they are indeed valuable, but perhaps also in what degree they are so, and an equal conviction that to enjoy these values means a steadily increasing insight into the meaning and heart of the world. We then seem to have a double intuition: an intuition of the values through the guidance of God, and a further intuition of the value of the values.

A knowledge or recognition of objects of value as it may come in revelation as distinct from vision is a slightly different matter. Though here there is no question of any other method than the intuitive, the interest in the nature and working of such intuition still remains.

There is, first, the question to whom does the revelation come? Who has the intuition? Evidence suggests variety, not sameness of procedure. Some objects are universally recognized by man, and probably by most animals, as, for example, the nature of cause, the reality of order. In such cases we are unconscious of the revelation itself, it is born with us, or develops with consciousness, and seems part of our mental make-up. The intuition is internal and partakes of the nature of an assumption until it comes under the analytic eye of science.

But revelation suggests some special theory to be revealed,

¹ *The Idea of Value*, p. 4.

or some special minds to receive the revelation. So we have the chosen peoples; in the case of the Israelites perhaps those capable of receiving certain theological and moral ideas. Such may be the foundation of national distinctions. It is certain that the Chinese races, for instance, have shown themselves more ready to make use of the intuition of the value of un-deviating order than have the Aryans; the Hindu has more clearly before his mind the ultimate value of Peace than the American; the Anglo-Saxon of the value of Variety of experience than the yellow races.

The consideration of special receptacles for special intuitions leads naturally to the subject of genius which in some of its aspects has already been considered. If we cannot always—or ever—believe that special truths have been revealed to men of genius, we may believe that they have a natural talent for receiving intuitive revelation of some particular value. As we have seen, this seems to be especially the case with artists, or more properly speaking, if the word had not been vitiated, with aesthetes.

Revelation of value then may be made universally, or to chosen societies, or chosen individuals, or, if "chosen" is misleading, to societies and individuals whose development has suited them in some particular way to be the subjects of such revelation.

The manner of the revelation is also of interest. It may depend on chance, or on compulsion, or on will. It is clear enough that, if we can believe at all in the inspirational nature of the origin of great scientific or metaphysical ideas, such ideas or intuitions can find lodgment in such minds alone as, by their space-time circumstances and their particular education, can give them meaning. This is emphasized in the history of religion where we are most inclined to accept revelations, in the sense of intuitions of value.

Chance may play an equally important part in the history of the individual genius, as in the history of his race; but if Woolman had not come in contact with slavery, if Da Vinci

had never met the person whose face haunts all his pictures, if Shakespeare had not been compelled to leave Stratford? In all these cases it seems clear to me that something important would still have happened. Woolman was obviously sensitive to moral ideas, as his peculiar clothes and their reason witness, Da Vinci perhaps only by the accident of his age was a great painter rather than a great scientist, Shakespeare must have been great in anything (except perhaps domesticity) to which he put his mind. And so with the people whose individual genius we considered in a previous chapter. It is fairly obvious that every one of them from Rousseau to David and Ford must have been remarkable men if their circumstances had been so different as to preclude that particular outlet for genius which actually presented itself. We must conclude then, that on the whole, there is a type of man who is sensitive to intuition generally, as well as the type who is capable of receiving and developing one revelation, or is sensitive to one value, perhaps at only one period in his life, as we may infer from the number of Elizabethan lyrics of a very high quality which claim almost as many authors, or from Richard II who seems to have had as a boy one gleam of insight into the nature of kingship.

Intuition through direct revelation of value presents another problem in its working: the question with what degree of compulsion it comes. There seems little doubt that if we accept intuitive revelation of value at all it comes to some men and women with compulsion, perhaps even against their wishes. Here we come up against the difficult problem of the subconscious, and I realize that probably the question of compulsion is not at all a simple one: nevertheless on its face value at least, people like Moses, St Paul and Newman, people like Chatterton, and Shelley, and Goethe did experience something of compulsion or inevitability about the realization of value, the first three probably with some touch of resentment and a deliberate attempt to blind their eyes or avoid the issue. And perhaps the same may be true of a more

general revelation of a value novel to men or neglected by them. Waves of realization of the value of liberty, of naked truth, of meticulous order, of adventure, seem to sweep over whole peoples in a way that cannot be wholly explained by an intellectual preparation, nor by "herd" sympathy, and which is resented and resisted by individuals. Or compulsion may manifest itself in another way, not by irresistible storms of feeling but by the gentle lapping in of the tide which seems "no painful inch to gain" and yet persists till its term is reached. The change from a concentration of interest (first in natural unconscious evolution and then in conscious and intense attention) on the social values to one on the personal, which resulted in an intuition of Personality as one of the values, if not the supreme, is an instance in point.

At the other extreme there is the revelation of value which is hard to come by, which has to be sought through long years, fought for and held. Tennyson illustrates the whole matter beautifully and intricately in the allegory of the Holy Grail, from Galahad who had only to seek to find, through Percivale who was always mistaking, to Lancelot who fought, and struggled, and persisted, and did in the end get a dimmed far-off vision. Jacob wrestled with his angel; Matthew Arnold and Housman both record the seeking and the waiting as well as the achievement, and Wordsworth illustrates the same practically.

The same seems true of the gradual revelation through the ages which without a persistent seeking would remain hidden. The idea of the atomic nature of the universe is of no general interest, and of no direct general profit to mankind, yet from Timaeus to Whitehead philosophers have weighed and examined and considered, with the reward, not yet of clear revelation, but of a gradual elucidation which may in the end, perhaps, give us a fuller and clearer intuition of the values of harmony and variety, of the one and the many.

Between the extremes in revelation of value, of those given with compulsion and those secured only with pain and per-

sistence, there lies a zone of indifference. There may be revelation of value which comes at first with compulsion and later with ease. As Hartmann says: "Perhaps all values pass in their realization along the path from commandment to law, from virtue to instinct."¹ We might illustrate from the historic struggles for liberty to the general unquestioned acceptance (in England at least) of the rights of the individual. And so with particular men and women. Many a university professor with just a touch of genius, many a man of letters uses his gifts with no great urge to do so either from the compulsive nature of the gift itself or from his own great desire. Dr Johnson is as good an example as any.

The consideration of compulsion leads naturally to the problem as to how far intuition of value is a matter of will. Do we find through intuition what we have made up our minds to find? and, if so, is what we find a truth or a fiction? The spiritual world for instance. Man is discontented with his lot: with his physical powers—he would like to remove mountains; with his mental powers—he would like to have the natural and the supernatural world spread before his understanding eye, a solved jig-saw puzzle; with his aesthetic powers—he would like to be able to express the ineffable; with his moral powers—he would like all the world to be glad and every man's nature to be developed to its fullest capacity.

It is, first, clearly a question as to whether such wishes are not in themselves intuitions; but, as I have pointed out in considering Perfection as an ultimate value, it is easy to see how reason from experience can give such ideals. Secondly, however, there is the question whether the entertainment of the ideal does not create a reality; whether the persistence of the demand does not create the supply, in short whether a spiritual world is not evolved out of a desire for such things. If we accept any doctrine of creative evolution, there seems no reason so cogent as to forbid its entertainment. On the

¹ *Ethics*, vol. I, p. 129.

other hand there is little enough, beyond the existence of the idea itself of a spiritual world to support it; only the growing accumulation of what in truth cannot be clearly understood without some such assumption; only the degree in which the hypothesis of a spiritual world, or of a spiritual world in the making, elucidates rather than confuses the problems that face the psychologist, the artist, and the metaphysician.

We may put the same question in regard to the value of Order. It is well known that some metaphysicians consider that order is an intellectual desire of the human mind rather than the nature of the external world. Primitive man has a name for each kind of tree, but no general name of "tree"; he has a name and character for each of the small numbers and of some of the more important big ones, but no general name (and so no concept?) for number itself. But civilized man with his highly cultivated intellect sets all these particulars in classes, and the classes again in classes, and can, scientifically, be satisfied in the end only with one final class in which all the others find their due, subordinate and harmonious place, as Smuts has expounded so thoroughly in his *Holism*. Does he get order because he demands it? We know that sitting on the right-hand side of a hall or the left-hand side is not a distinction made by scientific or natural law, yet the order may be conveniently used in playing a game or conducting an experiment. Such an order is useful and so is created. Without suggesting the existence of any such chaos as Milton attempts (and fails) to depict, it is not outside practical metaphysics to put the question whether the will to arrange in scientific order is not evolving a value, at least to a finer issue.

Will as a creator is no new suggestion in philosophy. Religious faith with its resulting miracles is a familiar idea. I have heard, though I have not verified the fact, that among certain Indian sects there is a strong belief in the power of the will to affect both physical nature and the human mind, in a way impossible scientifically; witchcraft, and many sorts of

magic are dependent on a belief in the power of the will to make men and gods do what is required of them. Indeed a large part of primitive religion consists of ceremonies which in their essence are methods of compelling the supernatural powers to do the will of their worshippers. I am not bringing this forward as proof, but as an illustration of the widely spread and deep-seated belief in the power of the will in creating what is valuable: rain, perhaps, with the savage; free will with man. "He found no place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears", is written of Esau, and we realize a man of weak will. Children too are convinced that adults can, if they will, do a thousand things, it is the will that they feel is lacking. It is a fact too that every man's god is his own creation, even if we believe at the same time that that creation is an aspect of the truth. In God we have what we will to have, on the positive side. Negation of course is another matter.

Hypnotic and suggestive powers, though they have been explained scientifically, have never been satisfactorily explained. We still feel that they are a partially unsolved problem of the human mind, and particularly of the human will.

Intuition of value may then come by revelation, and the revelation may be compulsory in its nature, or the result of effort, and that effort may reveal what is, or what may be, or even create the latter. As a persuasion to belief the argument is of the flimsiest, but not, perhaps, quite useless as food for thought and as adding a little to the accumulation of evidence on the nature of intuition of value.

In considering the method of "intuition of value" we have dealt with the form it takes in a reasoned approach to the understanding of value, in teleological vision of value, in direct revelation of value, and in will to value. We have left "feeling", and this seems to be the most likely field of search from the sceptical point of view, and the most general from the positive. The term "Feeling", however, carries no clear and definite meaning; here we use it in the sense of sym-

pathy, a feeling for or with something else, and so, in some sort, a unity or an inclination to unity, not simply emotion. "Thou would'st not think", Hamlet says when he has a premonition of impending disaster, "how ill's all here about my heart." So we may say: "I have a feeling that this is going to be a success"; "He is a man without any feeling for music"; or "You might think him without feeling if you had not seen him in his laboratory"; "He judges by his feelings rather than by reason".

It is obvious that in all these cases we might, were we not (rightly) shy of the word, express the idea more clearly by using the word intuition, since "feeling" is chosen with a deliberate intention of contrasting reason.

We may group such feelings of value under three heads: (a) cosmic feelings, (b) personal, and (c) impersonal feeling. By cosmic feeling I mean a general tendency in the universe or in human nature to recognize and seek some particular value or values such as may be claimed for beauty, morality, holiness throughout nearly the whole history of the human race. It is evident that claiming such universal values as cosmic in Nature does not preclude others less universal in time though still cosmic in Nature, such as the comparatively recent recognition of freedom and personality as of ultimate value.

The personal feeling for values may be understood in two ways: as bare inclination or appetite "we needs must love the highest when we see it", and so morality, art, etc.; and as a definite knowing through emotion such as Whitehead describes, where knowledge comes immediately with sensation or conception, before perception, before reason, so that the mere sight, hearing, idea convey value, definite and conscious sometimes, sometimes indefinite and unconscious, as, for instance, a stone polished and abraded by the sea may be picked up and prized by a savage who is without aesthetic theory and yet is conscious of valuing the stone on sight, or a youth's jumping at the chance of an adventure is an indication of an indefinite and unconscious valuation of variety of experience.

Impersonal feeling of value is more difficult to understand, and, when understood, to accept. Hartmann describes something of the kind when he speaks of "The emotional act of transcending one's own ego".¹ Hartmann uses the phrase when describing the intuitive act of grasping another person's ego, or personality, but psychologists of the Gestalt school have suggested that emotion may be felt outside the ego, that is, while it is of necessity felt by a particular mind in conjunction with a particular body, it has no close relation to that mind-body, that is, to that personality. The idea is strange and difficult, but like so many other strange and difficult things has been foreshadowed in myth and legend. The idea of a wandering or lost soul, with neither mind nor body is familiar in Celtic literature, as is the medium to us all. The fact, if fact it is, of impersonal emotion is too remote for us and too slightly understood by anybody to be valuable in discussing intuition, but we can just see how intuition might conceivably be an arrival at knowledge through impersonal feeling when we have reduced our ego, our personality, to its lowest terms, and have arrived at the state that Schopenhauer, in company with many eastern contemplatives, describes and desires. It savours something of the aloofness of the artist who gets absorbed in his subject until his own personality is for the time suspended. He feels or sympathizes outside himself, he achieves a union in which his own personality, or the whole of his personality is not involved. Charlotte Brontë describes how criticism and expostulation seldom made her alter anything in her novels since her characters said and did what was inevitable; she herself being something of a medium.²

Except for the fact that here it is "feeling" that is being examined as the intuitive agent we have considered these matters before, and we are left at this point with the query as to whether intuition works in all these ways to the same end, namely the immediate recognition of value, or whether

¹ *Ethics*, vol. II, p. 276.

² Mrs Gaskell's *Life*.

they can be reduced to one method, whether for instance it is always "feeling" which is the medium, and "revelation", "vision", "will", only confused ways of describing intuitive feeling. I cannot help thinking that, though intuition in the act may always be of the same nature, the creatures who experience it, the circumstances under which it is possible to act, the objects revealed, are so different as to make for a variety of procedure which is so essential as to be, in fact, a variety in the nature of intuition itself.

Before we leave the subject of the values and their intuition we must consider whether, this being granted, the intuition of any particular value involves an intuition of obligation to act in any particular way.

When we considered the nature of value itself, and when we considered the possibility of "feeling" as the method of intuition we were compelled to include an appetite or desire for unity, in however slight a degree, as part of the nature of intuition itself. This is also true, even emphatically true, in the cases we have mentioned where the compulsive nature of the revelation encounters unwillingness. If we distinguish "sense of obligation" from "necessity" I think that in every case we have in mind there is a suggestion that if we can we ought. This, however, does not necessarily take the form of a simple desire for unity; it may be an obligation to enjoy the revealed value, in an egoistic or an altruistic sense. If we have a very clear realization of the value of Beauty, it is almost inevitably accompanied by a desire either to indulge it, or to share it. As M. Paul Janet says: "nobility is obligatory when one is firmly convinced of the nobility."

Again there is a question of whether an intuition of some possible future value carries with it the obligation to create that value. We have considered the question from one point of view under the heading of "compulsion". There is, however, a difference: a final cause, while it may be understood in such a way as to allow of the entrance of free will in suitable cases, has in the main a fateful and compelling nature.

Obligation implies, not the compulsion of a final cause, but the result of delighted acceptance of the value realized, a delight which may not be deep and lasting enough to result in difficult action but which has a tendency to it.

On the whole it seems true to say that intuition leads to action, and reason to thought or argument. When the two are in conflict it is not often, except in highly trained minds, that reason wins. What often happens is that we follow the dictates of intuition, according to our powers or our vision, and reason attempts to justify us. Most of us recognize something as beautiful, enjoy it, then analyse it and justify our enjoyment. We "feel" that an almsgiving is good, perform it, and justify our action; sceptics, we experience awe at some religious ceremony or in some dedicated^{*} place, analyse our sensations and attempt to justify them.

There is of course the highly cultivated man who knows a picture is good and then proceeds to enjoy it; who realizes that to sense the holy is an experience worth having, seeks it in places likely to produce it and, may be, finds and enjoys it; but such people, familiar as they are nowadays, we feel to be unnatural and (perhaps unfairly) insincere. We may cultivate our impulses in order to ennoble action, but purely reasoned action does not appeal.

All this suggests, though it does not prove, a sense of obligation accompanying intuition of value.

Our one-idea'd examination of the values, when considered in conjunction with our chapters on religious, moral and aesthetic intuition, leads on the whole to the conclusion that it is difficult to accept value at all, and with value teleology, without admitting at any rate the likelihood of some such form of immediate knowing as intuition, and that it is difficult to deny teleology and the resulting values without taking all except the most trivial meaning out of the world. On the other hand, if we accept intuition, we seem to be compelled to accept it in many forms and its appearance in many ways and hardly remain satisfied with the resulting confused variety.

Part Three



Chapter XII

DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS

(1) Intuition is sensation as distinct from perception; that is, it is the most primitive mental function, such as may be experienced by the amoeba or the embryo, or animals when inert or dreaming: it is the vaguest possible awareness as experienced by animal life.

(2) Intuition is a form of thought prior to, or synchronous with sensation, by which the space-time continuum in which sensation, perception, etc., take place, is assumed.

As this may be considered a special sense, or a special quality of mind it may, or may not, find a place under (1).

(3) Intuition is perception as distinct from sensation; that is, it involves the process of interpretation: not merely the sensation of burning, but the recognition of pain in a definite place.

(4) Intuition is the realization of particulars or wholes, as distinct from mere perception; e.g. one may perceive all the different aspects of a chair or a person and have an intuition of a particular chair as one whole, of a friend as one individual, of a varied scene or train of circumstances as picture or novel.

(5) Intuition is feeling or emotion (as distinct from pain and pleasure), and so is a non-intellectual method of being aware, with the corresponding mental reaction to awareness; e.g. through love and the felt attraction to the beloved, or through distaste and the shrinking away from the offender, we have an intuition of the beloved or the disliked object.

(6) Intuition is experience on its mental side. It is a wider function than knowledge since it involves all mental activity from its subjective aspect, and is vaguer than perception and so may lack definiteness and be a more or less shapeless emotion, or "state of mind".

So experience of the Great War involves physical action, but an intuition of the Great War is the mental side of that experience. Or one may have an intuition of warmth or of fear when those experiences are understood from the mental side merely. It follows, then, that experience regarded as an intuition is an abstraction from the fullness of experience which must of necessity have a physical existence.

(7) Intuition is instinct on its mental side. It is a realization or knowledge of the suitable circumstances in which to act in a particular way. The intuition probably precedes the subsequent emotion and activity.

So a child may have an intuition, without analysing the different sensations and perceptions which bring him the intuition, that the circumstances are favourable to feeding, and immediately feel pleasure and proceed to action.

(8) Intuition is any instance of consciousness, be it sensation, perception, conception, feeling, etc.; that is, it is the basis of mentality.

(9) Intuition is the realization of truth, or true fact: that "one and one make two", that "I am a person" are truths that can be realized only by intuition. Even the results of lengthy demonstration are realized ultimately only in this way, i.e. by intuition: as witness the difference between the understanding of an explanation, step by step, and the sudden realization of the fact explained; the following of the words and syntax of a sentence in a foreign language, and the final intuition of its meaning.

The sudden illuminations experienced sometimes by great thinkers (more particularly perhaps scientists and philosophers) and even induction itself would be included in this meaning of intuition though not accounted for by it.

(10) Intuition is the apprehension of reality as opposed to appearance, not as inferred from appearance, as in the case of perception. It is, therefore, often the accompaniment, or even essential, of genius, and of fanaticism.

Since truth is often pragmatic, such intuition may mean the dawn of a new era, as in the case of Christ; or it may mean an untimely birth, as perhaps in the case of the communist intuition, so essentially noble in itself, but leading practically to blood and misery.

(11) Intuition is a "knack of the mind" by which some specially endowed people are able to arrive at conclusions without consciously formulating the premises, as seems to be the case with persons gifted with peculiar calculating powers, with some chess players, and even with men of valuable practical achievement, as, for instance, the engineer and builder of canals, Brindley.

To call this "knack" intuition is, obviously, to plead ignorance.

(12) Intuition occurs when the mental process involved in knowing takes place without the customary physical stimulus, and so mind communicates with mind without the intervention of the body. This is sometimes called telepathy and is not yet scientifically established, nor yet disproved.

(13) Intuition is a general name for all possible ways of understanding, whether intellectual, instinctive, vital, or any other that has been, or will be, derived from these.

This conception of intuition differs from (8) in that it has a wider scope, may be pragmatic in nature, and have a future reference.

(14) Intuition is the unconscious realization preceded by no reasoning process (conscious or unconscious) of what is suitable conduct in a particular and novel situation. It involves, therefore, a reference to the future, and may even be considered as a temporary amalgamation of present and future: "I feel the future in the instant."

This conception of intuition differs fundamentally from (7) since the resulting action is not typical but novel.

(15) Intuition is ineradicable pragmatic belief, conscious or unconscious. Ineradicable, because without such belief the action, or even the life, of the individual would cease to exist; pragmatic, because the belief need not be held theoretically at the same time that it is held in action.

The conviction that we have freedom of will and movement is a typical example. Here again, there is future reference, conscious or unconscious.

(16) Intuition is the conscious or unconscious assumption by the mind, when striving to comprehend the universe, or part of the universe, of certain notions or axioms upon which subsequent reasoning is based. Such notions are: order or system, time sequence, extension in space, change or flux, movement, mentality, etc. It is therefore a sort of endowment of the human, and possibly sub-human, mind, without which its exercise upon facts would be impossible.

This form or notion of intuition differs from (15) in that the ideas involved are necessary to mental action, whereas those described in (15) are necessary to physical and vital action. There are some notions perhaps, as Kant's categorical imperative, which are both unrealized guides to action and the conscious or unconscious foundations of theory.

These concepts would seem to include and be synonymous with the categories except that the categories are always conscious, i.e. they are such notions stated as the foundation of a course of reasoning and are not universally agreed upon, e.g. Aristotle's categories differ from those of Kant, and both from those of Whitehead, though in a perfected philosophy the categories would be indisputable and universal. There may be intuitive notions, not included in the categories, which are peculiar to individuals, and would never, even in a state of perfected knowledge, be universal.

(17) Intuition is the unreasoned apprehension of the future importance of a present event. Socrates seems to have

enjoyed this form of intuition though only in a negative direction. It differs from (14) in that the revelation is conscious and the connection with the future is one rather of reference than of amalgamation and need not urge to personal action.

(18) Intuition is the unreasoned mental guide to betterment or progress.

This conception differs from (17) since it is pragmatic in its nature: it urges to or against action rather than makes a judgment. It may be enjoyed by creatures far below the human standard, possibly even by plants, and so it differs from (14) which involves consciousness, particular persons and particular circumstances, rather than unconscious racial or generic inclination. The "assembling agency" in the embryo (to those who allow any mental agency here) may be considered as an example at intuition's most primitive stage, and the adolescent's effort to break away from parental control the result of a similar intuition at a higher.

(19) Intuition is life as abstracted from living creatures. It is that quality which differentiates the crystal from the plant, the machine from the animal. It involves sensitivity, but the effect of the stimulus is not entirely mechanical as in the case of purely physical or chemical response, but has a general character of spontaneity; neither is it a purely mental manifestation since it is as vigorous and highly developed in the vegetable as in the animal: it is a non-mental way of knowing; a spontaneous way of doing.

(20) Intuition is the faculty by which we recognize the ultimate values: truth, beauty, goodness, etc., or value the particulars that embody them.

The recognition need not be conscious. We may, for instance, wish to bathe in a Cornish bay because it is warm, clean, secluded, without realizing the part played in the desire by the loveliness of the place. On the other hand the recognition may be conscious and even prior to experience as is perhaps the desire for knowledge in some children.

So the recognition of anything as *sub specie aeternitatis* may be considered as a recognition or intuition of its essential value; or the discrimination of one object, or idea, or place, or circumstance as somehow significant, even where the direction of the significance is not realized.

(21) Intuition is an appetite for new experience. It is a valuation of experience itself. This is synonymous with (20) only if experience itself be accepted as an ultimate value. It differs from instinctive intuition since its object is not biological well-being but mental fullness or intensity.

(22) Intuition is imagination: not the faculty which enables us to form new images from old experience, but that which gives us ideas or visions transcending these.

Science reaches its conclusions laboriously by the Method of Difference; imagination leaps to the same conclusions without the demonstration. So Jung by observation and deduction comes to certain conclusions about the nature of the mind, Wordsworth comes to something of the same conclusions, by observation, certainly, but without the aid of the negative instance. He sees what every one is blind to because it is universally present. The scientist is enlightened by the negative instance with which his medical calling brings him in contact; the poet's imagination gives him the vision. "If your eyes were opened ye would see"; "Ye have eyes and ye see not; ears have ye and ye hear not", are the complaints of the man of imagination trying to convince an unimaginative world.

This intuitive vision seems to be possessed by the historian who succeeds in reconstructing the past in such a way as to give it life, as well as form and meaning; and by the scientist or thinker whose labours are rewarded, not by a neat and precise deduction, but by a flash of insight which rearranges his material and indicates an unsuspected solution.

(23) Intuition is the faculty by which we feel truths that are not, or are only partially, truths, at, or for, the present, and that wait on the future for their fulfilment.

This conception, like (22), is of the nature of vision but differs from (22) in its future aspect; no matter how keen the eye, it cannot see what is not there. So, perhaps, a visionary may hardly realize the value, or meaning, or scope of his vision: he may think that his ideas apply to his own contemporary world while a later generation recognizes in them a prophetic utterance of profounder truths. Plato, perhaps, the Hebrew Prophets, Shakespeare, were endowed with this peculiar mixture of imagination with an understanding of the essence of present reality, as well as of its vitality and wholeness.

(24) Intuition is the faculty of knowing what is beyond the domain of demonstration or proof.

So some people "know" that the universe and man with it will not run down like a piece of clockwork and be no more; that there is a spiritual world; that some things have absolute, as distinct from relative, value. This knowledge differs from that described in (15) and (16) since it is not assumption upon which subsequent conduct or reasoning is based, and without which action or thought would be impossible. It is superstructure rather than foundation; the sovereign knowledge, not the minister; the ultimate conclusion, not the working hypothesis. It differs from (22) since it does not await the vindication of time or the scientist.

(25) Intuition is the mental faculty which places us in touch (metaphorically) with what is outside the cosmos, with what is neither mental nor physical, in short, with the spiritual world.

Since the realization of such a world can be gained only through intuition, exposition is impossible. To experience is to believe; or at any rate belief is impossible without experience.

(26) Intuition is God immanent, and so gives us our sense of values, our imagination, our realization of reality as distinct from appearance, our past and future, our vision, our faith, our entrance into unity with a spiritual world.

(27) Intuition is a mental faculty which directs action, whether mental or physical, to a biological end through the subconscious mind.

This conception differs from (7), (14), (15), (17), etc., since it regards intuition as antagonistic or at least indifferent to conscious thought or reason.

(28) Intuition is a mental faculty by means of which a particular mind comes into such close and intimate relation with some external person, or circumstance, or mind, or even with the Absolute itself, as to approach amalgamation or temporary unity. So it may be described as a special sensitivity or understanding.

A musical man hearing a sonata may find his mind in complete temporary accord with that of the composer. Out of a thousand who hear and enjoy the music he alone has understood it. Christ seems to have had the faculty of complete and immediate understanding of quite different personalities: Peter, Judas, Mary Magdalene. Shakespeare's peculiar quality as a dramatist is the way he amalgamates himself so completely with his character that the latter could behave in no other way; he is a complete personality; he is vivified by a real and not a fictitious life. A man of Hamlet's make up would, under such circumstances, become, just so much, and in such a manner, mentally unbalanced—but Shakespeare himself would not. It is a special understanding, not a self—or any other—portrait, an intuition of a diverse but real personality.

Such a faculty would seem to pertain to genius, and both artistic and religious geniuses lay a special claim to it. It is sometimes considered, as by Schopenhauer, to be attained through long and concentrated contemplation which, by its intensity, nullifies the ego and absorbs the subject into the object. Magic makes use of it in such rites as we are told are practised to this day in Haiti where girl and goat, after prolonged contemplation, share personalities, and the girl is sacrificed in the goat. Dante illustrates the idea in his hideous

conception of the sympathetic corporal and mental union of Judas Iscariot and the Serpent.

The pathologist is very familiar with the phenomenon.

(29) Intuition is that special form of knowing whose object is the self. It carries with it the peculiar intimacy of introspection as discriminated from inspection of the not-self, but, unlike introspection, it does not view the self externally as though it were the not-self, that is, with an attempt to negate the effects of prejudice, but in such a way as to amalgamate subject and object; that is, it is the object that intuits as well as the subject, which, in its turn, is intuited: object and subject are one.

This is perhaps a variety of (28).

(30) Intuition is the assumption, for practical purposes, of a final end or ends, and is equally essential in every aspect of being: in matter, where it takes the form of physical and chemical laws; in life, where it is more clearly seen in the behaviour which governs preservation and evolution; in mind, where a future is assumed.

It is, in short, the principle of teleology.

(31) Intuition is a non-existent mental function, the word being loosely used to express some other function or combination of functions not clearly analysed, as for instance rapid synthetic judgment, or that interaction of emotion and reason which gives rise to a type of conviction peculiarly firm on account of the fact that it is in reality supported by reason though apparently only by feeling.

Or the word may be used simply to avoid clear thinking. From what has been said in the earlier sections of this book, it is obvious that the word "intuition" has been used by serious and thoughtful writers in so many different senses that it has no clear meaning outside its immediate context, and often not in it. The foregoing definitions and descriptions, and, I have no doubt, a great many more, are all obtainable from the use made of the word in the writings of such men, and consequently, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that either

the meaning of the term should be made definite, or it should be expunged from philosophical literature. On the other hand its constant and varied use, as of other terms which fall under the same indictment, such as "subjective" or "sub-conscious", suggests that there are ideas in men's minds that not only need clarifying but are necessary to an understanding of the truth, or the partial truth that we are all trying to formulate, that, in short, there is a present necessity to express something which is vaguely implied by "intuition".

It is clear that the thirty-one foregoing descriptions can be grouped in such a way that the more essential differences in meaning stand out.

Definitions (1) to (8) and (13) describe the normal functioning of the mind in the process of realizing, and attempt to give a name to the primal mental fact which is not explicable by chemical change, reflex action, conditioned response, etc., but involves real mental activity and initiative. Whether this primal knowing is found in its simplest form in sensation, or perception, or conception, or feeling, or whether in all of them, there is undoubtedly something which takes place when facts become knowledge, and this something undoubtedly requires a name.

The essential ideas at the basis of all usage of the word "intuition" are (a) knowing, i.e. mental action; (b) immediacy, i.e. the knowing that cannot be explained as the outcome of previous knowing, or a process of knowing, but is characterized by an isolation from other mental facts; (c) inexplicableness: "Intuition" always carries with its utterance a flavour of mystery or miracle. We can "know because", but not intuitively. This really follows from (b); (d) Truth: in spite of the fact that we do accept such expressions as "doubtful intuition", "conflicting intuitions", we only use the word when we mean to imply that knowledge, not opinion or deduction, is in question, and such epithets as "doubtful", "conflicting" are used to describe the in-

definiteness, vagueness, or *apparent* contradictoriness of the truth intuited, rather than its falsity.

Now primal awareness has a place in perception, conception, the mental side of instinct, etc., and what is common to all knowing, whether it be the most primitive sensation or the most elaborate conclusion to a mathematical argument, appears to be just those qualities what lie at the basis of all usages of the term intuition. Premises certainly lead up to the conclusion of a judgment, but they do not provide the mental act by which the conclusion is understood; that act is in itself immediate; it is the spark from heaven, it is the flash of lightning that makes clear what has been only partially understood sounds and touches; it is miraculous; we cannot explain how a series of sensations suddenly has meaning and is fact, not, certainly, necessarily truth in the sense of "correspondence truth", but truth in the sense of real experience.

It seems then that there is something in common to all kinds of knowing, and that this something carries the attributes of what is found in all usages of the term intuition.

We must agree then that here is a consistent and useful meaning to the word.

Definitions (10) to (12) and (14) to (30) all describe what in our present state of knowledge may be called abnormal ways of knowing, and are in contradiction or antagonism to normal mental working, or an antagonism is felt towards it by people thinking along normal lines. Though the characteristics of knowing, of immediacy, of truth are all present as in the previous group, the quality that is especially present to the mind when using the word in any of these senses is that of inexplicability. Normally we draw our conclusions from appearance. We feel antagonistic to the man who "knows" in spite of appearance: we feel he is contradicting and insulting our own intelligence. So there is a certain scepticism and contempt for the boy who can give the product of great numbers without understanding or being able to explain the process. The gift may be useful but it is abnormal, inexpli-

cable, and so in some way inferior. So with telepathy: its outstanding quality is its mystery and its abnormality brings with it a certain uneasiness, dissatisfaction; we shall not be content until we can explain it, i.e. reduce it to the normal.

The intuition which inspires to suitable conduct or response under novel circumstances might be thought, in spite of its abnormality, to be free from all taint of contradiction or antagonism. But this is not so. Men speak with apparent respect, or at least indulgence, of "feminine intuition", but they do not desire to possess it; they have a much greater respect for their own "sound judgment"; and, on the other hand, a certain impatience and contempt is undoubtedly felt by people, who, possessing this power, are asked to explain how they know. The scientific desire, even determination, to reduce this intuition to normal, though obscure, processes of deduction, illustrates at once its abnormality, and the natural antipathetic reaction to abnormality.

In some of the definitions immediacy takes the form of inexplicable endowment. The abnormality of contradictoriness is apparent in that the intuition may be maintained in the face of a clearly reasoned opposite conclusion, as with free will, system, mentality. "The lunatic, the lover and the poet are of imagination all compact", says Shakespeare, illustrating at once the reaction of the normal man to any abnormal mental activity, and the amused contempt of the poet at the reaction of the normal man.

Just as in the first group of definitions we found a common denominator in the elements of primal or fundamental knowing, while the other essentials to any meaning of the word intuition were present, here we have the essential and common element in the miraculous nature of the knowing, the other qualities being still present though not emphasized.

While, however, in the first case there seems to be a real need for that word, or some other to express just that notion, it is doubtful whether a term to express what is commonly emphasized in the second group would have any scientific

value, at any rate in the present state of psychological knowledge.

Definitions (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (21), (23), (27), (30) all lay emphasis on a future reference. They are flavoured with teleology. Here it is not the immediacy, or the inexplicability, or the truth which is emphasized, though all these ideas are present in each case; it is the knowing, and the felt emphasis lies in the fact that the knowing is of a peculiar kind: it is not a value in itself but as a means to an end. The intuition of the right way to behave is valuable because of possible future contingencies; so the idea of life in its last abstraction is a mental and physical striving towards a future.

Here we have a notion of very particular value at the present day when philosophy, and, to some extent, psychology too, seems to be in reaction or even rebellion against the purely mechanic theories of the cosmos. If, in truth, we live in a "realm of ends", if we are advancing through the mechanical and mental towards the spiritual and divine, either as individuals or in the race, or even if we are advancing only towards a finer or more intense physical and mental structure; if, in short, the future for the universe is anything other than a repetition of the past and the present; if there is order and method in its evolution, then the Final Cause must again take a first place in philosophy, and the feeling, or recognition of that Final Cause, whether conscious or unconscious, is of sufficient importance to deserve a name, and "Intuition" with its suggestion of immediate knowledge, inexplicable but reliable, seems a very suitable term to distinguish this teleological type of knowing from the normal which may perhaps be quite simply and adequately called "knowing", and which would rightly include intuition with this meaning of knowing—brought-into-being-by-a-final-cause.

The difficulty of limiting the term to such a usage, however, is that it does not agree with that of many great thinkers, while the phrase "teleological intuition" would find a readier acceptance.

Definitions (7), (20), (21), (24), (25), (29) imply that the peculiarity of intuitive knowing is its object. Other forms of knowing deal with what comes to us directly or indirectly through the sense; intuitive knowledge with that with which the senses can never come in contact.

They postulate a spiritual world which lies outside the cosmos as generally or scientifically understood, but not outside the possibility of knowledge since intuition discovers it to us.

Since men do not yet seem agreed to abandon all faith in a transcendental world, whether understood as Tom, Dick and Harry, or as scholars and artists, understand it, there seems to be a sheer necessity for some term to express a form of knowing which however vague, indefinite or partial, is an essential of the mental life of a large number of people. Whether or no this intuitive knowledge of the undeducible will ultimately be analysed into humbler and commoner forms of knowledge, at the moment such an analysis has not taken place to universal satisfaction, and, until it has, we need some term with which to express the idea.

In this sense intuitive knowledge still bears the qualities of immediacy, inexplicability, reliability, but differs from the other uses in the fact that its object is not material nor mental but spiritual.

We have then, as a result of this analysis, four main usages of the term "Intuition":

(1) Intuition is the essential mental act involved in any knowing.

(2) Intuition is an abnormal method of knowing based neither on the senses nor on deduction, and inexplicable as to its working.

(3) Intuition is teleological knowing or knowledge inspired or partially inspired by the future or a final cause.

(4) Intuition is the method by which the mind enjoys certain objects unattainable by sensation or reason.

Though (4) may seem to be involved in (2) the difference

between the knowledge whose object is the cosmos, and knowledge whose object involves the conception of a spiritual world, is so essential as to make two clear varieties.

It is obvious that (2), (3) and (4) are species of (1). Of these it is clear that only (1) is a generally accepted fact. We must admit, if we argue at all, that there is the mental activity of knowing. On the other hand we need not admit the reality of (2), (3) or (4). We may argue with both conviction and reason that all these may be explained away.

If, however, we limit ourselves to our acceptance of (1) it is clear that in reality we have rejected intuition as a peculiar form of knowing, since the addition of the epithet "intuitive" adds nothing to the idea of simple knowing, though it emphasizes some of its aspects. We have then arrived at description (31) which denies the existence of intuition as distinct from any other form of knowledge.

The fact remains, however, that these three notions of intuition are still widely held, and widely defended, and the interest of a systematization of their meanings lies far more in their justification than in their negation. A careless dismissal of what is intensely felt and persistently defended is not philosophic. The evidence before us which points to more than one, to at least three, and perhaps more, varieties of immediate knowing would seem to encourage research into this difficult and evasive problem.

Chapter XIII

CONCLUSION

IF then we make a final definition which will include, though not necessarily include, all the definitions and descriptions of the previous chapter, we arrive at the bare bones of intuition. With such a summary definition in mind we may sum up our conclusions under the heads of:

- I. Positive statements which we may expect every one to accept.
- II. Statements and beliefs about intuition which most people will consider to have been disproved.
- III. Conclusions about intuition which may be drawn, but with a large degree of improbability.
- IV. Conclusions about intuition which may be drawn with varying degrees of probability.
- V. Residual problems.

We offer the two following definitions as reducing intuition to its lowest terms:

- A. "An intuition is an immediate awareness by a subject, of some particular entity, without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for that awareness."
- B. "Intuition is a method by which a subject becomes aware of an entity without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for such awareness."

In both cases "entity" is used in its widest possible significance so as to include: idea, fact, situation, indeed any one individual particular of any nature whatever from a brick or the memory of a sound, to a society or the Absolute itself.

It will be noticed that in the first case intuition is used as a name for the awareness itself, and in the second as a name for

the method of becoming aware; and the same thing occurs in nearly all accounts and discussions of intuition. I think there is no ensuing confusion. We think thoughts and intuit intuitions, and if "intuition" is often, by custom, used instead of the less familiar "to intuit" or "intuiting", the practice is reprehensible only when it gives rise to ambiguity.

Keeping in mind, then, these definitions, what positive conclusions can we legitimately draw from our previous examinations and discussions?

I think we may safely draw the following:

I. *Positive conclusions:*

(1) There is undoubtedly an intuitive method and immediate intuitive awareness on which reason and all other forms of knowing are dependent.

(2) No form of intuition other than this fundamental act of knowing is universally acknowledged.

(3) Intuition is not alternative to reason: its minimum function is to form a basis for reason, and its wider functions (if any) to deal with what is inaccessible to reason.

(4) There is no necessary dependence of intuition on reason.

(5) Intuition is not antagonistic to reason but the two are alien, one appearing natural and the other supernatural to the ordinary mind when considering the two.

(6) The object of every intuition has some vital significance for the intuiting subject. Intuition has not the power possessed by reason of playing with or experimenting with impersonal ideas or facts, as reason does, in games for instance. The intuition is a necessity if only as a basis for reason to work on.

(7) The objects of intuition are wholes or particulars of any degree of simplicity or complexity.

(8) They are, nevertheless, limited in scope from one point of view since, though even a process itself may be an individual thing and so be intuited, yet the particular character

of intuition in presenting to the mind individualized wholes negatives the possibility of that more or less vague background of premise, circumstance, and sensation which always accompanies the conclusion of reason and the meanings of perceptions.

(9) The isolated individuality of the object combined with the immediate nature of the knowing found in intuition gives a peculiar feeling of unity between subject and object. This may be felt in varying degrees according to the nature of subject and object, but always in a degree which makes it a marked characteristic of intuition.

(10) The knowledge brought by intuition is reliable though it may subsequently be misused by reason. The absence of any deductive or interpretative or other steps between subject and object renders this reliability not only possible but exceedingly probable.

(11) The knowledge gained by intuition is private in its nature in so far as the intuition cannot be conveyed to another subject, though the knowledge itself may be used as an instrument of reason. Universal intuition would then be consistent with only a solipsistic view of mind. Solipsism, in fact, assumes only intuitive knowledge, its apparent reasoning being merely immediate intuitions.

(12) An intuition is not attainable at will.

(13) There are two types of object which may be acquired by intuition:

(a) that common to all minds capable of intuition, e.g. intuition of the self;

(b) that which can be conveyed only to a suitable subject, e.g. a work of art; a reasoning process.

(14) There are two varieties of intuition itself:

(a) where the object is realized;

(b) where the object is unrealized but assumed, e.g. the reality of the self. This lack of realization is peculiar to the intuition and may disappear when the analytic powers of reason come into play.

(15) There is (so far) no sure method of distinguishing between ideas acquired directly through immediate intuition and those acquired through reason or perception working on an intuitive foundation.

Unless we put the negative conclusions on the above list into a positive form there are not many relevant propositions which we can claim to have been absolutely disproved. The following however may, I think, make such a claim.

II. *Disproved propositions:*

(1) That there is only one way in which the human mind acquires knowledge apart from the fundamental cognitive act.

(2) That intuition is valuable only in the absence of reason.

(3) That intuition is a declining faculty of the mind.

(4) That a large number of ideas claimed by their subjects to have been gained through intuition has been so acquired, and not an intuition of a general truth projected on to a particular fact, e.g. Cowper's "intuitions" of salvation and damnation; many superstitions.

While the following propositions cannot claim to have been absolutely disproved, I think that they have been shown to be highly improbable.

III. *Improbable propositions:*

(1) That intuition gives direct inspiration to particular actions, or ideas, or feelings without universal ideas, or tendencies (natural laws), or vision acting as intermediaries.

(2) That intuition is a means of communicating the will of a personal God to a particular mind.

(3) That intuition as a method of the mind in acquiring knowledge is limited, or even largely limited, to sections of humanity, e.g. to women rather than to men; to Eastern rather than to Western peoples; to artists than to scientists. On the contrary, if there is any type of intuition other than that which is the foundation of any knowing, it would seem

to be the gift of individuals rather than of classes. Or perhaps it would be truer to say that such classes have not yet been satisfactorily discriminated.

(4) That the gift of intuition can be cultivated.

Interest, however, must centre on the propositions which though possibly true are neither proved nor disproved on the one hand, nor (in the light of our examination and argument) improbable on the other. These are many, and almost any list must necessarily be incomplete. The following are possibilities (sometimes contradictory) that have emerged in the course of my study on the subject of intuition. Some are much more probable than others and achieve for me a sojourning belief; others are little more than interesting possibilities.

IV. *Possible conclusions on the subject of intuition:*

(1) That intuition has a wider scope and more varied function than that implied in the definition offered at the beginning of the chapter, i.e. that intuition sometimes works without any essential partnership with reason or perception.

(2) That there are two kinds of such immediate intuition as is described in (1): (a) where the objects are universal, or universally acknowledged when understood; and (b) where the object is enjoyed by only one particular mind. "Cause" or "responsibility" may be given as examples of (a) and the beauty of a particular tree blown by a particular wind in a particular light, or the meaning of a certain general situation for one particular person will serve as examples of (b).

(3) That (2) (a) may be subdivided into:

- A. What may be called particular universal intuitions such as Kant's categorical imperative.
- B. What may be called general universal intuitions, or concepts, such as "goodness".

(4) That intuition gives us insight into reality as opposed to, or supplementing appearance. An example of the first is an intuition of the values as opposed to the meaningless

automatic appearance of the march of life, and of the second the intuition of free will to supplement its apparent reality and resist the attacks of reason.

(5) That intuitions differ in degree rather than kind. That our commoner and simpler intuitions are of the superficial nature of reality which has to be understood in order to preserve life; while we may by intuition penetrate deeper and deeper into the meaning and nature of reality, through the "values", to a possible final absorption, to a complete sympathetic understanding.

(6) That, on the other hand, while intuitions may be considered to vary in degree rather than in kind, the result may be an infinitely progressing realization of variety in the creative possibilities of the universe.

(7) That intuition is a guide to action rather than to thought. This idea brings it very close to instinct, but allows of novelty of situation unknown to instinct.

(8) That intuition is a subconscious, or preconscious working of the normal mind rather than a different type of working. Prince Metternich with his clear, logical, practical mind gives us a vivid example of an experience which may be so interpreted: "I don't sleep always equally well. When an idea has exclusive possession of my mind I often wake up. . . . It is then I feel all the weight I have to carry, and find it beyond my strength. Difficulties and embarrassments assault me; but at the end I always hear an interior voice which rises up against all the obstacles. I imagine myself, then, becoming greater, and I end by thinking myself immense. It is that, in the hours when the soul is undistracted by external objects, everything runs to extremes. I go to sleep again, tired, and in the morning, upon waking up, I find in my head a plan all prepared. This plan was not conceived by my intellect but born in some sort of itself."¹

(9) That intuition brings with it a certain degree of com-

¹ *Autobiography of Prince Metternich* (translated by Napier, 1880), vol. III, p. 251.

pulsion to action. This seems true whether we confine intuition to the definition at the beginning of this chapter or allow it a larger scope. In the first case the intuition of a fact does seem to act as a spur to reason to make use of that piece of knowledge. This, of course, may very well be considered as the essentially active nature of reason itself. If, on the other hand, we accept an intuition which works independently of reason and perception, a sense of obligation seems nearly always to accompany its revelation, if only an obligation to continue in contemplative enjoyment.

(10) That intuition is largely teleological in its motives, and is the minister of final causes. It has in consequence a prophetic aspect.

(11) That intuition is an endowment of specially gifted people and follows rather than precedes rational thought, and is the crown of reason.

(12) That such intuition (11) rather than reason introduces novelty into the mental world.

(13) That the main function of intuition is a recognition of the values (as developed in Chapter XI).

(14) That it is intuition rather than perception or reason that connects man (*homo sapiens*) with a spiritual world.

It is very obvious that from whatever side we have approached intuition we have come up against a wall of blank ignorance. Doors, however, can be made in walls, even if a little destruction in solid masonry has to occur, even if the general plan of the estate has to be modified. It cannot be that a subject so vital to the understanding of our fellows and ourselves will be left in its present vague formulation, practically just asserted or denied.

The main problems are psychological, and modern research is along lines which would seem to run in a direction where intuition may be found.

It seems to me that the emotions are the most likely fields to work in; not their analyses, nor their dependence on or independence of the body; nor their modes of expression;

though all these aspects are of absorbing interest; but, from the point of view of intuition, more particularly, perhaps, their functions and powers, their connection with mind rather than body, their regions of influence.

The metaphysical problems which a more thorough, or even any, knowledge of intuition would help to solve are mostly the old familiar ones: the question as to whether the world is an Absolute, static and eternal, or a progressive creative flux; the question of whether the universe is the creation of a mind and all its apparent variety the vagaries of that mind (solipsism), or objective and divine in its nature; the problem of the origin of the concept.

And so on.

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